Managing the Civil-Military Interface in the EU: Creating an Organisation Fit for Purpose

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Abstract: The establishment of European Security and Defense Policy /Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1999 has been accompanied by the anticipation that the European Union will represent a unique strategic actor because of its ability to mix civilian and military crisis management instruments as part of a comprehensive approach. But to what extent is this characteristic reflected in the EU’s civil-military organisation? The EU is clearly not a state, but it does embody certain non-intergovernmental characteristics that set it beyond a “normal” inter-state organisation or alliance, the expansion of the role of the administrative level being one of them. The development of a well-functioning civil-military organisation is important in this regard, but appropriate benchmarks for what such an organisation would look like are missing from the current EU debate. A problem is that, when focusing on the novelty and uniqueness of the EU’s comprehensive approach, institutional change is often treated as a good in itself. However, by contrasting and using two classical models for organising civil-military relations – Samuel Huntington’s so-called “normal”, or separated model, and Morris Janowitz “constabulary”, or integrated model – as benchmarks, the article shows that institutional innovations have largely sustained a separation of the civil-military interface, despite the stated objective of developing an EU “culture of coordination”. This situation reflects the inherent tension between a traditional civil-military culture with deep roots in the Member States, on the one hand, and an evolving “in-house” civil-military culture within the
Council Secretariat, on the other. When it comes to ESDP/CSDP, certain Member States have used institutional reform as a way to push through national agendas, producing frequent but often ineffective institutional change. At the same time, there has been a lack of attention inside the Council Secretariat paid to effective measures for breaking down professional and cultural barriers between military officers and civilian personnel.

**Keywords**: civil-military relations, CFSP, ESDP, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defense Policy, security/external, institutionalisation, benchmarking, political science

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**1. Introduction**

The EU’s assumption of a military role by the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 has been accompanied by the anticipation that the Union will represent a unique strategic actor because of its ability to mix civilian and military crisis management instruments as part of a comprehensive approach. In fact, acting comprehensively seems to have become something of *raison d’état* for a Union ever more eager to become a global security actor. In recent years, the EU’s apparatus for crisis management has also been subject to an impressing number of institutional innovations to support this ambition, although with only limited practical results. The aim of this article is to assess the degree to which these institutional developments have enhanced the EU’s ability to plan for and implement a truly comprehensive approach, while ultimately evaluating the appropriateness of the EU’s civil-military organisation.

While the EU is clearly not a state, it does embody certain non-intergovernmental characteristics that set it beyond a “normal” inter-state organisation or alliance – the expansion of the role of the administrative level, also in the ESDP/CSDP domain, being one of them, as reflected in the various contributions to this special issue (See also Norheim-Martinsen, 2010). This raises issues that are not fully captured by existing approaches to CSDP (See the *State of the Art* article by Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra and Maurer in this issue). While EU and integration studies, on the one hand, tend to view the EU as something that
requires special attention empirically and theoretically, strategic studies, on the other, offer useful perspectives on the issue of military power, perspectives that have been largely lost on the EU because of the traditionally state-centric focus, and inherent realist underpinnings, of this tradition. There exists, however, an extensive scholarship – and an ongoing debate – within the strategic studies community on how traditional models of organising civil-military relations affect and are adapted to current thinking on how to deal with the complex challenges of today’s security environment. This perspective is often overlooked by many EU scholars who, by typically focusing on the novelty and uniqueness of the EU’s comprehensive approach, tend to treat institutional change as a good in itself, even though frequent institutional changes are, as it often turns out, not necessarily to be taken as signs of a healthy civil-military organisation “fit for purpose” (See Forster, 2006: 43).

To situate recent institutional developments in support of CSDP in the broader strategic literature on civil-military relations, this article discusses two classical models for organising the civil-military interface: Samuel Huntington’s so-called “normal”, or stovepipe model (Huntington 1957), and Morris Janowitz’ “constabulary”, or integrated model (Janowitz, 1960). By tapping into the current debate, it shows that, despite the different original purpose of and context for these models, they are still highly relevant to many of the issues that states – and international institutions like the EU and the UN – are battling with today. The models are then used as “benchmarks” for an assessment of the institutional apparatus in support of CSDP. The article shows that, for several reasons, the many institutional innovations over the last ten years have largely sustained a “Huntingtonian” separation of the civil-military interface, despite the stated objective of and efforts made towards developing a more “Janowitzian” EU “culture of coordination”. The article also offers some considerations regarding how an EU civil-military organisation “fit for purpose” may be forged.

