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How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of Europeanization

Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl

European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 3 (1999) N° 7; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-007a.htm

Date of Publication in : 15.6.1999

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The Knill/Lehmkuhl paper ”How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of Europeanization” is a further indicator that the impact of European integration on domestic politics and domestic institutions of the member states is finally getting the attention of EU scholars. I expect that this area of research will expand considerably in the years to come. While Knill and Lehmkuhl seek to contribute to this new area of research, I find several shortcomings in their theoretical arguments. Knill and Lehmkuhl develop a general model on how to assess the impact of Europeanization depending on the type of integration (positive, negative, “framing”). The first problem with this framework is that “framing integration” – defined as changing the beliefs of domestic actors – is hardly a separate category from positive or negative integration. Any Europeanization effort might or might not change the beliefs of domestic actors. The example provided only underlines the point. Railways is an example of negative integration. The difference to road haulage concerns the degree of discretionary leeway left to the member states rather than a difference in “framing” potential.

Second, Knill and Lehmkuhl argue that institutional compatibility explains the domestic adaptation patterns in cases of positive integration, while the redistribution of resources available to domestic actors is the primary adaptation mechanism in cases of negative integration. These claims are problematic on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, I don’t quite understand why Europeanization should re-distribute power resources among domestic actors, if there is no misfit between European rules and regulations, on the one hand, and the “domestic way of doing things,” on the other. Domestic Actors who want to change domestic institutional arrangements, will not be empowered by the EU if the EU rules are compatible with those domestic rules. The project directed by Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and myself on “Europeanization and Domestic Change” (forthcoming) to which Knill and Lehmkuhl refer in their paper, addresses the impact of European integration on domestic structures in a three-step approach. These three steps encompass all mechanisms identified by Knill and Lehmkuhl’s table 1, but place them in a sequential order rather than ordering them according to type of integration:

1. Europeanization, i.e., the policies, rules, and regulations emanating from “Europe.”
2. Degree of adaptational pressure, i.e., the extent to which Europeanization is compatible with domestic institutional arrangements or requires change. The higher the “misfit,” the greater the adaptational pressure for change. But misfit by no means guarantees institutional change, not even in cases of positive integration with little discretionary leeway, as Knill and Lehmkuhl seem to believe.
3. Adaptational change, if any, depending on mediating institutions and/or actors’ strategies. Our project identified several such factors which are also mentioned in the Knill and Lehmkuhl paper (e.g., presence or absence of institutional veto points; facilitating institutions; redistribution of power and resources among domestic actors; elite learning; cooperative decision-making culture to overcome veto points, etc.).

Empirically, our case studies which cover a wide variety of European policies – from telecommunications and transport to territorial politics, business-government relations, and collective identities – disconfirm that the neat distinction between positive and negative integration makes any difference in accounting for domestic change. First, the degree of adaptational pressure varies widely and has much more to do with entrenched institutional arrangements in the EU member states than with the type of integration. Second, the mediating factors determining the domestic response diverged enormously across cases and again, irrespective of negative or positive integration. In conclusion, we found that Fritz Scharpf’s distinction between these two types of integration is not particularly helpful in explaining the patterns of domestic institutional change in response to European integration.

Thus, while Knill and Lehmkuhl posit an interesting argument, empirical case studies found in the Cowles et al. project appear to disconfirm their model. It is clear that further work on the impact of Europeanization on domestic politics and institutions is necessary.

Prof. Thomas Risse, European University Institute, Florence

(The papers from the Cowles et al. project on “Europeanization and Domestic Change” are available on the internet: http://www.iue.it/Personal/Risse/oprisse.htm)

While highly appreciating the initiative of Risse to comment on our paper "How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of Europeanization". We fully share his statement that further research is necessary in order to understand the domestic impact of European integration. However, we strongly disagree on the substance and content of his arguments.

