

Synergies and Tradeoffs in International Cooperation: Broadening, Widening, and Deepening

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Abstract

International cooperation rests on state preferences with regard to the substantive scope, geographical range, and institutional depth of issue-specific devices to over-come collective action problems. Substantive broadening, geographical widening, and institutional deepening are the elixir of life of the European Union. As is familiar from international cooperation more in general, and not only from European integration, this rests upon a complex process of bargaining among states, each of which has its particular preferences. This paper explores two hypotheses about the relationship between preferences on broadening, widening, and deepening. The first hypothesis assumes that the relationship is characterized by a virtuous cycle, while the second hypothesis assumes that there are tradeoffs rather than synergies. By looking at a sample of 24 distinct case studies from a specific policy field, namely international cooperation against drugs, the paper shows that, at least in this particular policy field, state preferences follow a synergetic pattern of broadening, widening, and deepening.

Kurzfassung

Internationale Zusammenarbeit beruht auf staatlichen Präferenzen hinsichtlich der inhaltlichen Breite, geographischen Weite und institutionellen Tiefe sachbezogener Arrangements zur Lösung von Problemen kollektiven Handelns. Inhaltliche Verbreiterung, geographische Erweiterung und institutionelle Vertiefung sind das Lebenselixier der Europäischen Union. Aus der internationalen Zusammenarbeit ganz allgemein, und nicht nur aus der Europäischen Integration, ist bekannt, dass dies auf einem komplexen Aushandlungsprozess zwischen Staaten beruht, von denen jeder eigene Präferenzen hat. Dieses Papier untersucht zwei Hypothesen über die Beziehung zwischen Präferenzen über Verbreiterung, Erweiterung und Vertiefung. Die erste Hypothese geht von einem synergetischen Zusammenhang aus, während die zweite Hypothese negative Effekte betont. Dieses Papier zeigt, auf der Grundlage von 24 Fallstudien aus dem Bereich der Drogenbekämpfung, dass zumindest auf diesem speziellen Gebiet der internationalen Zusammenarbeit die staatlichen Präferenzen einem synergetischen Muster von Verbreiterung, Erweiterung und Vertiefung folgen.

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Introduction [↑]

International institutions are created to meet a variety of challenges. To tackle these challenges, states broaden the scope of their activities, enlarge their membership base, and reform the institutional setup of international regimes and organizations. This is in line with a more general feature of human organizations, from neighborhood associations and self-help groups to industrial companies and international organizations: they are all distinguished by a complex relationship between the scope of their activities, the range of their membership base, and the depth of members' commitment. In a word, any organization is shaped by a specific relationship among the following three components: substantive scope, membership range, and institutional depth.

In such a perspective, organizational growth means deeper collaboration and wider membership for the achievement of more substantive goals. From an optimistic viewpoint, the three components are mutually reinforcing. A pessimist, however, would object that it is not less plausible to assume tradeoffs rather than synergies between substantive scope, membership range, and institutional depth. Either way, there seems to be a familiar mechanism at work here. Actors have preferences which they cannot realize without collective action; based on these preferences they shape and re-shape social structures; once these social structures are in place, they shape and re-shape the actors themselves and their preferences (Giddens 1984; Wendt 1987).

European integration is a standard example. Over various decades, the European Community has considerably expanded its institutional depth and membership range, while increasing its competencies to policy fields that were previously regarded as the exclusive prerogative of national regulation and control. There has been a constant increase of the substantive scope, geographical range, and institutional depth of European integration. Of course this does not mean that European integration is necessarily and always a good thing. However, European integration is an ideal object to study the complex relationship between substantive scope, membership range, and institutional depth. Both in the theory and in the practice of European integration, substantive broadening, geographical widening and institutional deepening have been, and are still, the nuts and bolts of the permanent reform initiated in the mid-1960s.

The crunch question, however, is whether there are synergies or rather tradeoffs between broadening, widening, and deepening. Concerns about inappropriate timing and counterproductive integration mechanisms, as well as the weak impetus for institutional reforms have initiated a broad political discussion. Pessimists treat the prospects for significant progress with skepticism. Nevertheless it is significant that, despite these concerns, up until now European integration has been moving on. After the accession of ten new member states in 2004, however, the intricate interdependence and harmonious evolution of the three dimensions is more than ever crucially important for the proper performance of the EU, and possibly even for its future existence. If the pessimists are right, the European Union must be careful not to shipwreck in the “Bermuda triangle” of substantive broadening, geographical widening, and institutional deepening. If the pessimists are wrong, the prospects look much better.

In the [first section](#) of the article we define and explore, with particular regard to European integration, the relationship between substantive broadening, geographical widening, and institutional deepening. We formulate two competing hypotheses, the first assuming a virtuous and the second assuming a vicious circle between the dimensions. In the [second section](#), we narrow down the object of our analysis to state preferences with regard to each of the three dimensions. The [third section](#) is dedicated to the selection of case studies. The objective is to conduct a structured, focused, and historical comparison (Mahoney 2003; George and Bennett 2005) of the preferences of the four largest EU member states in a particularly salient policy field: the international fight against drugs. In the [fourth section](#) we run a formal analysis of our dataset, which is specially designed to assess the two hypotheses against each other. It turns out that, at least in the policy field examined, there are more synergies than tradeoffs between preferences on substantive scope, geographical range, and institutional depth. We also discuss whether and to what extent our findings can be generalized.

1. European Integration: Virtuous or Vicious Circle?

As already mentioned, organizational growth in the EU depends on the triangulation of substantive broadening, geographical widening, and institutional deepening.

1. The first dimension (broadening) encompasses the increase of the substantive political remit with which the organization is endowed.
2. The second dimension (widening) refers to the accession of new member states and their integration into the existing organization.
3. The third dimension (deepening) comprises any increase of the organization’s authority vis-à-vis the individual member states.

For the supporters of European integration, there is (or should be) a virtuous circle of organizational growth. Against this, Euro-skeptics point to possible tradeoffs. In their view, an increase in substantive scope will eventually make it more difficult to reach a common denominator on institutional reform; expanded membership will impede the further broadening of the scope of activities; and the possibility to reform the existing institutions is hampered by enlargement; insufficient institutional reforms, on the reverse, will curtail the substantive output of legal norms and policy decisions.

Insofar as the European Union provides an organizational structure to facilitate political intercourse among its members and thereby helps to overcome collective action problems, all actors concerned are interested in a balanced evolution of the three dimensions. At the same time, however, the member states are also struggling to preserve their autonomy and often have preferences that run counter to the further evolution of a structure that increasingly conditions and shapes their room of maneuver. Depending on the issue at hand, there may be disagreement on whether to privilege substantive broadening over geographical widening, geographical widening over institutional deepening, and institutional deepening over substantive broadening. This creates a series of dilemmas that can affect the organizational evolution of the EU.

It is an empirical question whether there are synergies or rather tradeoffs between the three dimensions. Accordingly, let us formulate two competing hypotheses to be placed under empirical scrutiny.

Hypothesis 1: There are synergies. The three dimensions are related to each other by a virtuous cycle of positive feedback. When substantive scope broadens, geographical range widens; when geographical range widens, the institutional commitment deepens; when the institutional commitment deepens, substantive scope broadens (and vice versa).

Hypothesis 2: There are tradeoffs. The three dimensions are related to each other by a vicious circle of negative feedback. Substantive broadening has a negative effect on geographical widening; geographical widening hampers institutional deepening; institutional deepening runs counter to substantive broadening (and vice versa).

In order to assess the plausibility of either hypothesis, let us further examine the influence of the three dimensions upon each other. First we provide a picture of European integration in terms of a virtuous circle. Subsequently, we follow the more skeptical strand of the literature in depicting European integration as trapped in a “Bermuda triangle” of tradeoffs between broadening, widening, and deepening.

1.1 European Integration as a Virtuous Circle

To those who believe in European integration as a unidirectional historical process, integration in different fields should be, and is, mutually reinforcing. Organized cooperation in more and more policy fields yields benefits because it wards off the undesired effects of isolated solutions. For example economic cooperation without environmental protection is insufficient, and this puts an incentive on states to expand the scope of European integration. The existing institutional and geographical framework will periodically prove inadequate, but fortunately there is a burgeoning political elite at the national and at the European level promoting forceful institutions and geographical enlargement. As a consequence, the dynamics of European integration will generate an increasing demand for broadening, widening, and deepening.⁽¹⁾

As a matter of fact, the substantive increase of the European Union’s competences since the Single European Act (1986) has been accompanied by periodic institutional changes. Reforms strengthening the European Parliament are regarded by some authors as an important step to counter the “democratic deficit” of the Union (*e.g.* Scharpf 1999: 9).⁽²⁾ In addition, the application of qualified majority voting to new policy areas has been helpful to smoothen the decision-making process (Dehousse and Weiler 1990; Engel and Borrmann 1991; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997).

Over the last decades, the EU has fully established itself as a gravitational center for political and economic life in Europe. The price for non-membership has become prohibitive, and this accelerates the race for membership. There is a strong stimulus for potential member states to implement the *acquis communautaire* and join the Union. At the same time, wider membership leads to increasing socio-economic heterogeneity. This heterogeneity needs to be regulated, which leads in turn to a further broadening of the substantive scope of EU activities. At the same time, enlargement does also require institutional reforms to make the Union amenable to increased membership. This process creates a synergetic circle in which the three dimensions of broadening, widening and deepening mutually reinforce each other.

