How to cite?

DOI: 10.1695/2013001

The Europeanisation of foreign policy: An assessment of the EU impact on Portugal’s post-colonial relations in Sub-Saharan Africa

António Raimundo
University of Minho, Research Centre in Political Science and International Relations (NICPRI), Associate Member.

Abstract: Within the growing literature on the Europeanisation of national foreign policies of European Union (EU) member states, the case of Portugal has been almost absent. Yet despite its small size and intermediate level of development, Portugal has had relatively extensive international relations rooted in its long and rich national history. This article explores the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy by focusing attention on relations with Mozambique. Mozambique is one of Portugal’s largest former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa, a sub-region where the EU has had long-lasting relations. Based on original fieldwork, the findings of this longitudinal assessment point to significant national adaptation, but also highlight Lisbon’s important efforts to project its priorities at the EU level and preserve some freedom of manoeuvre. This study adds to the literature on Portuguese foreign policy and corroborates the usefulness of the Europeanisation concept for exploring the European dynamics that influence national foreign policies. The results may also prove illuminating for other studies on smaller EU member states and Europe-Africa relations.

* The author thanks Carlos Gaspar, the editors of EIoP and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. The author is also grateful to all the interviewees. The largest part of this research was conducted in the context of a PhD programme funded by a grant (SFRH/BD/37088/2007) from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT). An earlier version of this article was circulated as a working paper titled: “The Europeanization of national foreign policy: a case study of Portugal’s relations with Mozambique”, Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI), 2012.
Keywords: Europeanisation; foreign policy; CFSP; Portugal; acquis communautaire; intergovernmentalism; socialisation; integration theory; international relations; political science.

Table of Contents

Introduction .......................................................... 2
1. Portugal’s European Community accession and the acquis on Mozambique .......... 4
   1.2. Adapting to a weak, but potentially useful, acquis ........................................ 5
2. Mozambique’s peace process and European Political Cooperation ..................... 8
   2.1. Between “outside” and attempts at projection ............................................... 8
3. Mozambique’s elections and Common Foreign and Security Policy ...................... 12
   3.1. Adapting for better projecting? ....................................................................... 12
Conclusions ........................................................................ 15
References .......................................................................... 19

Introduction

After the 1974 Carnation Revolution, Europe became more central in Portuguese foreign policy. For many centuries Portugal’s external priorities were oriented towards the Atlantic and its overseas territories. That general orientation was also adopted under the authoritarian Estado Novo regime (1933-1974), which deliberately distanced the small Iberian country from European issues. However, following a regime change and decolonisation in the mid-1970s, Portugal gave a novel emphasis to Europe, particularly to the process of European integration (see Teixeira, 2003). This shift was translated in the country’s full accession to the European Community (EC) in 1986 and in the committed participation that Lisbon subsequently came to have in that regional grouping. Yet in the context of the broad Euro-Atlantic consensus that crystallised domestically, areas of traditional interest continued to occupy an important place in Portuguese foreign policy, even if under new lines. Thus, as a founding member of NATO, Portugal remained actively committed to the Atlantic Alliance and to a close relationship with the United States, as illustrated by the Iraq episode in 2003 (see Gaspar, 2007). Moreover, Lisbon kept its post-colonial relations high on its foreign affairs agenda. For instance, Portugal’s bilateral aid has been traditionally concentrated in its former colonies and, since very early on, Lisbon pushed for the creation of a community of Portuguese-speaking countries, finally established in the mid-1990s (see Cravinho, 2005).

Considering this general pattern of evolution, this article seeks to assess, in an exploratory manner, the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy. While references to the

---

1Portugal was one of the subscribers of the “Letter of the Eight” in January 2003, expressing support for the United States’ approach in Iraq and contributing to a split between EU governments over this important international issue.
2Apart from Portugal, the members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) are Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
“Europeanisation” of Portugal’s foreign policy are frequent, the literature that deals directly with the issue is scarce. Most contributions focus on Portugal’s general participation in European foreign policy, overlooking the impact such involvement may have on national policy.\(^3\) When that issue is dealt with expressly, the approach tends to be very general and unsystematic (see Magone, 2000, 2004, 2006; Moita, 2007).