First, Risse seeks to criticise the distinction of Europeanization mechanisms as proposed in our paper, arguing that "framing integration" can hardly be separated from other Europeanization mechanisms. This argument cannot be considered as being very convincing for several reasons:

• We have clearly emphasised in our paper that our distinction of different Europeanization mechanisms is based on analytical rather than empirical or nominal considerations, hence viewing the different mechanisms as ideal types.
• We have emphasised that although elements of these different mechanisms of Europeanization can be identified in almost every European policy, different policy types are characterised by a varying mixture of these mechanisms, with different logics dominating in different policy types. Our railways example is a good case in point: The European Directive in question certainly has to be placed in the overall context of negative integration. However, given its very limited legal and institutional requirements in favour of market liberalisation, it hardly changes institutional opportunity structures for domestic players (as it is the case in road haulage), but basically follows a merely cognitive logic of framing integration. Rather than prescribing concrete outcomes or substantially altering institutional opportunity structures, this policy is designed to change the domestic political climate by stimulating and strengthening the overall support for broader European reform objectives.

Second, Risse does not agree with our argument that different mechanisms of Europeanization make a difference for the explanatory relevance of different approaches, emphasising that the domestic impact of Europe can be explained by his "tree-step approach", regardless of policy type and Europeanization logic at work.

We strongly disagree on that point, especially with respect to his statement that the degree of European adaptation pressure ("goodness of fit") is of universal explanatory relevance for each integration type.

• Our claim that the degree of adaptation pressure is of limited explanatory relevance in cases of negative integration can be illustrated by the impact of European road haulage policy in France. Although there was a complete fit of French arrangements with European liberalisation policies (as France had liberalised its road haulage market long before the respective European Directive was enacted), the European policy had a considerable domestic impact. Paradoxically, it strengthened the position of those actors opposing the domestic liberalisation activities, hence leading to far-reaching re-regulation activities in France (see the chapters of Douillet/Lehmkuhl and Hèritier/Knill in Hèritier et al. forthcoming). In other words: Although the adaptation pressure was zero, EU policies did have a strong domestic impact (!), which can only be understood when analysing the impact of these policies on domestic opportunity structures. So what is the explanatory value of the degree of adaptation pressure in these cases?
• In our view, the limited explanatory value of the adaptation pressure/goodness of fit concept can be traced to systematic peculiarities of different Europeanization mechanisms. Institutional pressure for domestic adaptation can attributed only to such European policies which actually prescribe or define such requirements. This is generally the case for (ideal type) policies of positive integration. As we demonstrate in our paper, the degree of adaptation pressure is of important explanatory relevance in order to understand domestic adaptation patterns, although it may hardly determine these patterns (in so far Risse misinterprets our argumentation) (see for further details on the explanatory scope of the adaptation pressure concept Knill 1998).

By contrast, where European policies do not prescribe such concrete adaptation requirements (as it is the case in ideal type policies of negative and framing integration), it does not make much sense to speak of European adaptation pressure. This does not exclude that subsequently such pressure might emerge as a result of regulatory competition invoked by European market liberalisation. However, this way, adaptation pressure emerges not from direct institutional requirements of European policies, but from the impact of these policies on domestic opportunity structures. Exactly this aspect; i.e. the limited benefits of the goodness of fit argument in cases of negative integration becomes apparent in our above-mentioned example.

Thus, while Risse seeks to challenge our argumentation on the basis of a universally applicable "three-step approach", his criticism seems to be not very convincing, neither from a theoretical nor from an empirical perspective. In order to understand the domestic impact of European integration, a more differentiated perspective is necessary.

Dr. Christoph Knill, Dr. Dirk Lehmkuhl,
Max-Planck Project Group "Common Goods: Law, Politics and Economics", Bonn

References

Héritier, Adrienne, Dieter Kerwer, Christoph Knill, Dirk Lehmkuhl, Michael Teutsch, Anne-Cécile Douillet (forthcoming). 'Differential Europe. New Opportunities and Constraints for Domestic Policy-Making.'

Knill, Christoph (1998). European Policies. The Impact of National Administrative Traditions. Journal of Public Policy, 18, 1, 1-29.