Figure 1

From the optimistic viewpoint, there is a virtuous circle among the three dimensions of integration. Enlargement enhances the readiness of the new member states to share the goals and values of the organization, this in turn reinforces the process of institutional reform and makes it possible to bring new policy fields under the competence of the organization, which further increases the incentives for ever more member states to join the Union, and so on and so forth (*Hypothesis 1*).

1.2. European Integration as a Vicious Circle

Whereas the optimistic vision of European integration as a virtuous cycle is outlined in roughly one page, it is significant that the pessimistic picture is more complex. In the relevant literature, much more ink has been spent on possible tradeoffs. ⁽³⁾

1.2.1. Broadening versus Widening

The geographical enlargement of international organizations is connected to an increasing heterogeneity of state preferences. It is easier for organizations with a small number of members to endow the organization with additional competencies. Large organizations are composed of many members with a variety of preferences that must be accommodated. Therefore, it is unlikely for these members to agree on cooperation in a large spectrum of activities. Members of smaller organizations, by contrast, are more likely to have a similar willingness and capacity to act. This results in a greater certainty about policy outcomes, and therefore, higher incentives to cooperate on a broad range of issues (Downs *et al.* 1998). There seems to be a negative relationship between substantive scope and geographical range.

Moreover, a game theorists would argue that, in a heterogeneous framework, weak actors tend to be reluctant against the organization being endowed with new fields of competence, since unpredictable coalitions of powerful partners may suppress their interests and further increase their dependence (*cf.* Walt 1987: 17-32). For the same reason, one may speculate that weak actors will be reluctant to join an organization with an exceedingly large substantive *acquis communautaire* in the first place.

Another problem is that large organizations face the problem of a diverging capacity to execute basic obligations, reflecting socio-economic and socio-political differences among their member states. This problem seems to be particularly important in the context of eastern enlargement, the largest enlargement that the European Union has ever experienced. There is considerable concern that the obligations of the new member states largely exceed their capacity to act, and that particularly the Central and Eastern European countries may have joined the EU not so much because they were convinced about integration as a normative goal but rather because they wanted to reap material benefits from “joining the club” (Balazs 1998: 69).

Insofar as new member states do not see integration as an end but rather as an instrument, however, and insofar as they are economically less developed, their incentives and capabilities to push the integration process forward are substantially weaker. Accordingly, it may be difficult for a EU of 25 to delegate new competences to the supranational level, or even to reform its institutional setup. Perhaps it would be premature to end on such a pessimistic note. Nevertheless, everything seems to depend on the extent to which the new member states share the values and aspirations of the Union, and are willing to comply with their substantive and legal obligations.

1.2.2. Widening versus Deepening ↑

The critical interdependence between the institutional and the geographical dimensions of integration is reflected in the post-Nice debate about the future of the European Union. Geographical widening may affect the structure, functioning, and efficacy of the EU institutions, such as the Council and the Commission. For that reason, the Nice Treaty aimed to reform them in a way suitable for the forthcoming enlargement. But unfortunately the plans to reform qualified majority voting complicated and slowed down the implementation of the treaty (Dinan 2002), while eastern enlargement was already imminent. At the end of 2003, the enlargement process came close to failure because of this tension between widening and deepening.

Even though the impasse was overcome at the beginning of 2004, enlargement may still have dire consequences for the European Council and the Council of Ministers, which occupy a central decision-making position in the EU. The ability of the Union to act depends largely on the proper functioning of these bodies. Unfortunately, however, increased membership in the absence of the necessary institutional reforms poses a dilemma between capacity and control (Kerremans 1998). The interests of the member states become more diverse, and this creates an additional burden for the legislative process. At the same time, especially in the case of qualified majority voting enlargement reduces the control of individual states over the content of decisions. Moreover, if the institutional *acquis* of an organization demands too much from the member states, this will deter third countries from applying for membership.

The significant structural and decision-making problems that the Union is facing may endanger its efficiency. In the worst case it may turn out that enlargement was premature, as significant institutional problems have not been resolved by the deadline. Eastern enlargement is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the previous rounds, and this makes the future of the European Union look even more uncertain. Accordingly, the latest accession round has become subject to widespread political skepticism (Laurent and Maresceau 1998: 1). Deviations from the traditional gradualist approach may turn the integration process into a particularly vicious circle, in which enlargement takes place at the expense of institutional viability.

1.2.3. Deepening versus Broadening ↑

Despite recent institutional innovations, many scholars express doubts about the ability of the EU to deal with an ever-broadening political agenda. They object that an increase in the substantive scope of the Union may undermine institutional reforms. A number of studies suggest that the decision-making process in the EU has deteriorated considerably as a result of expanding legislative activities. Scharpf (1988) and Sbragia (1993) emphasize the inability of the Council of Ministers to cope with the legislative output of the Commission. The incongruence between the two organs slows down legislative processes, reduces efficiency, and threatens to dilute the substantive content of EU legislation (Van den Bos 1994, Héritier 1996).

Moreover, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties have delegated competences to the community level in policy fields that previously had been strictly regulated by national governments, namely in the second and third pillar. Therefore, the Council often finds difficulties in reaching agreement on these issues. As Scharpf (1997) argues, the policy of the least common denominator tends to prevent the realization of effective institutional reforms. In his opinion, even the introduction of qualified majority voting has failed to make the decision making process more flexible.⁽⁴⁾ The fear that individual states may further loose control over the substantive outcome of EU decision making further weakens the impetus for structural reforms.

The other way round, even successful institutional reform can reduce the prospects for substantive broadening. Extensive changes in the voting rules may affect the willingness of European governments to broaden the substantive scope of integration. As Bräuninger *et al.* (2001) point out, different voting rules increase the uncertainty about future policy outcomes. Moreover, qualified majority voting makes it more difficult for individual actors to control the decision-making process. All this is likely to make them more reluctant to delegate further competencies to the EU. The loss of control connected to extensive institutional deepening may lead to a reluctance of the member states to transfer new competences to the European Union.

The negative interrelation between substantive broadening and institutional deepening is most clearly observed in those fields where national interests predominate. In the sphere of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), improvements are hampered by the “instinct” of national governments to keep control over this particular area (Ham 1997: 309). In this respect, the Commissioner for External Relations Hans van den Broek acknowledged that “the problem [is] how to go beyond joint declarations and really act together to tackle specific international problems. [...] It is partly a question of political will but partly also because our sense of joint European interests is still insufficiently developed and because we have not yet learned how to take decisions together quickly and how to carry them out” (quoted in Ham 1997: 309).

Although in many areas qualified majority voting may facilitate decision-making, the legislative process with respect to the more recently introduced policy fields, such as CFSP or Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM), is still cumbersome and makes it difficult to agree on the necessary institutional reforms.

Figure 2

From the pessimistic viewpoint, there is a vicious circle among the three dimensions of integration. Substantive broadening hampers the proper functioning of institutions in the absence of the necessary reforms; institutional deepening affects the actors' willingness to broaden substantive scope; geographical enlargement complicates the legislative process and leads to stagnation, and so on and so forth (*Hypothesis 2*).

2. Preferences over Outcomes ↑

So far we have dealt with possible synergies and tradeoffs in the outcomes of bargaining on the institutional depth, geographical range, and substantive scope of European integration. The pessimistic theory postulates a variety of tradeoffs. A more optimistic theory would emphasize that the three dimensions are mutually reinforcing.

So far, so good. However, in this paper we are not going to deal with bargaining or with the outcomes of international cooperation. Instead, we are going to deal with *state preferences on international cooperation*. Let us briefly outline the reasons for this analytical choice.

We understand international cooperation as the outcome of a policy cycle. Such a policy cycle starts from a real-world problem. If unilateral dealing with the problem is perceived as too costly, it will induce states to formulate preferences on the desired terms of international cooperation. Provided that there is sufficient consensus for an agreement to seem at all possible, states can be expected to negotiate with each other. In some cases, although certainly not always, the bargaining process will engender a substantive and institutional outcome, which is implemented more or less faithfully. Due to problems of incomplete contracting, voluntary and involuntary defection, and unintended outcomes, more often than not the result of the exercise will turn out to be unsatisfactory. Compliance is not automatic, nor are the “real” problems always being dealt with effectively. Due to these and similar hardships, states will formulate new preferences on future international cooperation, and the cycle starts anew (*cf.* Lasswell 1956; Easton 1965: 29-33; Howlett and Ramesh 2003).

For a full understanding of the political process one would have to start from the beginning of the cycle, *i.e.* with state preferences, and work oneself through the bargaining stage to the agreements that are finally reached; moreover, one would have to consider the feedback of experiences with implementation and compliance into new preferences in a new policy cycle. An isolated analysis of bargaining and/or outcomes will not do the trick if one wants to gain a full understanding of what makes international cooperation work. While it is of course not possible to discuss the entire policy cycle in the context of the present paper, we would argue that the most promising starting point is carefully to analyze the initial preferences of the actors involved. Although it is impossible directly to deduce outcomes from preferences, preferences rather than bargaining or outcomes are the linchpin of the policy cycle.

In line with these considerations, preferences can be defined as “the ways actors order the variety of possible outcomes of an interaction” (Frieden 1999: 42). According to Moravcsik’s (1997) liberal theory of international politics, international cooperation is the result of a two-stage process. In the first stage, state preferences take shape in response to pressure from interest groups embedded in society. The second stage constitutes international bargaining on substantive issues and institutional choices.⁽⁵⁾ If one adds geographical enlargement to the list, and if one assumes that it is reasonable to draw an analytical distinction between deepening, widening and broadening already at the stage of preference formation, one has a ready-made framework at hand.