In order to better examine the EU’s influence at the national level, this article makes an explicit use of the concept of Europeanisation, which has been increasingly applied to the foreign policy domain (e.g. Alecu de Flers, 2012; Economides, 2005; Gross, 2009; Jokela, 2011; Miskimmon, 2007; Pomorska, 2007; Wong, 2006; Wong and Hill, 2011). The utility of the concept lies in its ability to capture the complex interaction of EU and national levels, to assess the transformation of the nation-state on account of European cooperation, and to reveal the underlying mechanisms of this change (Major, 2005: 187). Over the last decade or so, the literature on foreign policy Europeanisation has matured at the empirical, conceptual and theoretical level, but more work is still needed to further test the claims of Europeanisation, particularly extensive and in-depth studies (see Alecu de Flers, 2005; Alecu de Flers and Müller, 2012; Major, 2005; Major and Pomorska, 2005; Mounoutzis, 2011; Smith, 2010; Wong, 2005, 2008). In a frequently used conceptualisation, foreign policy Europeanisation is defined along three interrelated dimensions: “national adaptation,” “national projection” and “identity reconstruction” (Wong, 2005). The first dimension refers mainly to changes in national structures and processes due to EU demands, which become an increasingly important point of reference for national actors. While filtered by national variables, that adaptational pressure from the EU acts as a constraint on member states. The second dimension relates to the projection of national preferences and ideas to the European level. Member states “Europeanise” what were previously national priorities in order to benefit from the advantages of a joint action. Finally, the third dimension centers on the process of identity and interest redefinition in the EU context. Frequent interactions among national and European policy-makers generate processes of social learning and socialisation, which in turn favor the perception of common interests. Based on this conceptualisation, the general question that structures the subsequent analysis is: to what extent has Portuguese foreign policy been “Europeanised”? Four main sub-questions are also considered: (i) whether Portugal has adapted to EU positions; (ii) whether it has tried to expand and influence joint European actions; (iii) whether Portuguese foreign policy elites “think” increasingly in European terms; and (iv) whether Lisbon has favoured other bilateral or multilateral channels over available EU options.

For a more detailed analysis, the article centres on political-diplomatic relations with Mozambique, one of Portugal’s largest former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Like the other Lusophone countries, Mozambique forms part of one of the main pillars of Portuguese foreign policy. Grounded in historical and cultural ties, their post-colonial relations are seen by Lisbon as significant in themselves. But Portuguese policy-makers also perceive those relations as significant because of the value they can add to other dimensions of Portugal’s

external action, particularly within Europe (see Norrie MacQueen, 1997; Venâncio and Chan, 1996). Similar to other former colonial powers, Portugal has in fact been a strong advocate of closer Europe-Africa relations, as illustrated by the bi-regional summits held during its EU Presidencies in 2000 and 2007 (see Ferreira-Pereira, 2008; Neves, 1996). In turn, the EU has long-standing and highly institutionalised relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, even though the sub-region has not been among its top foreign policy priorities. Marked by the historical legacies of some of its member states, those relations have traditionally privileged economic and development dimensions. Yet since the 1990s, the EU has tried to adopt a more coordinated approach towards Africa, and its objectives have become more “ politicised” (see Carbone, 2010; Holland, 2002). The analysis that follows is based to a large degree on primary sources, including interviews conducted in Brussels, Lisbon and London.

