Time to Decide: The Effect of Early Agreements on Legislative Duration in the EU

Dimiter Doychinov Toshkov, Anne Rasmussen

Abstract


The increased use of early agreements in the EU co-decision procedure raises the concern that intra and inter-institutional political debate is sacrificed for the sake of efficiency. We investigate the effect of early agreements (trilogues) on the time it takes for legislation to be negotiated during the first reading of co-decision. We find that the first reading negotiations of trilogues on salient legislation take longer than first readings of similar files reconciled at second and third reading. First readings of early agreements also appear to last longer when considering all co-decision files submitted to the 5th and 6th European Parliaments, but the effect is masked by a general increase in first reading duration after 2004. We conclude that even if early agreements restrict access of certain actors to decision making, they allow for more time for substantive debate at the first reading stage than similar files reconciled later in the legislative process.

Keywords


co-decision procedure; Council of Ministers; early agreements; European Commission; European Parliament; institutionalization; legislative procedure; joint decision making

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