In this paper, we focus on the interplay between the three dimensions of international cooperation at the initial stage of the policy cycle, *i.e.* before the bargaining stage. We call this *preference configurations*. We argue that there can be synergies and tradeoffs not only at the bargaining stage or with regard to the outcomes of interaction, but already with regard to the very preferences the actors bring to the negotiation table.

Preferences as intended outcomes are related to broadening, widening, and deepening. Accordingly, there are three types of preferences: preferences on substantive scope, preferences on geographical range, and preferences on institutional depth. Preferences on substantive scope regard the gamut of issues a state wants to be subsumed under a regime. Preferences on geographical range are concerned with the number of states with which a state would like to cooperate under the intended agreement. Preferences on institutional depth refer to a state’s willingness to accept binding commitments. Depending on whether there is a positive or negative relationship between these three dimensions, there will be different patterns of preference configuration.

This leads to a modified version of our initial hypotheses. The modified version of *Hypothesis 1* suggests that preferences on each of the three dimensions are mutually reinforcing. From this perspective, a state that wants to cooperate with more states will also endorse the necessary institutional reforms and support the inclusion of new items under the remit of an international regime. The modified version of *Hypothesis 2*, by contrast, would lead us to expect that preferences emphasizing institutional deepening, geographical widening, and substantive broadening take place at the expense of each other. Both hypotheses sound plausible, and it is an open empirical question whether and to what extent we are going to observe synergies or rather tradeoffs between state preferences on deepening, widening and broadening.

To recap: just like inter-state bargaining and its outcomes, state preferences on international cooperation can also be analyzed with respect to substantive scope, geographical range, and institutional depth. An empirical analysis of the interrelationships between these three dimensions is an important precondition for a true understanding of international cooperation (understood as a policy cycle). In the next two sections, we provide an analysis of state preferences for the particular policy field of international cooperation against drugs. Moreover, we discuss whether and to what extent our findings can be applied to other fields of international cooperation.

3. Case Selection

Our dataset allows the examination of state preferences with regard to international cooperation against drugs. As a matter of fact, international police cooperation in general, and the fight against drugs in particular, are highly topical fields for the examination of state preferences. Insofar as the monopoly of force is the defining characteristic of modern statehood (Weber 1968, 1992), international police cooperation is one of the most crucial fields of international cooperation. With the exception of the military field and maybe taxation, no other sphere is so directly related to national sovereignty. We have selected international cooperation against drugs because, together with terrorism and illegal immigration, it is one of the three most important challenges to international police cooperation (Mitsilegas *et al.* 2003; *cf.* Occhipinti 2003).

In our analysis, we have chosen to examine the four largest EU member states: Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. These four countries are suitable for comparison because they are similar in all regards other than political system. Not only are they the most relevant players in the European Union, they do also share a similar socio-economic, cultural, and political background. Moreover, they face common challenges and cooperation problems. However, they vary in their willingness to engage in deepening, broadening, and widening the international regime to fight drugs.

The preferences of our four countries are analyzed across two time periods (1960s/1970s and 1990s/2000s). From a European perspective, the fight against drugs has become a central issue only in the 1960s and 1970s. Until then, drugs were considered to be mainly a problem of the United States, with its huge addict population. By the early 1970s, the European states started to be genuinely concerned about drugs and to see the problem with similar eyes as their American partners. Over time, this led to the adoption of three UN conventions on different aspects of drug trafficking. (6)

During the late 1990s, however, European attitudes started to change. Since then, the American hegemony over the international drug prohibition policies has been challenged by the emergence of an alternative European drug regime (Elvins 2003). Whereas the US continues to favor strict law enforcement, most EU member states are now promoting the so-called balanced approach. The idea is to combine the intentional fight against the supply of drugs with appropriate measures of demand reduction at home, which can either take a more repressive or a more preventive form.

The fight against international drug trafficking takes place at three different levels, namely at the level of general principles to convey legitimacy to the struggle; at the level of finding the right methods to pursue this struggle; and at the level of designing adequate frameworks for the authorization of joint international operations against drug criminals. At each of these three levels, we have tried to identify the most important topic in either of the two time periods under consideration (table 1).

Table 1

On the first level, the UN is traditionally the most important source of legitimacy in the fight against narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The UN is also the venue where the international drugs problem is authoritatively defined in the first place (Thomson 1995: 222-223). In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a US-led attempt to boost the existing UN anti-drugs regime. We have analyzed the response of different European states to this American initiative. At least initially, drugs were considered a typically US-American problem and there was only limited interest on the part of European states in the construction of the emergent regime. But as European societies were increasingly faced with the same drug problems as the United States, the UN approach to drug prohibition was gaining sway. More recently, however, several European countries are fairly unhappy with the UN approach. Some of these states, among them Britain and Germany, have started an attempt to emancipate themselves at least in part from the UN regime. As a consequence, an emergent EU drugs regime is challenging some important components of the UN regime, which formally is still the legal umbrella of international drug prohibition (McAllister 2000: 215-246).

On the methods level, the 1970s saw an unprecedented diffusion of the investigative techniques used by American drug enforcers to the rest of the world (Nadelmann 1993, 1997). These techniques included, among other things, intrusive forms of surveillance, extensive undercover operations, controlled delivery of illicit drug consignments, and reduced charges or immunity from prosecution to known drug dealers in order to “*flip*” them into becoming informants. In the face of this challenge to their legal systems, different European states reacted in different ways. Some states, such as Germany, tended to embrace the new investigative techniques, whereas other states were more reluctant. Nevertheless, by the 2000s American drug enforcement techniques have been largely accepted in all European states. The cutting edge of international drug enforcement is now the fight against criminal finance, *i.e.* the idea of depriving drug criminals of their profits by means of anti-money-laundering measures and asset confiscation. There are different preferences on international cooperation against criminal finance, with Britain and France assuming a leading role.

Whereas the UN regime and American investigation techniques were rapidly advancing, in the 1970s operational cooperation against drug trafficking had not yet gone much beyond episodic trans-border operations against criminal gangs. An important exception were US-French and US-German cooperation agreements after the impasse over the so-called “French connection”, a drug trafficking ring based in Marseilles. Over the 1980s and 1990s, however, a dense network of bilateral and multilateral agreements for the authorization of operational police cooperation has been created. The latest achievement in Europe is a multilateral legal umbrella for joint investigation teams.(7) If joint investigation teams become a routine tool for drug enforcement in the EU, the authorization of operational police cooperation will be placed for the first time within a multilateral legal framework. However, different EU member states have different preferences with regard to the practical application of the new legal instrument. Moreover, the usage of the instrument is

optional and not all European states are equally keen on recommending it to their own national police forces.

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4. Data Analysis [↑]

We will now investigate the configurations of state preferences with regard to fighting drugs. As we have seen, the dataset consists of 24 case studies (2×4×3), which span across two time periods (1960s/1970s, 1990s/2000s), four countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy), and three levels of abstraction (legitimacy, methods, operational).

For every single case study, we have conducted a careful analysis of the documentary evidence. This includes public archives and UN debates for the 1970s, and governmental press releases and other official documents for the 2000s. In some cases, we were forced to use other sources such as press agencies, newspaper articles, and personal interviews. Whenever possible, we have given precedence to primary sources. Since it is beyond the scope of this article to trace the way how our data has been gained, the gentle reader is referred to Appendix 1 for further information.

The aim of the data analysis is to place our two hypotheses under empirical scrutiny. We do this by means of a correlation analysis. For the purpose of statistical analysis, the two hypotheses are operationalized the following way:

Hypothesis 1: There are synergies. Preferences on scope co-vary with preferences on range and depth, i.e. there are three positive correlations.

Hypothesis 2: There are tradeoffs, i.e. there are two negative correlations between the three dimensions, whereas the third correlation is positive.⁽⁸⁾

If the statistical analysis does not provide evidence in favor for either hypothesis, then the *Null hypothesis* (no significant relationship between the indices) must be upheld.⁽⁹⁾

To make our dataset amenable to statistical scrutiny, we use three indices that are especially designed for this purpose. Each index reflects the preferences of a state on one of the three dimensions. The first index measures the preferences with regard to substantive scope; the second index is dedicated to geographical range; and the third index covers institutional depth. The higher the score of an index, the more the country concerned supports the issue the index stands for. The scores are then converted into ranks to make them amenable to rank-order correlation.⁽¹⁰⁾

Subsequently, we use rank-order correlation to test which of our two hypotheses is valid. Basically, we compare the ranks of different countries on each of the three indices and try to identify regularities across the indices. For example, whenever a particular country has a high rank on one index which correlates with a high rank on another index, then this points to a synergetic relationship between the two categories.

When run over a sufficient number of empirical cases, the statistical method of rank-order correlation can tell us how strong a relationship is, and whether a relationship stands the significance test.⁽¹¹⁾ In order to accept the first hypothesis, we need to find strong and significant positive relationships among the indices. For the second hypothesis to be confirmed, we would expect two negative and one positive relationship, all of which should be strong and significant.

Table 2

Table 2 presents the general results. First of all, it is important to note that all correlations are positive. In particular, the correlation between preferences on substantive scope and institutional depth is very strong and highly significant (at the 1 % level). The correlation between preferences on geographical range and institutional depth is also relatively strong and fairly significant (at the 5 % level). Only the relationship between substantive scope and geographical range is the rather weak and hardly significant. All in all, however, *Hypothesis 1* is clearly vindicated.