In the first section, the article focuses on Portugal’s accession negotiations to the European Community, which lasted from 1978 until 1985. During accession talks, the EU can exert a strong influence on candidate states due to the desire of the latter to become members and their legal obligation to adopt the acquis communautaire. In the second section, the attention moves to Portugal’s participation in the peace process negotiations in Mozambique, whose direct talks ran from 1990 to 1992. This was the most important political event to occur in Mozambique after Portugal’s EC accession while still under European Political Cooperation (EPC). The third section deals with Portugal’s involvement in electoral processes in Mozambique, more precisely with the general elections of 1994 and 2004. Both elections took place after the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was launched and EU observers were sent to monitor them. However, while the 1994 elections were widely considered a “success,” the EU was more critical than ever before regarding the 2004 vote. The article closes with some conclusions.

1. Portugal’s European Community accession and the acquis on Mozambique

When Lisbon began to negotiate its accession to the European Community in the late 1970s, its relationship with Mozambique was far from easy. In fact, with a centuries-long presence in Africa, in the post-Second World War context Portugal had resisted change and fought a protracted colonial war with Mozambique liberation forces that left deep wounds. Thus, following the collapse of Lisbon’s authoritarian regime and decolonisation from 1974-1975, Portugal was interested in rebuilding its ties with a new, more positive vision. However, considering the instability and difficulties that Portugal experienced until the mid-1980s, the precise definition of what that post-colonial policy should be was far from established. Moreover, the civil war that erupted in Mozambique soon after independence and the different orientation Lisbon and Maputo came to adopt during the Cold War brought further challenges to an already sensitive bilateral relationship. In this context, Portugal’s policy instruments were unsurprisingly limited and very often ineffective. In the early 1980s, some improvements took place, but the bilateral relationship remained complicated and somewhat distant. Throughout the pre-accession phase, the acquis communautaire in the field of foreign policy was the European Political Cooperation. The EPC was a loose framework for foreign

http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2013-001a.htm
policy cooperation oriented by broad interests rather than by clearly articulated goals. This was particularly pertinent in relation to Africa, since despite a declared common interest to reinforce “long-standing links,” some member states remained very wary of their national prerogatives towards former colonies. The EC members had committed themselves to regular consultations, coordination of national positions and, where “possible and desirable”, common action. Yet the EPC remained entirely intergovernmental and was kept rigidly separate from the EC legal framework. While habits of cooperation among member states were fostered, the output of EPC was essentially declaratory. Considering this general background, what was the impact of Portugal’s EC accession process on its relations with Mozambique?

1.2. Adapting to a weak, but potentially useful, acquis

Over the period of Portugal’s EC accession negotiations, the EPC acquis on Mozambique was not very substantial. Concerned about growing Soviet influence in southern Africa, in 1975 the EC member states had collectively recognised the independence of Mozambique and expressed their willingness to see the new African country join the Lomé Convention. The following year, the then nine members issued a joint statement setting out their policy towards southern Africa as a whole. Among other aspects, the document rejected “any action by any State aimed at setting up a sphere of influence in Africa” and condemned Apartheid in South Africa (Hill and Smith, 2000: 399; Nuttall, 1992: 127-30). In the face of South African military raids in Angola and Mozambique, in 1981 the Dutch Presidency released a press statement deploring the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those countries (Conseil Européen, 1981). Subsequently, with Mozambique’s decision to join Lomé (achieved in late 1984), relations between Brussels and Maputo gradually became closer. These developments were largely in tune with the pro-Western and European orientation, which had become dominant in Lisbon (Teixeira, 2003: 114-5). By and large, Portugal was also interested in lessening Soviet influence in the sub-region and supporting the sovereignty of its ex-colonies (Figueiredo, 1986: 100). The more openly critical stance of some EC countries vis-à-vis the segregationist South African regime was possibly less welcome in some Portuguese quarters. However, as put by a former Portuguese ambassador, “EPC declarations were not a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.” In that context, the same source added that “in any case, the spoilers were already in” (certainly referring to Britain, among others). The content and limitations of the EPC acquis related to Mozambique were, therefore, not likely to pose many difficulties to Portuguese interests and perspectives. That picture contrasted with the new opportunities EC membership promised to create for Portugal’s meagre and problematic relations with Mozambique, as well as for its overall foreign policy. In fact, for Portugal’s main political forces, EC accession had become a top priority in order to support the stabilisation and modernisation of the nascent