2. Two Models for Organising the Civil-Military Interface

The traditional point of concern for the management of civil-military relations has been how to create effective military forces under proper civilian control. It has been observed that it is “extremely difficult [for democracies] to escalate the level of brutality and violence to that which can secure [military] victory” (Merom, 2003: 15). This was also Samuel Huntington’s concern in his seminal study The Soldier and the State (1957), which is still referred to as the “normal theory” of civil-military relations. Indeed, for almost five decades, Huntington’s model represented a blueprint for organising civil-military relations. As such, it has sustained a particular structure and culture underpinning how civil-military relations are approached and organised in most democratic states, while it is only recently that people in the strategic community have started to question the legacy and appropriateness of Huntington’s model for the security challenges of today.
If we go back to the roots, the central premise in Huntington’s model (1957) is his conception of the military profession as a vocation not dissimilar to, for example, medicine or law, which are all recognised by expertise in a particular area of human affairs, and a sense of belonging and commitment to other members of one’s group. As with other vocations, military professionalism is definable, universal and capable of being isolated. In Huntington’s view, it is possible to separate military means from political ends. The officers and soldiers ought to represent apolitical servants of the state. Their sole purpose is to fight and win the nation’s wars, which is the “functional imperative” or criterion by which the quality of the armed forces ought to be measured, not the political end for which it fights. Huntington’s answer to the question how to create effective armed forces under proper civilian control is, therefore, a strict division of labour between political decision-making and military implementation. He calls this “objective control”, which relies on extensive military professional autonomy over a clear jurisdiction of professional practice, namely the conduct of war. A necessary precondition for effective armed forces under civilian control is, therefore, an ideological as well as physical separation of the military and civilian spheres.

In his book *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960), Morris Janowitz warned against the consequences of this separation. Taking issue with Huntington’s view of military professionalism, Janowitz claimed – somewhat ahead of his time – that “the use of force in international relations has been so altered that it seems appropriate to speak of constabulary forces, rather than of military forces” (Janowitz, 1960: 418). This change of role, he argued, added a new set of requirements to the military profession. Proper civilian control and effective use of the armed forces can only be achieved by political integration and education of the officer corps. This cannot be achieved by separation, because of the inevitable political and social impact of the military establishment on civil society. In Janowitz’ view, the professional military officer:

- is sensitive to the political and social impact of the military establishment on international security affairs.
- He is subject to civilian control, not only because of the “rule of law” and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values (Janowitz, 1960: 420).

In place of Huntington’s “objective control” through separation, Janowitz advocated “subjective control” through integration with civil society. However, his concern was the same as Huntington’s – how to create effective armed forces under civilian control. It was not the need for coordination between armed forces, NGOs and a host of different actors on the ground in places like Afghanistan, Iraq or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a point which could be raised with regard to the appropriateness of using the two models to discuss more current concerns. However, as an ideal type of organising the civil-military interface, Janowitz’ model of tight integration to break down cultural barriers between the military profession and the rest of society represents an obvious contrast to Huntington’s model. It represents also a wholly different way of thinking about civil-military relations, which has again become relevant in the context of peace and stability operations and the need for...
comprehensive strategies, planning and command arrangements that incorporate all instruments of power.

In a recent edited volume that discusses Huntington’s impact on civil-military thinking in the US, two of the authors claim: “Nowhere are the deficiencies of such an approach [i.e. Huntington’s] more evident than with respect to stability operations” (Schadlow and Lacquement Jr., 2009: 114). Recent operational experience shows that effective crisis management requires a quick response from flexible teams of people with various professional backgrounds who can address different types of challenges, i.e. filling immediate security gaps, while, at the same time, starting to build local capacity. Civilian instruments cannot simply be “bolted on” once peace is restored, but needs to be involved already in the early phases of planning for an operation. A strict separation of planning and command structures – although Huntington’s arguments for such a model were perfectly reasonable in the Cold War-context in which they were conceived – have today become an obstacle for the kind of tasks that the military is expected to carry out.

However, while Huntington, and the way in which his arguments have “colored the military’s self-perception for an entire generation” (Quotation in Schadlow and Lacquement Jr., 2009), have become a source of considerable debate inside the US strategic community (Barnett, 2004; Feaver and Kohn, 2001; Nielsen and Snider, 2009), these are issues that have received little attention in Europe. In the EU debate, they have been largely absent (However, see Gordon, 2006). Still most European states’ draw on a Huntingtonian model, and retain what Rupert Smith refers to as heavily “stove-piped” civil-military organisations (see also Forster, 2006; Smith, 2007). One important exception is Britain, which is probably the state that most closely resemble the “Janowitzian” model (Egnell, 2006; 2009). This means that even if the EU’s origins as a peace project and long history of being a strong civilian power seem to suggest that it is in one way historically pre-disposed to becoming a comprehensive civil-military actor, the EU idea of developing a “culture of coordination” is up against a very different type of culture that has dominated civil-military thinking in most of the EU Member States for a generation.