At first glance this looks like an all-out victory for the virtuous circle in the ‘struggle’ between *Hypothesis 1* and *Hypothesis 2*. The supporters of *Hypothesis 2* need not despair, though. A careful analysis shows that, at least in one particular sub-set of our sample, there are tradeoffs rather than synergies.⁽¹²⁾ When we analyze the data for France, an interesting pattern becomes visible. The correlations between scope and range, and between scope and depth, are strongly negative. The correlation between scope and depth is significant at the 5% level. Thus, France is the “odd one out”: its preference configurations are based on tradeoffs rather than synergies (Table 3).

Table 3

But if we turn back to the overall results (Table 2), there is an interesting implication of our results. As we have already seen, the strongest and most significant correlations in our dataset are those between broadening and deepening (scope depth), and between widening and deepening (range depth). The correlation between broadening and widening (scope range), by contrast, is neither very strong nor significant. This suggests that preferences on institutional depth is the master variable. In line with these considerations, it is possible to provide a 'consolidated' version of the virtuous cycle that is the dominant pattern within our dataset (Figure 3).

Figure 3

To what extent do these findings apply to other policy fields? We would argue that the fight against drugs is an unlikely case for a harmonious relationship between broadening, widening, and deepening. The reason for this unlikelihood is the close link between crime fighting and the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, which is the defining characteristic of sovereign statehood. One would expect that, the more a state wants to increase the substantive scope and geographical range of drug enforcement, the more reluctant it becomes to undergo binding institutional commitments. Despite this expectation, however, we find synergies rather than tradeoffs. Pending further research, our findings are therefore likely to be applicable more widely. (13)

Are our findings likely to apply beyond the European Union? Although we have used the EU for the generation of our hypotheses in the first section, a closer look at the case material examined in the present section reveals that the empirical basis of our analysis extends far beyond the European Union. The case sample includes many instances of international cooperation beyond the EU, such as the UN drug prohibition regime, the fight of the G7/G8 and the OECD against money laundering, and a bilateral cooperation agreement between France and the United States in the early 1970s. Although we have examined the preferences of the four largest member states of the European Union, our empirical horizon is not confined to the EU.

Finally, it is important to stress that the empirical analysis has been dealing with preferences, not outcomes. The four states examined are important players, but none of them is in a position to dictate the terms of international police cooperation. There is no direct way to derive preferences from outcomes. While preferences are at the beginning of the policy cycle, outcomes are towards its end. In between are the stages of bargaining, implementation, and compliance. An understanding of preferences is not sufficient to understand outcomes. However, it is an important precondition for the understanding of the subsequent stages in the policy cycle, including outcomes.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have been trying to combine the best of three worlds: the empirical examination of qualitative evidence, grounded in sound theoretical concepts and supported by reliable statistical methods. We have identified two competing possibilities of viewing international cooperation in general, and European integration in particular: either as a virtuous circle of synergies, or as a vicious circle of tradeoffs. The former possibility (Hypothesis 1) represents the optimistic view that broadening, widening, and deepening are going hand in hand. The latter possibility (Hypothesis 2) reflects the pessimistic conviction that the three dimensions are sitting uneasy with each other. In the remainder of the article, we have presented an analysis of preference configurations, *i.e.* issue-specific constellations of state preferences concerning the substantive scope, geographical range, and institutional depth of inter-state cooperation in a particular policy field: the international fight against drugs.

Is there any significant relationship between the three variables? And if so: are there synergies or rather tradeoffs between them? After a careful analysis of a specially designed dataset concerning international cooperation against drugs, it turns out that Hypothesis 1 is vindicated, whereas Hypothesis 2 and the Null hypothesis are rejected (only in the case of France, Hypothesis 2 prevails over Hypothesis 1). Or, in other words: The results that we arrive at are mostly in favor of the optimistic view. More often than not, preference configurations are characterized by a synergetic constellation. Finally, it turns out that preference configurations gravitate around the dimension of institutional depth. This lends support to those who believe that clever institutional design is the key to successful international cooperation.

Where do we get from here? As has been argued in the course of the essay, preferences are at the beginning of a policy cycle that may or may not lead to the desired outcomes. With little alterations, it would be possible to analyze the question whether there are synergies or tradeoffs between broadening, widening and deepening at the end-stage of the policy cycle, *i.e.* with regard to outcomes. However, let us leave this and similar questions to other authors. In the meantime, our results show some interesting insights into the internal structure of preference configurations. It is important to gain a better understanding of state preferences, because they are a necessary, although not a sufficient condition for real international cooperation as an outcome.

Appendix 1: The Dataset [↑]

We are using a dataset that is borrowed from a research project on the internationalization of the monopoly of force, based at International University Bremen. The dataset uses three indices to measure state preferences on substantial scope (I1), geographical range (I2), and institutional depth (I3). These indices are derived from six parameters, which cover state preferences with regard to scope (P2), range (P4) and depth (P6), and the question whether a state intends a relative advance in comparison to the status quo, *i.e.* the scope (P3), range (P5) or depth (P7) already achieved. The six parameters are complemented by a forced-choice parameter (P1), which measures whether a country does want the agreement in the first place. The assumption is that if a country is either against international cooperation in a given area or indifferent, then the declared preferences on details are likely to be strategic and therefore irrelevant.

Figure 4

Table 4

(Note: This table includes the criteria adopted for coding.)

Due to empirical and categorial differences between the parameters, there are some minor but unavoidable problems. The parameters, none of which is interval-scaled, combine nominal (P1) and ordinal (P2-P7) scales. Not all of them have the same interval, nor do they all have their arithmetical mean at {0}. The latter problem does also apply to the indices, which are computed from the parameters.

However, there is a justification to all of these problems. In this study we engage in 'within-case analysis'. Mahoney (2003: 360-61) recognizes that it is typical for this kind of analysis to combine different levels of measurement. Nevertheless, since the level of measurement and format of our data is somewhat debatable, for safety reasons we assume that our three indices are ordinal and use them for rank-order correlations only. This should be sufficient to remedy for the problems mentioned.

Appendix 2: The Results in Detail [↑]

To measure the strength of association, we use Spearman's rho (r_s). Spearman's rho is a rank-order correlation coefficient which measures association at the ordinal level. It is a nonparametric alternative to the Pearson correlation coefficient, which requires interval-scaled values. The formula for Spearman's rho is

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{6 \sum D^2}{N(N^2 - 1)}$$

, where D is the difference in ranks. The values for Spearman's rho range from {+1.0} to {-1.0}. {+1.0} means a full positive correlation between the ranks, while {-1.0} means a perfect negative correlation.⁽¹⁴⁾

In order to use Spearman's rho, one first has to assign appropriate ranks. Our data set is not continuous, since it is composed by blocks of four case studies each (we examine the preferences of each of our four countries for every individual topic). If we simply ran the analysis over all 24 case studies, our software program (SPSS) would assume that the data is continuous and would rank each case with respect to the other 23, rather than with respect to the other 3 cases in the block. To prevent this from happening, the indices are pre-ranked in each block of four cases, and only then is the analysis run on the already assigned ranks. Because the indices are not whole number, fractional ranking is used to capture the full extent of variation among the indices.

This is how we have dealt with the levels-of-measurement problem. Another possible objection is that, since the dataset is composed of different clusters, there may be autocorrelations. This is typical, however, about within-case analysis more in general (Mahoney 2003: 360-367). Within-case analysis, which is typical for historical comparison, disaggregates cases into their component parts and then examines associations within cases, as well as associations with other cases. The aim is to identify general or partial regularities in the internal configuration of the cases. In such a procedure, autocorrelations is not a problem. To the contrary, we are interested precisely in the impact that sampling has over the results, and we try to find this out by disaggregating out dataset into a variety of sub-samples (table 5).

Table 5

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Endnotes

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(1) Cf. the neofunctionalist strand of integration theory since the late 1950s, as represented by Haas, Lindberg, Schmitter, and others (for a concise overview see Rosamond 2000: 31-42).

(2) Nevertheless Scharpf emphasizes that, despite these reforms, the 'democratic deficit' of the EU persists and even increases.

(3) Although we would define ourselves as relatively sympathetic towards European integration, based on the arguments reported in this section we expected that *Hypothesis 2* (tradeoffs) should prevail over *Hypothesis 1* (synergies). However, things turned out otherwise. We were ourselves surprised by the results of the empirical part of the paper (see below, sections 3 and 4).

(4) There are also studies to support a more optimistic view. By studying the time lag between Commission proposals and Council decisions, Schulz and Köning (2000) suggest that the EU is often successful in meeting the demands posed by expanding policy competences. Nevertheless, the speed of decision-making varies significantly across policy areas. It is

higher with respect to issues constituting the functional core of the EU and lower in the more recently introduced spheres.

(5) In Moravcsik's book *The Choice for Europe* (1998: 24-50) this is extended into a three-stage process: preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining, and institutional choice.

(6) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (amended 1972); Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971; Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.

(7) In Amsterdam (1997) and Tampere (1999), the EU member states agreed upon a legal framework for these teams, which are created to combat trafficking in drugs and human beings as well as terrorism and other forms of serious crime; cf. Schalken and Pronk 2002.

(8) It is logically impossible to observe three negative correlations between a set of three variables; nor is it possible to observe two positive and one negative correlations.

(9) What we are actually testing is if there is enough evidence to reject the Null hypothesis. If so, then based on the correlations observed we can see which of the two alternative hypothesis is validated.

(10) For a more detailed overview of the dataset and the statistical methods used please see [Appendix 1](#).