---

4 Later Portugal became one of the EC member states (together with Britain and West Germany) most opposed to a “tougher” stance on the South African white regime.
5 Interview (Brussels, 2011).
6 Ibid.
democracy, as well as the redefinition of its international orientation (Pinto and Teixeira, 2004: 122-4). That same pro-European political elite dominated Portugal’s accession negotiations, where the “external relations chapter” was fairly easy to close (Dinan, 2004: 184). Ultimately, the *acquis politique* was part of the conditions Lisbon had to accept in order to become an EC member.

Although the “European option” was a priority, throughout the pre-accession period Portugal continued to promote initiatives in relation to its former African colonies. Mainly from the late 1970s Portuguese authorities sought to improve the country’s post-colonial relations (see Norman MacQueen, 1985). The EC appears to have added a further impulse to that *rapprochement*. Since the beginning of Portugal’s accession process, Brussels had pointed out the potential utility of Lisbon’s historical links in different continents (European Commission, 1978: 7). Moreover, as the EC and its member states were interested in strengthening their relations with the Front-Line States (particularly with Angola and Mozambique, then still outside Lomé), Portugal increasingly linked strong ties with its ex-colonies to a reinforcement of its own position within the European Community (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 45). Portugal’s initiatives in Africa were meant to be “compatible” with the country’s new international orientation, including the objective of EC membership. However, considering the political instability and uncertainties in Portugal at that time, that broad understanding incorporated many domestic nuances (see Gaspar, 1988). In any case, it was clear that Portugal wanted to preserve a voice in relation to its former colonies, including *vis-à-vis* Mozambique. A good illustration of that was Portugal’s mediation role in the “Nkomati Pact,” signed by Mozambique and South Africa in March 1984. Lisbon’s stake in the agreement was justified on the basis of the safety of the Portuguese community in South Africa, as well as the losses that the instability was causing to the Portuguese state by affecting the operation of the Cahora Bassa dam in Mozambique (Figueiredo, 1986: 96; MacDonald, 1993: 113-4). With Nkomati, Lisbon’s diplomacy played an active role in the politics of the region for the first time since 1975 (Gaspar, 1988: 62). That role appears to have been conducted in coordination with Washington which had a key involvement in the process exerting pressure on both sides to negotiate and providing assistance to Mozambique (Hall and Young, 1997: 146-9). On the European side, a statement released by the French Presidency welcomed the “understanding” between Pretoria and Maputo, but without specifying the role of the external mediation (European Commission, 1984: 95). Eventually the pact collapsed and so did Portugal’s attempt as a regional mediator. Among the reasons pointed out for Lisbon’s failure were internal Portuguese divisions, lack of resources and regional conditions beyond its control (Gaspar, 1988: 65). EC membership arguably presented itself as potentially useful to help overcome some of those shortcomings.

---

7 Interview with former Portuguese politician (Lisbon, 2010).
8 Interview with former Portuguese ambassador (Brussels 2011).
9 The pact aimed at preventing the Mozambique government (led by the FRELIMO party) from supporting the African National Congress, on the one hand, and the government of South Africa from supplying the Mozambican rebel movement, RENAMO, on the other.
10 A legacy of colonial times, the massive Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme was at the time still primarily owned by the Portuguese state.
While Portugal’s intentions to play a specific role in Europe-Africa relations became visible early on, it was only in the final stages of Lisbon’s EC accession negotiations that such claims gained more ground and clarity. A senior Portuguese diplomat remarked that, from the closing phase of the accession process, Portugal started to consider what would be its distinctive “mark” within the EC in the domain of foreign policy. In the context of Euro-Africa relations, in particular, the role Portugal envisaged for itself was that of a “privileged interlocutor” (Gama, 1985: 312). Through accession, Portugal could join the group of member states with historical links to Africa (such as Britain and France) and make a valid contribution to closer ties between the two continents. Under its new status, Portugal would be well positioned to particularly favour its former African colonies, which by the mid-1980s were almost all part of the Lomé Convention. By acting this way, Lisbon would be simultaneously benefiting its own national position. This idea of reciprocal advantages was explicitly conveyed in a public statement produced in January 1985 by the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Gama:

“Portugal’s integration in the European communities will provide Europe with the Portuguese sensibility to African problems and will give Portugal the support of community mechanisms to expand its African vocation. As a result, it will also provide Portuguese-speaking African countries with an ally and a friend within the community structures, balancing the game of influences which has been conducted there by other linguistic areas” (Gama, 1985: 251).

Although national and European objectives are depicted as complementary, the specificities of Portugal’s position and the sort of role it intended to play within the EC are also emphasised. The fact that in matters related to Africa Lisbon had an anticipated participation in EPC (since August 1985) represented an early recognition of Portugal’s potential as an “interlocutor” (Vasconcelos, 1991: 130). Concurrently, this initial exposure to the EPC framework may have triggered dynamics of policy learning and socialisation among Portuguese representatives. More specifically on Mozambique, despite the expectations of greater cooperation fuelled by the “EC factor,” the failure of Nkomati in late 1984 revised some of the traditional hostility towards Portugal on the part of the FRELIMO leadership and paralysed the bilateral relationship. Part of FRELIMO’s hostility was linked to a perceived tolerance of Lisbon vis-à-vis RENAMO groups operating in its territory (Gaspar, 1988: 63; Norman MacQueen, 1985: 49). In that sense too, the EC “cover” could offer some advantages for Portugal’s diplomacy. In sum, through EC accession, Portugal adapted its foreign policy to the political acquis on Mozambique. However, that adaptation was limited and it gave Lisbon the chance to project its preferences vis-à-vis Mozambique to the European level.

---

11 Interview (Lisbon, 2010).
12 Ibid.
13 Angola was the last former Portuguese colony in Africa to join the Lomé Convention in April 1985.
14 All quotations in this article originating from non-English sources are the author’s own translation.
2. Mozambique’s peace process and European Political Cooperation

The unfolding of Mozambique’s peace process throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s largely coincided with the initial phase of Portugal’s EC membership. Over this period, Lisbon’s relationship with its former African colonies was given a growing emphasis by a succession of centre-right governments. Greater domestic stability and political continuity were reflected in a gradual reinforcement of Portugal’s foreign policy instruments at a time when the conditions for a peace settlement in Mozambique were progressively coming into existence. Mindful of its national interests in Mozambique, Portuguese authorities maintained communication channels with RENAMO, while officially dealing with the Mozambican government. However, while the pro-RENAMO activities in Portugal were a complicating factor for Lisbon’s plans in Africa, Maputo’s network of support in the West (including Italy, Britain and the United States) was being consolidated. During this period, EPC was still the foreign policy arm of the European Community. The 1986 Single European Act codified EPC rules and working practices, while linking it explicitly to EC instruments. As a result, the commitment of foreign policy consultations among member states was formalised, and the European Commission became more involved. Yet significantly, no enforcement provisions were introduced and all decisions continued to be made by unanimity. Despite the ambition of “speaking ever increasingly with one voice” and to “act with consistency and solidarity”, EPC remained based on vague objectives. A broad pledge of closer cooperation was made towards third countries across the world, including in Africa. However, apart from South Africa, the Sub-Saharan region continued to receive little European attention. By the early 1990s, the traditional priority given to neighbouring areas was even reinforced. Against this broad setting, what was the impact of the EPC on Portugal’s diplomacy towards Mozambique during this period?