This tension between a traditional civil-military culture with deep roots in the Member States, on the one hand, and an evolving “in-house” civil-military culture within the Council Secretariat, on the other, explains well the shape and direction that the EU’s civil-military organisation has taken. The cultural inclination to think in terms of separation represents a particularly strong path dependency, insofar as “cultures” are notoriously hard to change (See Norheim-Martinsen, 2007; Pierson, 2004). Developing a particular culture requires, on the other hand, targeted measures that essentially facilitate extensive human interaction over time. However, as the following analysis shows, in the EU, certain Member States have used institutional reform as way to push through national agendas, producing frequent but often ineffective institutional change. At the same time, there has been a lack of attention inside the Council Secretariat paid to effective measures for breaking down professional and cultural barriers between civilian and officers, such as co-location and joint exercises.
3. Flawed by Design: Civil-Military Organisation in the EU

When uniformed officers started moving about in the Justus Lipsius building from 2000, it marked the introduction of a military culture in the EU, which not only meant that civil servants had to get used to the sight, but had to interact with them at different levels. To be able to integrate this new element into the EU machinery, Solana soon after his appointment as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR-CFSP) stated on several occasions the need to build a “strong in-house strategic culture”. One of the early steps was to co-locate all crisis management elements in the Kortenberg building in order to establish a secure environment for them, and provide the physical preconditions for increased interaction between different branches. Part of this co-location exercise included splitting up the Council Secretariat, moving the Directorates dealing with CFSP/CSDP matters in the larger DG-E out of the Justus Lipsius building.

Incidentally, and perhaps symbolically significant, the move separated these units from the “ordinary” business of the Council Secretariat. It also meant moving them further away from the Commission’s premises. The physical separation reflected a very real conceptual and institutional separation of the long term conflict preventive considerations of the Commission in the first pillar, and the Council’s responsibility for short term crisis management in the second. Such a division of labour would on the outset appear to be practical, and perhaps unavoidable because of the pillar structure, but drawing such a sharp line has sustained a somewhat artificial separation of areas of responsibility. This has proved a significant challenge for the coordination of conflict preventive and crisis management tools, especially when it comes to areas where competencies are disputed, such as in the area of civil protection (See e.g. Ehrhart and Quille, 2007; Gourlay, 2006). Although fully appreciating the gravity of the significant challenges posed by this situation, this article will in the following concentrate on the organisation of the civil-military interface in support of second pillar activities, more specifically the planning and command arrangements for military and civilian CSDP operations (See also Petrov and Mattelaer’s contributions to this special issue).

Civilian and military crisis management elements are in the EU coordinated in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which provides the overall strategic assessment in a crisis situation, and exercises full political control of CSDP operations. It receives advice from and instructs the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), and provides thus a minimum level of coordination by merging the organisational outputs of the two branches. Below the politico-strategic level, the civilian and military “arms” are divided. Until recently, it has also been a striking feature of the EU’s crisis management framework that there has been no clear hierarchy of civilian and military sub-units that correspond to each other and interact – at least not in a formalised manner – at the lower levels. There has been no direct civilian equivalent to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which operates under the direction of and reports to the EUMC.
On the civilian side, tasks have been loosely divided on a functional and geographical basis between the Policy Unit and the DG-E, whereas the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) is formally attached to COREPER. It has, however, started to report more substantially to PSC in step with the gradual increase in operational activities in CSDP. In addition to these organisational differences, and perhaps partly due to them, the EUMS has in practice remained somewhat on the side of the traditional DG structure, although it is formally an integral part of the Council Secretariat.

Although most people are keen to point out that working relations have improved, interview data indicate that military personnel to a lesser degree than the civilian personnel engage in interaction with other units, unless it occurs within the space of those parts that target civil-military coordination specifically, i.e. the Civil-Military Cell (CMC), or when practical operational needs demand it (See also Khol, 2006: 127). Integration of the civil-military interface in a “Janowitzian” sense is, therefore, largely absent below the politico-strategic level in the EU. Part of the reason for this is arguably that:

[w]hilst Council statements frequently reiterate the requirements for coordinated planning [...], it initially failed to create a genuinely ‘coherent’ structure. Rather it facilitated periodic comings together of what remained essentially separate and parallel planning processes which enjoyed only occasional convergence, particularly during the routine and initial phases of a crisis [...] (Gordon, 2006: 352).

It was not until late 2003 that the Council started taking concrete institutional steps towards more coordination between its civilian and military branches. By then, successive European Councils since 1999, and the Swedish (2001) and Danish (2002) Presidencies in particular, had highlighted the need to do more in this area (See Khol, 2006). In November 2003, the Council put forward the concept of Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) in a paper addressing “the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of the EU’s response to the crisis” (European Council, 2003a). CMCO must not be confused with CIMIC, which is a militarily derived concept concerned with force protection by way of cooperation with civilian and local authorities on the tactical level, as part of a complex military operation (Cf. Khol, 2006: 124-125). The EUMC adopted its own version of CIMIC, heavily influenced by NATO’s concept, for EU crisis management operations in 2002 (European Council, 2002). CMCO, on the other hand, was envisaged as an internal mechanism and a process for creating a “culture of coordination” rather than putting “too much emphasis on detailed structures and procedures” (Khol, 2006: 127).