(11) The better the significance, the lower the risk that the null hypothesis is true or, in other words, the more reliable the relationship, whether positive or negative, between a pair of indices.

(12) A critical reader might object that there is a problem of multiple testing. However, this is not the case because our detailed analyses (see [Appendix 2](#)) serve the heuristic purpose of examining the internal differentiation of our dataset. They should not be taken as premeditated hypothesis tests.

(13) One of the authors is preparing a book-length study about the international fight against terrorism and drugs (Friedrichs 2007).

(14) One advantage with r_s is that, when squared, it has a pre-interpretation effect, indicating how much the risk of wrongly predicting the rank of one variable from the rank of another is reduced (see Ollenburger and Walsh 2001: 183).

Table 1

The case sample

	1960s/1970s	1990s/2000s
1st level: Legitimization	International drug prohibition	International drug prohibition
2nd level: Methods	Diffusion of American drug enforcement techniques	Fight against criminal finance
3rd level: Authorization	First steps beyond ad hoc cooperation	Joint investigation teams

Table 2

Overall preference configurations

Sample	Relationship	Strength	Significance
All cases	scope o range	.291	.168
All cases	range o depth	.460	.024
All cases	scope o depth	.623	.001

Table 3

Preference configurations for France

Sample	Relationship	Strength	Significance
Only France	scope o range	-.682	.136
Only France	range o depth	.727	.101
Only France	scope o depth	-.909	.012

Table 4**Data**

Time	Level	Country	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6	P7	I1	I2	I3
1960/1970s	Legitimization	France	1 ▼	2 ▼	4 ▼	4 ▼	1 ▼	0 ▼	2 ▼	0,75	0,63	0,25
1960/1970s	Legitimization	Germany	1 ▼	-2 ▼	0 ▼	4 ▼	1 ▼	1 ▼	2 ▼	-0,25	0,63	0,38
1960/1970s	Legitimization	Italy	1 ▼	-1 ▼	2 ▼	3 ▼	0 ▼	2 ▼	2 ▼	0,13	0,38	0,50
1960/1970s	Legitimization	UK	1 ▼	-4 ▼	0 ▼	4 ▼	1 ▼	-2 ▼	0 ▼	-0,50	0,63	-0,25
1990/2000s	Legitimization	France	1 ▼	4 ▼	0 ▼	3 ▼	1 ▼	2 ▼	2 ▼	0,50	0,50	0,50
1990/2000s	Legitimization	Germany	1 ▼	-1 ▼	-2 ▼	1,5 ▼	-0,5 ▼	2 ▼	0 ▼	-0,38	0,13	0,25
1990/2000s	Legitimization	Italy	1 ▼	3 ▼	2 ▼	4 ▼	2 ▼	2 ▼	2 ▼	0,63	0,75	0,5
1990/2000s	Legitimization	UK	1 ▼	0 ▼	0 ▼	2 ▼	0 ▼	2 ▼	0 ▼	0,00	0,25	0,25
1960/1970s	Methods	France	1 ▼	3 ▼	2 ▼	3 ▼	3 ▼	2 ▼	4 ▼	0,63	0,75	1,00
1960/1970s	Methods	Germany	1 ▼	4 ▼	2 ▼	3 ▼	2 ▼	-1 ▼	2 ▼	0,75	0,63	0,75
1960/1970s	Methods	Italy	1 ▼	3 ▼	2 ▼	3 ▼	3 ▼	-1 ▼	4 ▼	0,63	0,75	0,63
1960/1970s	Methods	UK	0 ▼	-	-	-	-	3 ▼	4 ▼	0,00	0,00	0,00
1990/2000s	Methods	France	1 ▼	4 ▼	4 ▼	3 ▼	3 ▼	2 ▼	4 ▼	1,00	0,75	0,75
1990/2000s	Methods	Germany	1 ▼	-1 ▼	2 ▼	3 ▼	3 ▼	-1 ▼	2 ▼	0,13	0,75	0,13
1990/2000s	Methods	Italy	1 ▼	3 ▼	4 ▼	2 ▼	2 ▼	-1 ▼	4 ▼	0,88	0,50	0,38
1990/2000s	Methods	UK	1 ▼	0 ▼	4 ▼	4 ▼	4 ▼	3 ▼	4 ▼	0,50	1,00	0,88
1960/1970s	Authorization	France	1 ▼	4 ▼	2 ▼	3 ▼	3 ▼	2 ▼	4 ▼	0,75	0,75	0,75
1960/1970s	Authorization	Germany	1 ▼	4 ▼	4 ▼	3 ▼	2 ▼	2 ▼	2 ▼	1,00	0,63	0,50
1960/1970s	Authorization	Italy	0 ▼	-	-	0 ▼	0 ▼	-	-	0,00	0,00	0,00
1960/1970s	Authorization	UK	0 ▼	-	-	0 ▼	0 ▼	-	-	0,00	0,00	0,00
1990/2000s	Authorization	France	1 ▼	4 ▼	0 ▼	2 ▼	1 ▼	2 ▼	2 ▼	0,50	0,38	0,50
1990/2000s	Authorization	Germany	1 ▼	4 ▼	0 ▼	2 ▼	1 ▼	3 ▼	4 ▼	0,50	0,38	0,88
1990/2000s	Authorization	Italy	1 ▼	1 ▼	0 ▼	2 ▼	1 ▼	1 ▼	0 ▼	0,13	0,38	0,13
1990/2000s	Authorization	UK	1 ▼	3 ▼	0 ▼	2 ▼	1 ▼	0 ▼	0 ▼	0,38	0,38	0,00

NOTE:

In the above Table, clicking on the red triangles ▼ on the top right of each cell in the columns for P1 to P7, will lead to pop-up window that gives you the necessary information about the criteria according to which we have allocated particular scores. For this to function properly, Javascript has to be enabled in your browser and popups need to be allowed for this site.

An ordered list of comments is also attached to the [PDF version](#) of this paper.

Table 5: Preference configurations by sub-samples

(Sub-)Sample	Relationship	Spearman's rho	Significance	n
All Cases	I1 o I2	.291	.168	24
All Cases	I2 o I3	.460	.024	24
All Cases	I1 o I3	.623	.001	24
Period 1970s	I1 o I2	.289	.363	12
Period 1970s	I2 o I3	.394	.205	12
Period 1970s	I1 o I3	.671	.017	12
Period 2000s	I1 o I2	.334	.288	12
Period 2000s	I2 o I3	.614	.034	12
Period 2000s	I1 o I3	.613	.034	12
Legitimization Level	I1 o I2	.417	.239	8
Legitimization Level	I2 o I3	.103	.808	8
Legitimization Level	I1 o I3	.691	.058	8
Methods Level	I1 o I2	-.130	.760	8
Methods Level	I2 o I3	.621	.100	8
Methods Level	I1 o I3	.447	.267	8
Authorization Level	I1 o I2	.582	.130	8
Authorization Level	I2 o I3	.650	.081	8
Authorization Level	I1 o I3	.601	.115	8
Without France	I1 o I2	.250	.317	18
Without France	I2 o I3	.294	.236	18
Without France	I1 o I3	.725	.001	18
Without Germany	I1 o I2	.285	.252	18
Without Germany	I2 o I3	.489	.040	18
Without Germany	I1 o I3	.588	.010	18
Without Italy	I1 o I2	.290	.243	18
Without Italy	I2 o I3	.598	.009	18
Without Italy	I1 o I3	.586	.011	18
Without UK	I1 o I2	.220	.381	18
Without UK	I2 o I3	.391	.108	18
Without UK	I1 o I3	.442	.066	18
Only France	I1 o I2	-.682	.136	6
Only France	I2 o I3	.727	.101	6
Only France	I1 o I3	-.909	.012	6
Only Germany	I1 o I2	.303	.559	6
Only Germany	I2 o I3	.313	.546	6
Only Germany	I1 o I3	.688	.131	6
Only Italy	I1 o I2	.059	.912	6
Only Italy	I2 o I3	0	1	6
Only Italy	I1 o I3	.678	.139	6
Only UK	I1 o I2	.401	.431	6
Only UK	I2 o I3	.309	.552	6
Only UK	I1 o I3	.567	.241	6

Note: Correlations that are significant at the 10% level are set in bold.

Figure 1

European integration a virtuous circle




Figure 2

European integration as a vicious circle




Figure 3

The virtuous circle according to our data analysis




Figure 4

Parameters and indices

P1: Does the country believe that the problem should be dealt with internationally?
[Yes = 1; undecided = 0; no = -1].

I1: Preferences on substantive scope

P2: What is the substantive scope of the intended agreement?
[Sum of four topics with positive (=1), neutral (=0) or negative (= -1) preference]

P3: Is the intended agreement set to restrict or expand the substantive scope of an existing international regime?
[Strongly restrict = -4; restrict = -2; status quo = 0; expand = 2; strongly expand = 4]

$$I1 = \min[P1; 0.125(P2+P3)]$$

I2: Preferences on geographical range

P4: What is the geographical range of the intended agreement?
[Case-by-case = 0; in-between = 1; EU = 2; in-between = 3; universal = 4]

P5: Is the intended agreement set to restrict or expand the geographical range of an existing international regime?
[-4; -3; -2; -1; 0; 1; 2; 3; 4] (Difference between status quo and intended regime)

$$I2 = \min[P1; 0.125(P4+P5)]$$

I3: Preferences on institutional depth

P6: What is the institutional depth of the intended agreement?
[Sum of four topics with positive (=1), neutral (=0) or negative (= -1) preference]

P7: Is the intended agreement set to restrict or expand the institutional depth of an existing international regime?
[Strongly restrict = -4; restrict = -2; status quo = 0; expand = 2; strongly expand = 4]

$$I3 = \min[P1; 0.125(P6+P7)]$$

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Comments to Table 4
of paper [EIoP 2005-013](#)

1960-1970s
Legitimization – France – P1

France was a keen supporter of an international approach towards drug prohibition.