2.1. Between “outside” and attempts at projection

While not entirely disconnected from EPC, Portugal’s involvement in the Mozambican peace process was mainly “national.” Against a quickly evolving international and regional context, Portuguese foreign policy-makers formulated plans for active participation in the resolution of conflicts that persisted in southern Africa as early as 1988. At the time, the prospects for Portuguese involvement were more encouraging in the case of Mozambique than in Angola, due, in particular, to the signs of greater openness coming from Maputo (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 55). Following official accounts, rather than making a decision to intervene, Lisbon expressed an interest and readiness to have a role of “good offices,” which was ultimately dependent on the will of the parties.15 In that respect, Portugal’s status as an EC member would have reinforced its position.16 According to some authors, the level of importance

15 Interview with Portuguese diplomat (Lisbon, 2010).
16 Ibid.
Lisbon put on ensuring Portuguese involvement was also indicative of the place Africa continued to occupy in the national imagination (Cravinho, 2005: 97; Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 54). In mid-1989, when some African initiatives to facilitate peace talks on Mozambique were developing, the then Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Durão Barroso, travelled to Maputo, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Consultations were also made with Washington, which, according to Durão Barroso, chose Portugal as the first country to have discussions at a political level regarding Mozambique (Barroso, 1990: 45). Then, in September 1989, the Portuguese Prime Minister, Cavaco Silva, paid a four-day visit to Mozambique. Among the initiatives that ensued, Portuguese authorities had unofficial contacts with the RENAMO leader, Afonso Dhlakama, in early 1990. The main goal of these contacts appears to have been to secure a summit of Mozambican leaders in Lisbon during the visit of Mozambique’s President Joaquim Chissano (also leader of FRELIMO) to Portugal, scheduled for April that year (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 55-6; Vines, 1995: 143). However, the initiative failed as Chissano rejected the Lisbon venue, both because of its long-standing role as RENAMO’s propaganda headquarters and the colonial overtones (Venâncio, 1993: 149-50). Ultimately, the Mozambican peace talks were transferred to Rome, where they were hosted by a Catholic Church group backed by the Italian government (see Vines and Hendrickson, 1998).

Even as the chances of playing a leading mediation role were becoming more remote, Portuguese authorities continued to press for greater participation in the process, sometimes to the annoyance of the Italians. For instance, in September 1990, Portuguese military intelligence organised a visit to Lisbon by the head of RENAMO’s delegation in the peace talks, who ended up having a meeting with Secretary of State, Durão Barroso. The visit caused irritation in Rome and Maputo, as neither had been informed (Venâncio, 1993: 154; Vines, 1995: 143). Shortly afterwards, Portugal (as well as the United States, Kenya and Zambia) was invited by RENAMO to be a member of the joint verification commission set up to monitor Mozambique’s partial cease-fire. In May 1991, while the peace talks were stalled, one of the church mediators went as far as blaming “some Portuguese sectors” for the dilatory moves of RENAMO (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 57-8). The following month, both the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and the representative of the Italian government in the peace negotiations arrived in Lisbon for consultations on the status of the Rome talks and held separate meetings with Durão Barroso. The aim of those meetings is not completely clear, but the Italians appear to have wanted to secure support for its mediation and stop some of the Portuguese “interferences” (Venâncio, 1993: 154-6; Vines, 1995: 143). Cameron Hume (1994: 65), a United States diplomat who closely followed the Rome negotiations, sheds more light on Lisbon’s stance:

“The Portuguese, while not opposing the Italian mediation, wanted Portugal and the United States to have a significant formal role, one commensurate with the success they had just registered working together on Angola.”