Nevertheless, the period since 2003 has been marked by a number of institutional add-ons to make up for an original structure that is perhaps best described as being “flawed by design” (or perhaps “devoid of design”), to borrow a phrase from Amy Zegart (1999). As Radek Khol points out: “The framework for crisis management efforts was created by the military, while civilian input came later on and did not change the strategic planning approach fundamentally” (Khol, 2006: 127). In addition, institutional developments have often resulted from struggles and compromises between key Member States, and have, therefore, reflected
other considerations than the desire to create an effective civil-military organisation. This is illustrated in the next section, which gives a brief recapitulation of developments since 2003, while highlighting some of the problems and challenges that the EU has imported to its civil-military organisation along the way.

4. Reforming the Civil-Military Structures

To be able to plan and conduct its first military operation in Macedonia in 2003, the EU, both for political and structural reasons, had to rely on NATO assets, access to which was secured by the long overdue Berlin Plus agreement in December 2002. In practical terms, operation Concordia was carried out with NATO-SHAPE as operational headquarters. An EU Staff Group (EUSG) of nine officers was established, and D-SACEUR was designated EU Operation Commander. Berlin Plus did not provide for a permanent EU presence in NATO-SHAPE, but the EUSG was kept on for lessons learned when Concordia was terminated in December 2003, since an EU take-over of NATO's operation SFOR in Bosnia was anticipated. As part of a larger defence package, endorsed by the December 2003 Council and entitled “European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning, and Operations”, a permanent EU Cell at NATO-SHAPE was also established, while NATO was invited to set up liaison arrangements with the EUMS (European Council, 2003b). The EU Cell has today grown to some 20 EU officers, while since December 2004, the EU's military operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia has been conducted from NATO-SHAPE.

For mainly political reasons, Berlin Plus was a precondition for the EU to get off its feet militarily in 2003, after CSDP was declared operational at Laeken in 2001, but it has in many ways hampered the development of an integrated civil-military organisation in support of CSDP. Due to the physical and conceptual separation below the politico-strategic level, it inevitably pushed the level of coordination upwards to meetings between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Work in the PSC-NAC channel has, however, been blocked by the conflict between Turkey and Greece over the Cyprus question. Meetings were originally scheduled once a month, but have in reality been less frequent. When they do meet, discussions tend to be limited, while attempts to discuss closer practical collaboration between NATO and the EU are effectively put down by a handful of states. A NATO official reported that the political climate has gradually deteriorated to a stage at which one refrains from entering into debates in the first place rather waiting for a formal objection (Interview with NATO official, NATO-SHAPE, May 2006).

In more practical terms, a situation where a CSDP operation is carried out from within NATO naturally leaves the EU with a limited opportunity to learn from or make adjustments to the operation as it proceeds. Moreover, EUFOR Althea has arguably not produced the kind of mutual reinforcement and practical development of EU-NATO relations that were first envisioned. A case in point is that while EU officers have become well integrated at NATO-
SHAPE, carrying out their duties as any NATO officer would, contact with the EUMS is limited. According to one EU officer, there is an inherent scepticism in Brussels of anything that tastes of NATO, while “there has neither been any evaluation of what the EU has got out of Berlin plus, nor of how relations can be further utilised” (Interview with EU officer, NATO-SHAPE, May 2006). NATO has also, on the initiative of D-SACEUR, attempted to set up informal staff-to-staff contact points with the Council Secretariat, but have been met with scepticism on the part of EU officials (Interview with NATO official, NATO-SHAPE, May 2006).

NATO’s practical influence upon the EU’s approach to the civil-military interface has naturally been significant by virtue of the fact that most EU military officers have considerable experience from the Alliance (See Bono, 2004; and Mattelaer). But its legacy has waned in step with the growing emphasis on internal EU civil-military coordination through the CMCO process since 2003, as further steps were introduced in a second document titled “Civil-Military Co-ordination: Framework paper of possible solutions for the management of EU Crisis Management Operations”, adopted in May 2006 (European Council, 2006; see also Ojanen, 2006).

Albeit having Berlin Plus as framework for EUFOR Althea was a political necessity at the time, it has arguably remained a heavy constraint on effective coordination with other EU activities in the region. Reliance on the PSC-NAC channel has been problematic, but it is also clear that the potential for developing closer relations on the working level has been forfeited, and that there has been considerable resistance at the EU institutional level towards cooperation beyond the strictly necessary. There is, as such, both political and bureaucratic forces at play, but the lack of cooperation may also reflect a perceived gap between the strategic concepts of NATO and the EU respectively.