1960-1970s
Legitimization – France – P2

Expansive or restrictive attitude on the prohibition of narcotic substances: +

Expansive or restrictive attitude on the prohibition of psychotropic substances: +

International agreement on demand-side measures: –

Counterfoil forms for the medical prescription of drugs: +

1960-1970s
Legitimization – France – P3

France had a favourable attitude on the prohibition of both narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

1960-1970s
Legitimization – France – P4

Preferred geographical framework: universal UN regime

1960-1970s
Legitimization – France – P5

France wanted a universal drug prohibition regime at the UN level. Before the Single Convention of 1961, the regime had not been entirely universal.

1960-1970s
Legitimization – France – P6

UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC): –

For a strong institutional mechanism (CND, INCB): +

Appeals committee vs. arbitration committee: +

Embargo against states contravening the regime: –

1960-1970s**Legitimization – France – P7**

France supported a significant institutional strengthening of the drug prohibition regime, although Paris did also have some reservations (especially on the UNFDAC and on embargos against states contravening the regime).

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Germany – P1**

Germany was generally in favour of an international approach towards drug prohibition, although Bonn tended to be rather hesitant on substantive issues.

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Germany – P2**

Expansive or restrictive attitude on the prohibition of narcotic substances: –

Expansive or restrictive attitude on the prohibition psychotropic substances: –

International agreement on demand-side measures: +

Counterfoil forms for the medical prescription of drugs: –

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Germany – P3**

Germany had a favourable attitude on the prohibition of narcotic drugs, and a negative attitude on the prohibition of psychotropic substances.

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Germany – P4**

Preferred geographical framework: universal UN regime

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Germany – P5**

Germany wanted a universal drug prohibition regime at the UN level. Before the Single Convention of 1961, the regime had not been entirely universal.

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Germany – P6**

UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC): +

For a strong institutional mechanism (CND, INCB): +

Appeals committee vs. arbitration committee: ±

Embargo against states contravening the regime: –

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Germany – P7**

Short of an embargo against states contravening the regime, Germany did support the institutional strengthening of the drug prohibition regime.

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Italy – P1**

From 1972, Italy was in favour of an international approach towards drug prohibition (in 1961 Italy had not been accredited to the UN conference for the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and in 1971 the country had kept a relatively low profile at the UN conference on psychotropic substances).

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Italy – P2**

Expansive or restrictive attitude on the prohibition of narcotic substances: ±

Expansive or restrictive attitude on the prohibition of psychotropic substances: –

International agreement on demand-side measures: ±

Counterfoil forms for the medical prescription of drugs: ±

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Italy – P3**

Italy had a favourable attitude on the prohibition of narcotic drugs, and a relatively sceptical (although not entirely negative) attitude on the prohibition of psychotropic substances.

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Italy – P4**

Italy did not insist on a global drug prohibition regime, although it wanted to see enlisted as many countries as possible.

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Italy – P5**

Italy did not aim at any recognizable change in comparison to the situation before 1961 (the drug prohibition regime had been near-universal already before the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs).

1960-1970s**Legitimization – Italy – P6**

UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC): +

For a strong institutional mechanism (CND, INCB): +

Appeals committee vs. arbitration committee: ±

Embargo against states contravening the regime: ±

1960-1970s

Legitimization – Italy – P7

During the 1970s, Italy increasingly supported the institutional strengthening of the drug prohibition regime.

1960-1970s

Legitimization – UK – P1

The British Government never challenged the idea of international drug prohibition (nevertheless it is fair to say that, in the 1960s and 1970s, London took a rather minimalist stance).

1960-1970s

Legitimization – UK – P2

Expansive or restrictive attitude on the prohibition of narcotic substances: –

Expansive or restrictive attitude on the prohibition of psychotropic substances: –

International agreement on demand-side measures: –

Counterfoil forms for the medical prescription of drugs: –

1960-1970s

Legitimization – UK – P3

Britain had a favourable attitude on the prohibition of narcotic drugs, and a negative attitude on the prohibition of psychotropic substances.

1960-1970s

Legitimization – UK – P4

Preferred geographical framework: universal UN regime (Britain even declared that it preferred a thin but universal drug prohibition regime to a more demanding regime without universal membership.)

1960-1970s

Legitimization – UK – P5

Britain wanted a universal drug prohibition regime at the UN level. Before the Single Convention of 1961, the regime had not been entirely universal.

1960-1970s**Legitimization – UK – P6**

UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC): –

For a strong institutional mechanism (CND, INCB): –

Appeals committee vs. arbitration committee: +

Embargo against states contravening the regime: –

1960-1970s**Legitimization – UK – P7**

During the 1970s, Britain stuck to its preference that international drug prohibition should be limited to a small number of general principles, and that as much discretion as possible should be left to national legislation.

1990-2000s**Legitimization – France – P1**

France is very fond of drug prohibition, both at the UN level and in the EU.

1990-2000s**Legitimization – France – P2**

a) Supply side:

Criminalization of precursor substances: +

Crop eradication in Afghanistan and elsewhere: +

b) Demand side:

Tough line on controlled consumption, methadone, etc.: +

Tough line on “soft drugs” such as cannabis: +

1990-2000s**Legitimization – France – P3**

There is no significant change in comparison to the situation in the early 1990s (France has a long standing as a hardliner in international drug prohibition).

1990-2000s**Legitimization – France – P4**

a) Supply side: Preference for the universal UN drug regime (4)

b) Demand side: Preference for a regional EU drug regime (2)

1990-2000s

Legitimization – France – P5

a) Supply side: 0

The preferred geographical framework on the supply side continues to be the UN drug prohibition regime.

b) Demand side: +2

Shift from no international framework (0) to a the EU as the preferred geographical framework (2) for the demand side

1990-2000s

Legitimization – France – P6

Tangible commitment to international drug prohibition efforts: +

Budget share at UNDCP compared to budget share at UN: –

Minimum standards for penalties for drug dealers: +

Obligation to act against drug tourism (Netherlands): +

1990-2000s

Legitimization – France – P7

France would welcome a further institutional development of the drug prohibition regime, both at the UN level and in the EU.

1990-2000s

Legitimization – Germany – P1

Germany supports international drug prohibition, despite one or two de-facto opt-outs from the UN regime.

1990-2000s

Legitimization – Germany – P2

a) Supply side:

Criminalization of precursor substances: +

Crop eradication in Afghanistan and elsewhere: –

b) Demand side:

Tough line on controlled consumption, methadone, etc.: –

Tough line on “soft drugs” such as cannabis: ±

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Germany – P3**

Apparently, Germany would like to reduce the scope of the UN regime both on the supply side and on the demand side. With its harm reduction policy (notably drug injection rooms), Germany has touched the limits of what is acceptable under the UN regime. Moreover, Germany would like to see an end to some repressive practices on the supply side such as crop eradication in the producing countries.

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Germany – P4**

a) Supply side: Preference for bilateral development cooperation with the drug producing countries (1)

b) Demand side: Preference for a regional EU drug regime (2)

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Germany – P5**

a) Supply side: -3

Shift from the UN (4) to bilateral cooperation as the preferred geographical framework (1) for the supply side

b) Demand side: +2

Shift from no international framework (0) to a the EU as the preferred geographical framework (2) for the demand side [but open breach of the three UN conventions avoided]

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Germany – P6**

Tangible commitment to international drug prohibition efforts: +

Budget share at UNDCP compared to budget share at UN: –

Minimum standards for penalties for drug dealers: +

Obligation to act against drug tourism (Netherlands): +

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Germany – P7**

Germany does not support a tougher drug prohibition regime. Berlin is rather critical about the principles underlying global drug prohibition, although it does not openly challenge the UN regime; at the same time, Germany it is committed towards the construction of an alternative (and relatively soft) demand side regime based on harm reduction.

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Italy – P1**

The hard line of the second Berlusconi government is fully in line with the philosophy of the UN drug prohibition regime.

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Italy – P2**

a) Supply side:

Criminalization of precursor substances: +

Crop eradication in Afghanistan and elsewhere: ±

b) Demand side:

Tough line on controlled consumption, methadone, etc.: +

Tough line on “soft drugs” such as cannabis: +

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Italy – P3**

While Italy had become rather lenient in the 1990s, under the second Berlusconi government the country has become a hardliner.

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Italy – P4**

a) Supply side: Preference for the universal UN drug regime (4)

b) Demand side: Preference for a universal UN drug regime (4)

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Italy – P5**

a) Supply side: 0

The preferred framework on the supply side continues to be the UN drug prohibition regime.

b) Demand side: +4

Shift from no international framework (0) to a the UN as the preferred geographical framework (2) on the demand side

1990-2000s**Legitimization – Italy – P6**

Tangible commitment to international drug prohibition efforts: +

Budget share at UNDCP compared to budget share at UN: +

Minimum standards for penalties for drug dealers: +

Obligation to act against drug tourism (Netherlands): –

1990-2000s

Legitimization – Italy – P7

Italy has always been active in support of the UN drug prohibition regime (especially in the UNFDAC), but with the second Berlusconi government the Italian policy on international drug prohibition has turned even more determined.