17 Lisbon played a central mediation role (supported by Washington and Moscow) in the Angolan peace process that led to the signature of the Bicesse Accords in May 1991.
Thus, Lisbon was interested in keeping its position linked to Washington. For its part, the Italians came to acknowledge the need for increased international participation at a later stage of the negotiations, but expressed doubts about the role Portugal could play (ibid.: 64-6). In that context, Lisbon authorities took some more resolute initiatives aimed at preventing Portuguese pro-RENAMO lobbies from interfering in the Mozambique peace process.\(^{18}\)

Eventually, Portugal’s participation in the talks was only upgraded in the final stages of the process. In effect, in June 1992 Portugal (together with France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Nations) was granted formal observer status in the peace negotiations.\(^{19}\) Later, Portugal had an important involvement in the implementation of the Mozambican peace agreement signed in Rome in October 1992. In particular, Lisbon took part in all the international commissions that monitored the peace deal and made a significant contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operation.\(^{20}\) Moreover, Portugal (together with France and the United Kingdom) began to provide military training for the new national army (see Alden, 1995). Apparently, the British involvement raised some fears in certain Portuguese quarters. Some suspicions were also expressed that Mozambique was being “brought deeper into the Anglophone world” (Vines, 1995: 144). Officially, the high priority Lisbon put in participating in the training of Mozambique’s army was justified out of concern for the security, sovereignty and national identity of its ex-colony (see Gala, 1995: 189-95). Those military efforts obviously fell “outside” the EC, which at the time had no competences in that policy area (Vasconcelos, 1996: 282). However, after failing to secure a leading mediating role in Mozambique’s peace negotiation, Portugal’s noteworthy military involvement in the post-conflict phase also suggests an attempt to recover ground for its own national policy.

Parallel to its actions “outside,” Portugal was also active within the EC pushing for greater engagement with the situation in Mozambique. Indeed, from the beginning of its participation in EPC, Portugal gave great importance to issues related to southern Africa (Vasconcelos, 1991: 134-5). In particular, Lisbon participated actively in the initiatives promoted by the Twelve to strengthen relations with the Frontline States and started to mobilise political and economic support for Mozambique. Moreover, one of the arguments Portugal used at the time to oppose a policy of heavy sanctions on South Africa was the potential negative implications for Mozambique (Portugal, 1987: 199-200). Yet, the high importance Portugal gave to African issues contrasted with the low level of priority attached to Sub-Saharan Africa within EPC in general. To illustrate, in 1986, when the first ministerial meeting with the Frontline States was organised (intended to show opposition to South Africa’s policy of destabilisation in the sub-region) few EC foreign ministers were present. Santos Neves (1996: 156) contends that a disparity of priorities complicated Lisbon’s position and led its

\(^{18}\) For instance, in July 1991 Prime Minister Cavaco Silva took “full responsibility” for the Mozambican “dossier” in order to prevent any members of the Lisbon lobby obtaining information that might allow them to interfere in the peace process (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 58).

\(^{19}\) During the negotiations, after Portugal and the United States got accepted by the two sides, the Mozambique government pushed for an increased involvement of France and the United Kingdom.

\(^{20}\) Portugal’s military participation in ONUMOZ involved 480 personnel out of a total of around 6,800 deployed by 40 countries.
authorities to promote the “upgrading” of Sub-Saharan Africa’s status within the EPC more actively from the end of the 1980s. Portugal’s plans would benefit to a degree from the evolution of the political situation in South Africa, but they remained challenging.21

From 1989, European Council communications started to include regular references to Mozambique, specifically to its peace process. In general, those declarations welcomed and encouraged the efforts of peace in that African country. However, contrasting with the Angolan peace process (where Portugal’s position gained great visibility), the role of mediation which was explicitly indicated and supported by the Twelve in this instance was from Italy:

“[the European Council] hopes that the talks taking place in Rome, under Italian auspices, will lead to an early peaceful settlement of the conflict in Mozambique” (European Council, 1991).

Interestingly enough, the European Council meeting conclusions issued in June 1992, under the Portuguese Presidency, included a relatively longer reference to the Mozambican peace process, while keeping a generic indication of the role of EC member states in that process:

“The European Council urges the parties involved in the Mozambican conflict to reach, with utmost urgency, a peace agreement in the context of the mediation process in which EC countries play an active role. This will make possible the delivery of international aid to the affected populations, who are already suffering because of the prolonged drought which is having catastrophic effects throughout the sub-region” (European Council, 1992).