Having initially drawn heavily on NATO’s CIMIC approach, the EU’s civil-military thinking was first centred on the operational and tactical levels, while lacking a “strategic” component (Gordon, 2006: 351). CMCO raised the awareness of the need to connect civil and military resources along the whole spectrum from strategic planning to actual implementation in response to a crisis, while integrating CIMIC conceptually in the overall CMCO approach (Ehrhart and Quille, 2007: 13). Implicitly it also highlighted the paradox of branching out the responsibility for military operational planning and command to another organisation, which operates on a different understanding of civil-military relations altogether. NATO does not have civilian capabilities with which to coordinate, while its approach to CIMIC “has tended to ‘instrumentalise’ the civil sector in support of a military mission and creates perceived obstacles to more genuinely ‘holistic’ strategy” (Gordon, 2006: 348; see also Smith, 2007: 396). In this context, developing an autonomous institutional capacity for planning and running CSDP operations made practical sense, although it was political rather than functional imperatives that pushed for institutional change.
The political controversy surrounding the establishment of the EU Civilian and Military Planning Cell (CivMilCell) goes back to the informal “Chocolate Mini-Summit” between France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003, and the French initiative to set up an autonomous EU military operational HQ (OHQ) outside Brussels. The so-called Tervuren-initiative was heavily criticised by Britain who deemed it an unnecessary duplication of existing structures. As a compromise, the establishment of the CivMilCell was agreed as a part of the above mentioned defence package endorsed by the December 2003 Council (European Council, 2003b).

Although the document made it quite clear that “NATO is the forum for discussion and the natural choice for an operation involving the European and American allies”, it sanctioned the conduct of EU autonomous military operations. In such cases, the main option would be “national HQs, which can be multi-nationalised for the purpose of conducting an EU-led operation” (European Council, 2003b). This formalised a lead nation principle, which had already been used for the military operation *Artemis* in Congo, which was launched in June 2003 and led from Paris, whereas five national HQs (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Greece) were identified for use in future operations (See also Petrov in this issue). The other option was, somewhat defensively worded, the possibility that:

> In certain circumstances, the Council may decide, upon the advice of the Military Committee, to draw on the collective capacity of the EUMS, in particular where a joint civil/military response is required and where no national HQ is identified. Once such a decision is taken, the civilian/military cell in the EUMS would have responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and run the operation.

And the document goes on to make it perfectly clear: “This would not be a standing HQ” (European Council, 2003b).

To navigate clear of all duplication charges, the document also highlighted the added value in being able to run joint civil-military operations (Quille et al., 2006: 14) However, since the establishment of the CivMilCell and the OpCen were a result of a compromise including France – who really wanted an autonomous military OHQ – the new unit naturally received a heavy military bias, placed as it was inside the EUMS (Gordon, 2006: 354). The CivMilCell was developed by military officers, and by 2006, one year after it was formally established, people on the civilian side regarded it as a definitive military unit, and had yet to be significantly involved in or even informed about its tasks and functions (Interviews, Council Secretariat, May 2006).

The military bias was augmented by the fact that in case of a situation where the OpCen was to be actually manned, “the centre would operate separately from the strategic role of the EUMS, under a designated Operation Commander”, but still “a core staff, essentially ‘double hatted’ from the EUMS, would be required to maintain the necessary level of readiness” (European Council, 2003b). As such, the OpCen and the CivMilCell, despite its fairly balanced composition in the end of military and civilian personnel, largely reflected
traditional civil-military thinking, in which the civilian side is invited to take part in the military planning process, but *de facto* given a military support role (Smith, 2007: 396-97).

Although there remains uncertainty as to if and when the OpCen will be activated, there is an expectation that it will only be used “in case of a predominantly military operation” (European Council, 2008). The military component will then be organised, as any military OHQ, in five divisions, including a CIMIC division, and the civilian component will remain under the control of DG E. That is, the agreement on OpCen does not really provide for *integrated* operational planning, merely co-location and prospects for working “hand in hand”, as stated in the Council document (European Council, 2008), while there appears to be a high threshold for invoking the capacity. Of course, civilian and military operations have different operational needs, which need to be reflected in mandates and in planning and command options (Quille et al., 2006: 16). There is certainly no need to set up a full military OHQ to run most civilian operations, but one would expect that the OpCen would benefit from having also a permanent civilian “core staff” to plan for this. This would presumably improve connectivity across the whole spectrum of strategic and operational planning.

The use of the CivMilCell in connection with the planning for the operations in Aceh and Sudan, which involved military observers and counsellors, underlined its potential for linking work across the civil-military interface (Hansen, 2006: 27). But the operations themselves were not classified as integrated operations, but as civilian missions to be carried out from DG E, which has after all developed considerable experience over the course of planning and conducting more than 15 highly diverse missions since 2002. But due to lack of established procedures and constant understaffing on the civilian side, there is limited capacity for turning these valuable experiences into lessons learned (Interview, Council Secretariat DG E, May 2006).