1990-2000s

Legitimization – UK – P1

Despite some problems with compliance, Britain is mostly loyal towards the UN regime.

1990-2000s

Legitimization – UK – P2

a) Supply side:

Criminalization of precursor substances: +

Crop eradication in Afghanistan and elsewhere: +

b) Demand side:

Tough line on controlled consumption, methadone, etc.: –

Tough line on “soft drugs” such as cannabis: –

1990-2000s

Legitimization – UK – P3

Britain has become somewhat subversive on the demand side of the drug prohibition regime, but seems to be harder than ever before on the supply side.

1990-2000s

Legitimization – UK – P4

a) Supply side: Preference for the universal UN drug regime (4)

b) Demand side: De facto preference for a national approach (0)

1990-2000s

Legitimization – UK – P5

a) Supply side: 0

The preferred framework on the supply side continues to be the UN drug prohibition regime.

b) Demand side: 0

Britain continues to prefer no international regime on demand reduction.

1990-2000s

Legitimization – UK – P6

Tangible commitment to international drug prohibition efforts: +

Budget share at UNDCP compared to budget share at UN: ±

Minimum standards for penalties: +

Obligation to act against drug tourism (Netherlands): ±

1990-2000s

Legitimization – UK – P7

Britain's preferences concerning the institutional strength of the drug prohibition regime have not significantly changed over the last ten or fifteen years.

1960-1970s

Methods – France – P1

After the *French Connection* case, France was in favour of a coordinated approach to the development of drug enforcement methods.

1960-1970s

Methods – France – P2

a) Americanization:

Infiltration as an investigation technique: ±

Going for “Mr. Big” as an investigation technique: +

Other American-style investigation techniques: +

b) Europeanization:

Multidisciplinary approach towards the drugs problem: +

1960-1970s

Methods – France – P3

France was in favour of a coordinated approach towards drug enforcement techniques.

1960-1970s

Methods – France – P4

Preferred geographical framework: transatlantic level and Pompidou group.

1960-1970s**Methods – France – P5**

Shift from no international cooperation to cooperation at the transatlantic level and in the Pompidou group.

1960-1970s**Methods – France – P6**

a) Americanization:

“Soft” learning from the US (visits etc.): +

“Intense” learning from the US II (courses, internships, etc.): +

b) Europeanization:

Approximating/harmonizing legislation in Europe: +

Systematic information exchange beyond Interpol: +

1960-1970s**Methods – France – P7**

Since the *French Connection* case, France had a strong preference for the institutional development of international cooperation on drug investigation techniques. The American BNDD was welcomed in Paris; there were meetings with the BNDD every 3 months; France did even start “teaching” investigation techniques, and recommended the US-French memorandum of understanding as a blueprint for other European states

1960-1970s**Methods – Germany – P1**

Germany was in favour of a coordinated approach to the development of drug enforcement methods.

1960-1970s**Methods – Germany – P2**

a) Americanization:

Infiltration as an investigation technique: +

Going for “Mr. Big” as an investigation technique: +

Other American-style investigation techniques: +

b) Europeanization:

Multidisciplinary approach towards the drugs problem: +

1960-1970s
Methods – Germany – P3

Germany was in favour of a coordinated approach towards drug enforcement techniques.

1960-1970s
Methods – Germany – P4

Preferred geographical framework: transatlantic level and Pompidou group.

1960-1970s
Methods – Germany – P5

Before the 1970s, cooperation had been limited to coordination with the American CIDs to fight drugs in US military bases; thereafter, Germany had a preference for cooperation at the transatlantic level and in the Pompidou group.

1960-1970s
Methods – Germany – P6

a) Americanization:

“Soft” learning from the US (visits etc.): +

“Intense” learning from the US II (courses, internships, etc.): +

b) Europeanization:

Approximating/harmonizing legislation in Europe: +

Systematic information exchange beyond Interpol: +

1960-1970s
Methods – Germany – P7

Germany was in favour of the institutional development of international cooperation on drug investigation techniques.

1960-1970s
Methods – Italy – P1

Italy was in favour of a coordinated approach to the development of drug enforcement methods.

1960-1970s
Methods – Italy – P2

a) Americanization:

Infiltration as an investigation technique: +

Going for “Mr. Big” as an investigation technique: +

Other American-style investigation techniques: ±

b) Europeanization:

Multidisciplinary approach towards the drugs problem: +

1960-1970s

Methods – Italy – P3

Italy was in favour of a coordinated approach towards drug enforcement techniques.

1960-1970s

Methods – Italy – P4

Preferred geographical framework: transatlantic level and Pompidou group.

1960-1970s

Methods – Italy – P5

Shift from no international cooperation to cooperation at the transatlantic level and in the Pompidou group.

1960-1970s

Methods – Italy – P6

a) Americanization:

“Soft” learning from the US (visits etc.): +

“Intense” learning from the US II (courses, internships, etc.): +

b) Europeanization:

Approximating/harmonizing legislation in Europe: +

Systematic information exchange beyond Interpol: ±

1960-1970s

Methods – Italy – P7

Italy was in favour of the institutional development of international cooperation on drug investigation techniques.

1960-1970s
Methods – UK – P1

In the 1970s, British decision makers almost completely abstained from formulating official “national” preferences with regard to the investigation techniques that should (or should not) be adopted by the police in the prosecution of drug-related crime.

1960-1970s
Methods – UK – P2

Not addressed

1960-1970s
Methods – UK – P3

Not verifiable

1960-1970s
Methods – UK – P4

Not addressed

1960-1970s
Methods – UK – P5

Not verifiable

1960-1970s
Methods – UK – P6

Not addressed

1960-1970s
Methods – UK – P7

Not verifiable

1990-2000s
Methods – France – P1

France is in favour of international cooperation against money laundering.

1990-2000s
Methods – France – P2

Lifting the banking secrecy: +

Lifting the professional secrecy for lawyers: +

Fusion of the money laundering regime with tax evasion: +

Control of large cash transactions: +

1990-2000s

Methods – France – P3

France did fully support the shift from no anti-money laundering regime (in the 1980s) towards a strong regime.

1990-2000s

Methods – France – P4

Preferred geographical framework: FATF

1990-2000s

Methods – France – P5

Shift from no international anti-money laundering regime in the early 1980s to the FATF as the preferred geographical framework.

1990-2000s

Methods – France – P6

Shifting the burden of proof: ±

Tighter control of offshore activities: +

Tangible support to vulnerable countries: +

Readiness for international asset sharing: ±

1990-2000s

Methods – France – P7

France has supported a shift from no international anti-money laundering regime in the early 1980s towards a strong regime.

1990-2000s

Methods – Germany – P1

At least since 1998, Berlin is in favour of international cooperation against money laundering (although it is fair to say that Germany never was a particularly active supporter).

1990-2000s
Methods – Germany – P2

Lifting the banking secrecy: –

Lifting the professional secrecy for lawyers: –

Fusion of the money laundering regime with tax evasion: +

Control of large cash transactions: ±

1990-2000s
Methods – Germany – P3

Germany has been, and partially still is, a relatively lukewarm supporter of the anti-money laundering regime.

1990-2000s
Methods – Germany – P4

Preferred geographical framework: FATF

1990-2000s
Methods – Germany – P5

Shift from no international anti-money laundering regime in the early 1980s to the FATF as the preferred geographical framework.

1990-2000s
Methods – Germany – P6

Shifting the burden of proof: ±

Tighter control of offshore activities: ±

Tangible support to vulnerable countries: ±

Readiness for international asset sharing: –

1990-2000s
Methods – Germany – P7

Germany has supported a shift from no international anti-money laundering regime in the early 1980s towards a relatively strong regime, given domestic constraints.

1990-2000s
Methods – Italy – P1

Italy is in favour of international cooperation against money laundering.

1990-2000s
Methods – Italy – P2

Lifting the banking secrecy: +

Lifting the professional secrecy for lawyers: ±

Fusion of the money laundering regime with tax evasion: +

Control of large cash transactions: +

1990-2000s
Methods – Italy – P3

Italy did fully support the shift from no anti-money laundering regime (in the 1980s) towards a strong regime.

1990-2000s
Methods – Italy – P4

Preferred geographical framework: EU

1990-2000s
Methods – Italy – P5

Shift from no international anti-money laundering regime in the early 1980s to the EU as the preferred geographical framework.

1990-2000s
Methods – Italy – P6

Shifting the burden of proof: ±

Tighter control of offshore activities: +

Tangible support to vulnerable countries: –

Readiness for international asset sharing: –

1990-2000s
Methods – Italy – P7

Despite domestic constraints, Italy has supported a shift from no international anti-money laundering regime in the early 1980s towards a strong regime.

1990-2000s
Methods – UK – P1

Britain is in favour of international cooperation against money laundering.

1990-2000s**Methods – UK – P2**

Lifting the banking secrecy: +

Lifting the professional secrecy for lawyers: ±

Fusion of the money laundering regime with tax evasion: ±

Control of large cash transactions: –

1990-2000s**Methods – UK – P3**

Britain did fully support the shift from no anti-money laundering regime (in the 1980s) towards a strong regime.

1990-2000s**Methods – UK – P4**

Preferred geographical framework: universal

1990-2000s**Methods – UK – P5**

Shift from no international anti-money laundering regime in the early 1980s to the whole world as the preferred geographical framework.

1990-2000s**Methods – UK – P6**

Shifting the burden of proof: +

Tighter control of offshore activities: ±

Tangible support to vulnerable countries: +

Readiness for international asset sharing: +

1990-2000s**Methods – UK – P7**

Britain has supported a shift from no international anti-money laundering regime in the early 1980s towards a strong regime.