Lowering the threshold for invoking the OpCen capacity could have been a suitable way of pooling resources. As preparations for the OpCen were underway in 2006, people on the civilian side also anticipated that future civilian operations would be able to draw upon the new capacity (Interview, Council Secretariat DG E, May 2006). That proved not to be the case. Instead the Council decided on 18 June 2007 to set up the somewhat ambiguously titled Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The name of the unit reflected British opposition against giving it formal status as civilian OHQ, although it has been routinely referred to as such (Interview with CPCC official, Council Secretariat, April 2009). Accordingly, it does not have an ordinary planning unit, but it does have a Planning Methodology Unit (consisting of eight people), which will assist in the drafting of civilian strategic options and operation plans. Apart from that, it resembles an ordinary OHQ, organised in a Mission Support Unit (13 people) and a Conduct of Operations Unit (39 people), totalling 64 persons.

The CPCC draws on the staff and expertise of DG E IX (Civilian Crisis Management Directorate), which remains intact and will continue to be responsible for political and
strategic guidance. In terms of strengthening the civilian crisis management arm in CSDP, then, the CPCC was clearly a step forward. It increased manpower, and established procedures and a suitable physical environment (premises, secure lines of communication, etc) for planning and conducting civilian operations, which until 2007 had been conducted, more or less ad hoc from inside DG E. It also established a parallel structure to the military chain of command by identifying a Civilian Operation Commander to lead the CPCC, who answers directly to PSC and the High Representative (Grevi, 2007: 38). As such, it went some way towards evening out the initial military bias that has characterised the EU’s civil-military organisation from the start.

But at the same time, it confirmed a “Huntingtonian” separation of the civil-military interface by formalising a system of two chains of command, and by identifying specifically where they are to be bridged, namely at the politico-strategic level in the PSC, and at the level of strategic planning in the CivMilCell. As such, the Council Secretariat resembled still what Rupert Smith calls a traditional stovepipe structure from the tactical to the strategic, in which, except in particular cases, there is little interaction between the “pipes” (Smith, 2007). The danger is that such a rigid system lacks flexibility and to some degree weakens the incentive for nurturing contacts between the civilians and the military officers.

It is also worth noting that such a strict formalisation of civil-military relations resonates badly with a British “Janowitzian” approach, which may partly explain its principled stance against many of the institutional add-ons in support of CSDP. British scepticism is often viewed in context of its “privileged relationship” with the United States and dismissed as typical Euroscepticism. However, since the change of course in the lead up to St-Malo in 1998, Britain has consistently supported the strengthening of CSDP (See Howorth, 2000; 2005). But its focus has been on capabilities rather than on institutions, as reflected most recently in its insistence on strict capability criteria for “permanent structured cooperation”, included in the Lisbon Treaty. France, on the other hand, has been eager to set up permanent institutions as a means to strengthen the military side of CSDP. This French drive is often viewed against the background of its ingrained scepticism towards NATO ever since its decision to leave NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966. But incidentally the EU’s civil-military organisation has also come to resemble the French “Huntingtonian” system of strict separation, and its fairly conservative approach to civil-military coordination in general (Cf. Ehrhart and Quille, 2007; Forster, 2006).

As a result, the overall EU civil-military coordination process came to be dominated by two parallel objectives or strategies, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but may get in the way of each other: One has been the set-up of strong, balanced civilian and military institutions, which are bridged by units with a specified, formal responsibility for civil-military relations, while the other has been the nurturing of a “culture of coordination” that shall ideally transcend and reduce those formal institutional barriers.
5. Building a Culture of Coordination

Being able to work together requires a common perception of challenges and concepts amongst the people involved, a shared situational awareness, and a mutual understanding of and respect for the others’ qualities and responsibilities. In short, things need to make sense, common sense, to everyone involved. Yet the problem is that people with different professional backgrounds are used to different organisational structures (hierarchy vs. network), different ways of solving problems (intuitive vs. analytical), different views on good leadership (authoritarian vs. inclusive), and different ways of communicating (accepting orders vs. encouraging discussion) (Cf. Danielsen, 2008). This is why not only civilians and soldiers, but also humanitarian workers and police officers or lawyers may seem to find themselves at odds with each other in crisis management operations. Building a “culture of coordination” at the EU level, therefore, inevitably means attempting to reconcile inherently different professional cultures. This can hardly be achieved without extensive human interaction.

This point finds support in the fact that once an operation is up and running, people who are engaged in the same theatre of operations tend to work out practical ways of working together. To coordinate the activities of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia, for example, people in DG E VIII and IX and EUMS soon set up weekly informal Core Team Meetings (CTMs), which was supplemented by expanded CTMs including the EU Special Representative (EUSR) and representatives from the Commission. Within these Core Teams, which have since then been routinely set up for other CSDP operations, civil-military coordination have reportedly become a matter of routine, and there are no major difficulties in sharing information and views across institutional boundaries (Interviews, Council Secretariat, May 2006). As one commentator, quoting a Council Secretariat official, also remarked: “During a crisis ‘when people are dying on us’, it becomes easier to reach practical arrangements on the ground and in Brussels on how to tackle the situation” (Knutsen, 2008: 37). In the event of major challenges, the incentive for working together is stronger and cooperation will often follow naturally. That is not necessarily the case in the early phases of strategic and pre-operational planning, with the result that civil-military coordination is often insufficient.

To avoid this, the EU, on Solana’s initiative, introduced the concept of Comprehensive Planning, inspired by the UN’s similar concept for “integrated mission planning” (Ehrhart and Quille, 2007: 11; see also Eide et al., 2005; European Council, 2005a). The overall purpose, as described by Hans Gerhard Ehrhart and Gerard Quille, has been to improve CMCO by engaging all relevant EU actors at the earliest stage of the planning process. It is supposed to be valid for all phases of EU engagement, and to cover transitions from one operation or mission to another, also crossing the pillars. It is, however, a non-binding concept, which is, therefore, dependent on the goodwill of the parties involved.
No permanent structures for Comprehensive Planning have been put in place, but so-called Crisis Response Coordinating Teams (CRCT) have been established as an *ad hoc* basis for crisis management operations since 2003 (See European Council, 2003c). A CRCT is envisaged as a flexible grouping of senior officials at director level from the Council Secretariat and the Commission, who will convene to help prepare the overall Crisis Management Concept, which elaborates the EU’s political objectives and proposes to the PSC a broad set of options (Gordon, 2006: 352). To this end, it performs an early joint situation assessment, and seeks coherence between the range of civilian and military Strategic Options proposed via CIVCOM and the EUMC. The Crisis Management Concept, in turn, lays the framework for the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN).

As a result of the Comprehensive Planning initiative and subsequent elaboration of the concept, the EU has taken a few potentially significant steps towards creating a shared situational awareness at the Director level, designed to trickle down to lower levels as they develop their concepts and plans. The initiative has also brought about some clarification of concepts and procedures. However, at the same time, it has been accompanied by institutional developments that have placed the responsibility for developing corresponding military and civilian Strategic Options, CONOPS and OPLANs firmly within the civilian and military chains of command respectively. In addition, as Stuart Gordon points out: “There is already some evidence to suggest that the CRCT concept has not yet functioned optimally in the planning of current EU operations and exercises and that other, more *ad hoc* liaison processes have tended to emerge as a reaction to specific problems” (Gordon, 2006: 352). Often, more immediate and practical problems tend to take the focus off the overall picture. Moreover, Comprehensive Planning has not created incentives for closer human interaction at lower levels beyond the eventual implicit requirements that more integrated Crisis Management Concepts will have for the elaboration for subsequent concepts and plans. This will have to be stimulated by other means.

Simulating real challenges in joint exercises is one way of creating incentives for human interaction, which may be built upon in subsequent crisis situations (Cf. Danielsen, 2008). The EU has to date carried out three crisis management exercises: CME 02 in May 2002, CME/CMX 03 together with NATO in November 2003, and CME 04 in May 2004. Since 2004, it has also carried out three military exercises: MILEX 05 in November 2005, MILEX 07 (testing the OpCen) in June 2007, and MILEX 08 in June 2008. Lessons learned from these exercises are not open to the public, but judging from frequency alone, they come across as too rare and isolated events to have a significant impact on daily working relations, or even to involve the same people more than once or twice, due to length of rotation periods at least on the military side. It is also a case in point that the current EU Battlegroup training system makes no provisions for EU-led exercises involving the strategic level or civilian crisis management elements (Lindström, 2007: 28).

If one could for a brief moment put political realities aside, one could also imagine a more radical re-organisation of the whole Council Secretariat. Rather than having dedicated “cells”
for civil-military coordination, one could instead go for a model of functionally and/or geographically ordered “cells” in which military officers and civilians work together on a daily basis. In practical terms, this would mean that the EUMS would represent merely the overall organisational entity comprising all military personnel, and not the physical section of the Kortenberg building where all the officers sit. Also some contingency planning and doctrine development would be carried out in integrated cells with a balanced representation of civilian and military personnel, although it is to be expected that some parts of it should have to cater to the specific needs of both branches respectively. This would, however, require a massive re-arrangement of the whole Council Secretariat.