1960-1970s
Authorization – France – P1

After the *French Connection* case, France was genuinely committed towards international police cooperation to suppress drug trafficking.

1960-1970s
Authorization – France – P2

Exchange of information and personnel in joint investigations: +

Operating on drug producing and transit countries: +

Migration control (including expulsion and preventive measures): +

Customs and police cooperation: +

1960-1970s
Authorization – France – P3

Shift from no agreement to a detailed protocol with the US and own initiatives at the European level

1960-1970s
Authorization – France – P4

Preferred geographical framework: collaboration beyond Europe (most prominently with the US, but also with Spain, West-Germany, and Turkey)

1960-1970s
Authorization – France – P5

During the 1960s, France had not yet been willing to cooperate with the US on the fight against drug trafficking. By the early 1970s, France had a preference for a variety of agreements and activities with a broad geographical range.

1960-1970s
Authorization – France – P6

Bilateral agreements on operational police cooperation: +

Executive power for foreign agents on national territory: –

Exchange of liaison officers and/or special envoys: +

Technical aid for producing countries: +

1960-1970s
Authorization – France – P7

On occasion of the *French Connection* case, Paris took a very strong commitment for formal institutional coordination with the US agencies, including the carrying out of joint investigations.

1960-1970s
Authorization – Germany – P1

At the beginning, Germany was active mostly due to US pressure. Over the 1970s, however, Germany became genuinely committed towards international police cooperation to suppress drug trafficking.

1960-1970s
Authorization – Germany – P2

Exchange of information and personnel in joint investigations: +

Operating on drug producing and transit countries: +

Migration control (including expulsion and preventive measures): +

Customs and police cooperation: +

1960-1970s
Authorization – Germany – P3

Shift from no action (except for US military bases in the late 1960s) towards a web of intense cooperation around 1980, including a protocol with the US (1978) and with Turkey (1981), plus customs cooperation agreements with a variety of states.

1960-1970s
Authorization – Germany – P4

Preferred geographical framework: collaboration beyond Europe (Germany desired bilateral and multilateral cooperation in Europe and beyond, involving especially the transit and consumer countries and, as far as possible, also some source countries such as Turkey).

1960-1970s
Authorization – Germany – P5

Already in the 1960s, Germany had cooperated on a bilateral basis with the US concerning drugs in the American military bases. By the late 1970s, Germany had a preference for a variety of agreements and activities with a broad geographical range.

1960-1970s
Authorization – Germany – P6

Bilateral agreements on operational police cooperation: +

Executive power for foreign agents on national territory: –

Exchange of liaison officers and/or special envoys: +

Technical aid for producing countries: +

1960-1970s
Authorization – Germany – P7

Although not as much as Paris on occasion of the *French Connection* case, Germany took a strong commitment for formal institutional coordination.

1960-1970s
Authorization – Italy – P1

By the early 1970s, Italy did not yet have a coherent set of preferences on international police cooperation to suppress drug trafficking.

1960-1970s
Authorization – Italy – P2

Not addressed.

1960-1970s
Authorization – Italy – P3

Not verifiable

1960-1970s
Authorization – Italy – P4

Preferred geographical framework: only ad hoc cooperation (no bilateral agreements before the second half of the 1970s)

1960-1970s
Authorization – Italy – P5

No takeoff in the first half of the 1970s.

1960-1970s
Authorization – Italy – P6

Not addressed

(Italy had strong reservations against shortcutting Interpol)

1960-1970s
Authorization – Italy – P7

Not verifiable

1960-1970s
Authorization – UK – P1

In the early 1970s, the political establishment in the UK was not yet sufficiently motivated to formulate a coherent set of national preferences on international police cooperation to suppress drug trafficking.

1960-1970s
Authorization – UK – P2

Not addressed

1960-1970s
Authorization – UK – P3

Not verifiable

1960-1970s
Authorization – UK – P4

Preferred geographical framework: only ad hoc cooperation (no bilateral agreements in the 1970s; the “Draft for a Home Office circular for urgent drug cases involving France” does not count as such an agreement)

1960-1970s
Authorization – UK – P5

No takeoff in the first half of the 1970s.

1960-1970s
Authorization – UK – P6

Not addressed

1960-1970s
Authorization – UK – P7

Not verifiable

1990-2000s
Authorization – France – P1

France was among the initiators of the framework decision on joint investigation teams and supported the participation of Europol.

Accordingly, one can safely assume that the country did want a multilateral umbrella for joint investigation teams in Europe.

1990-2000s**Authorization – France – P2**

Joint investigation teams shall be applied to all sorts of crime: +++

Multinational ad hoc teams for exchanging information on terrorists: +

1990-2000s**Authorization – France – P3**

The EU regime is set to complement (not supersede) an already existing network of bilateral agreements. Despite the institutional innovation, the substantive scope of international cooperation is unlikely to increase significantly. The regime has the same scope as before with the additional possibility of using the EU umbrella.

1990-2000s**Authorization – France – P4**

Preferred geographical framework: EU

1990-2000s**Authorization – France – P5**

Shift from bilateral cooperation towards a regional framework in the EU

1990-2000s**Authorization – France – P6**

Right of participation for Europol: +

Right of initiative for Europol: +

Delegation of executive competences to foreign police officers: –

Commitment towards implementation: +

1990-2000s**Authorization – France – P7**

France wants that Europol shall be allowed to initiate investigations and shall be deeply involved in joint investigation teams. French representatives are strongly promoting the quick establishment of joint investigation teams with a variety of countries. All this would amount to a clear progress in comparison with the situation before 2000.

1990-2000s**Authorization – Germany – P1**

Being in favour of a “European FBI”, Germany was performe in favour of joint investigation teams (although joint investigation teams can also be seen as a surrogate to real investigative and coercive powers for Europol).

1990-2000s
Authorization – Germany – P2

Joint investigation teams shall be applied to all sorts of crime: +++

Multinational ad hoc teams for exchanging information on terrorists: +

1990-2000s
Authorization – Germany – P3

The EU regime is set to complement (not supersede) an already existing network of bilateral agreements. Despite the institutional innovation, the substantive scope of international cooperation is unlikely to increase significantly. The regime has the same scope as before with the additional possibility of using the EU umbrella.

1990-2000s
Authorization – Germany – P4

Preferred geographical framework: EU

1990-2000s
Authorization – Germany – P5

Shift from bilateral cooperation towards a regional framework in the EU

1990-2000s
Authorization – Germany – P6

Right of participation for Europol: +

Right of initiative for Europol: +

Delegation of executive competences to foreign police officers: +

Commitment towards implementation: ±

1990-2000s
Authorization – Germany – P7

In principle, the German preferences would go far beyond joint investigation teams: true investigative and coercive powers to Europol.

1990-2000s
Authorization – Italy – P1

Despite problems with ratification, Italy did want a multilateral umbrella for joint investigation teams in Europe and supported Europol participation.

1990-2000s
Authorization – Italy – P2

Preferred focus on terrorism, drugs, and trafficking in human beings: ±

Multinational ad hoc teams for exchanging information on terrorists: +

1990-2000s
Authorization – Italy – P3

The EU regime is set to complement (not supersede) an already existing network of bilateral agreements. Despite the institutional innovation, the substantive scope of international cooperation is unlikely to increase significantly. The regime has the same scope as before with the additional possibility of using the EU umbrella.

1990-2000s
Authorization – Italy – P4

Preferred geographical framework: EU

1990-2000s
Authorization – Italy – P5

Shift from bilateral cooperation towards a regional framework in the EU

1990-2000s
Authorization – Italy – P6

Right of participation for Europol: +1

Right of initiative for Europol: +1

Delegation of executive competencies to foreign police officers: ±

Commitment towards implementation: -1

1990-2000s
Authorization – Italy – P7

According to the Italian Minister of Interior the final objective is to entrust Europol with the coordination of European investigations on terrorism. But if one looks beyond rhetoric, it is telling that almost two years after the deadline, the framework decision on joint investigation teams has still not been ratified by the Italian parliament. In particular, the Italian judiciary seems to have problems with the usage of evidence that has not been gained according to Italian standards.

1990-2000s
Authorization – UK – P1

Britain was among the initiators of joint investigation teams and supported the participation of Europol. Accordingly, one can safely assume that the country did want a multilateral umbrella for joint investigation teams in Europe.

1990-2000s
Authorization – UK – P2

Joint investigation teams shall be applied to “organized crime groups across the full range of their activities”: +++

Multinational ad hoc teams for exchanging information on terrorists: ±

1990-2000s
Authorization – UK – P3

The EU regime is set to complement (not supersede) an already existing network of bilateral agreements. Despite the institutional innovation, the substantive scope of international cooperation is unlikely to increase significantly. The regime has the same scope as before with the additional possibility of using the EU umbrella.

1990-2000s
Authorization – UK – P4

Preferred geographical framework: EU

1990-2000s
Authorization – UK – P5

Shift from bilateral cooperation towards a regional framework in the EU

1990-2000s
Authorization – UK – P6

Right of participation for Europol: +

Right of initiative for Europol: ±

Delegation of executive competences to foreign police officers: –

Commitment towards implementation: ±

1990-2000s
Authorization – UK – P7

The EU regime will complement (not supersede) an already existing network of bilateral agreements. In the British case the usage of the new instrument is completely optional, and therefore there doesn't seem to be any strong institutional commitment from the British side.