6. Concluding Remarks

The analysis of the current institutional set-up for implementing the comprehensive approach shows that, on the one hand, the EU has sought a “Janowitzian” approach to the civil-military interface, perhaps best captured in its aim of developing a “culture of coordination”. But on the other hand, it has, through the institutionalisation of its crisis management structures, confirmed a “Huntingtonian” separation of its civilian and military arms. From the very start, the military arm of the EU was simply “added to the civil structure as a separate limb”, as noted by Björn Müller-Wille (2002: 61). And since civilian crisis management was also new to the EU, it had to start building institutional structures from scratch. In this context, “[t]he military were first to seek to restructure the operational civil-military interface and harvest any potential synergies” (Gordon, 2006: 340). The military side simply had structures in place that could be adapted to the new strategic environment. This was not the case with the civilian side, which initially came out on its heels.

This tendency has been strengthened by the strong ties with NATO, and the highly politicised process of institutionalising CSDP, behind which looms the ever-present struggle between those Member States pushing for an autonomous EU military capability and those wanting to avoid duplication. This has led to a military bias throughout the strategic and operational planning process, which only recently has been sought “evened out” by a strengthening of the civilian arm through the establishment of CPCC and the post of a Civilian Force Commander. The result has, nevertheless, been a classical stovepipe structure, which has not appeared to create the necessary incentives for a “culture of coordination” to take root.

This does not necessarily mean that the institutionalisation of CSDP has failed the EU’s stated ambitions, or that the current institutional separation of the civil-military interface is set in stone. Today, the EU is more capable of planning for and conducting CSDP operations along the whole civilian-military spectrum than only a few years ago – and the tendency has been to do it alone. The gradual disintegration from NATO is a telling point in more than one respect. Clearly, strained political relations have been one reason for why Berlin Plus has not become the platform for the more fruitful EU-NATO relationship it was intended to be. But also on
the practical working level, it appears that resistance within the EU institutions has been a major obstacle for more cooperation between the two.

Continuing to rely on the physically and doctrinally separate operational planning capacities at NATO-SHAPE, in any case, comes across as counterproductive to the effective integration of the EU’s civilian and military instruments – and it is an option that most likely will be terminated after operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia ends. However, the separation of strategic and operational planning is also a problem with the primacy given to national OHQs as the preferred option for military operational planning for autonomous CSDP operations. This, according to former Director of the European Defence Agency (EDA), Nick Witney, “inevitably means loss of continuity and momentum while the choice of OHQ for each operation is made, and the chosen headquarters gears itself up” (Witney, 2008: 48).

The creation of the OpCen as part of the CivMilCell was potentially a step forward towards a fully integrated EU OHQ, but it has been endowed with a high threshold for activation. The creation of the cell in itself gave rise to high expectations, prompting Solana to characterise it as a “pathfinder, leading the way to a more complete integration of civilian and military expertise within the Council’s structures” (cited in Ehrhart and Quille, 2007: 7; European Council, 2005b: 9). But it received an unfortunate military bias due to the political controversy that preceded it. For the moment, the EU Comprehensive Planning Initiative (CPI) may facilitate integration throughout the strategic and operational planning process, but it remains a non-binding concept. It has, nonetheless, made some headway towards clarifying concepts and procedures, which may in turn lead to a greater degree of shared situation awareness throughout the planning cycle.

Finally, the reorganisation of the Council Secretariat into a new Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) is set to lift civil-military planning activities out of the EUMS, up to the Deputy Director level, and back to the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) stage (Interviews, Council Secretariat, April 2009). When the reorganisation is completed (probably towards the end of 2010), the CMPD will be made up of people from DG E VIII and IX, the CivMilCell and other EUMS units, and even parts of the Commission, but since there is no money to hire people, it will not be reinforced with more civilians. There is, therefore, an inherent danger that the military bias will be carried on into the new Directorate, since the approximately 60 civilians involved in the CPCC are still meshed in the daily running of nine operations, trying to “shoot the wolf that is closest to the sledge”, to quote a CPCC official (Interview, Council Secretariat, April 2009).

That said, it is the continued Huntingtonian mindset that seems to permeate the key actors involved in CSDP – and which has more to do with culture than with structure – that needs to be broken. Yet another institutional add-on will not in itself create the incentives for increased human interaction to take place. Yet this is essential for an informal “culture of coordination” to take root.
References


**Endnotes**

1 ESDP was re-baptised Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the Lisbon Treaty. The latter acronym will be used hereafter.

2 For detailed comparison of Huntington and Janowitz, see Robert Egnell (2006; 2009).
The idea of militaries as constabulary forces or cosmopolitan law enforcers has received renewed attention lately (See e.g. Elliot and Cheeseman, 2004; Kaldor, 1999).

Information obtained in interviews. See also Solana’s early speeches as HR-CFSP.

Since 1 January 2007, the OpCen has been allocated permanent facilities (premises and equipment) in Brussels. It has a permanent staff of eight officers. At full operational capacity, it will be manned by a total of 89 officers and civilians (European Council, 2008).

In addition to the OpCen Permanent Staff, the CMC consists of a Strategic Planning Branch of eight military and seven civilian experts, including two permanent Commission representatives.