In more tangible terms, earlier that year the then Vice-President of the European Commission, Manuel Marín (a Spanish national), travelled to Mozambique for a two-day visit on the occasion of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference meeting taking place in Maputo. The visit was also used to show support for Mozambique’s peace efforts, to sign new agreements granting Community assistance and to give assurance for further support after the conclusion of a peace settlement (European Commission, 1992). Whilst the influence Portugal’s Presidency may have had in this particular event is not entirely clear, a senior Portuguese diplomat confirmed that Commissioner Marín was generally supportive of Lisbon’s initiatives towards Sub-Saharan Africa at the EU level.22 In brief, despite their limitations, Lisbon’s pro-Mozambique efforts conducted “within” the Community indicate that Portugal tried to combine the promotion of European goals with the projection of national preferences. In turn, this active use of common instruments and skilful combination of objectives suggests the presence of consolidated dynamics of policy learning.

---

21 Contrary to Portugal’s initial aspirations, Sub-Saharan Africa was not retained as one of the priority areas for the development of CFSP in the final report presented to the European Council of June 1992. Yet the following year, the Council adopted a CFSP Joint Action to support the transition towards democracy in South Africa.

22 Interview with Portuguese diplomat (Lisbon, 2010).
3. Mozambique’s elections and Common Foreign and Security Policy

After the end of the Mozambican civil war, Lisbon remained committed to the stabilisation and democratisation process of its former colony. The acceleration of economic reforms in Mozambique also generated great interest in Portuguese business circles. Even if Maputo was not among its most enthusiastic supporters initially, the launch of the CPLP in 1996 opened an additional channel for Portugal to promote its post-colonial relations. Following decades of negotiations, the reversal of the Cahora Bassa dam to Mozambique in early 2000s is often presented as a symbolic “turning of the page” in the bilateral relationship. Currently the two countries have close and solid relations. The return of peace and increased stability in Mozambique also attracted greater attention from other players, including from the EU. In fact, with few success stories to point to in Africa, the Mozambique case became an “example” that international actors were more willing to support. The replacement of EPC with CFSP in 1993 gave the EU new policy instruments (such as Joint Actions), which contributed to increase its international activity. Seeking to promote democracy in this post-Cold War era, the EU started to deploy election observation missions (EOMs) around the world, including in Mozambique. Apart from sending observers, EU electoral support has also included technical and material assistance. While the European Commission plays an important role in the planning and implementation of election support, member states have been eager to preserve their rights, namely in terms of the decision to send observation missions. Given this general background, what was the impact of the EU on Portugal’s diplomacy towards Mozambique during this period?

3.1. Adapting for better projecting?

Portugal had experienced a very active involvement in the first multiparty elections in Mozambique held in late 1994. Lisbon’s efforts were mainly channelled through the EU, making relevant contributions to common objectives while simultaneously trying to promote its own views. In May 1994, during an EU ministerial meeting with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group taking place in Swaziland, Portugal presented a proposal for a CFSP Joint Action in Mozambique involving two main components. The first component included sending European observers and providing “integrated and coordinated” EU technical assistance. The second component consisted in a fund to assist with the reintegration of demobilised soldiers to be implemented according to a “regional and decentralised perspective.” The proposal also suggested the creation of a package of short and medium term measures to be applied immediately after the elections (Gala, 1995: 116). The overarching aim of this ambitious programme was to “improve, coordinate and maximise the various initiatives that the European Union and some of its Member States have developed and intend to develop in Mozambique” (Portugal, 1995: 42). In fact, the Portuguese proposal followed the decision by the Twelve to support the democratic transition in South Africa (adopted the previous year), which Lisbon considered should be integrated in “an overall policy for the whole of Southern Africa” (Gala, 1995: 115). This Portuguese initiative was described as “controversial,” namely because it went against the understanding that former
colonies should be a *chasse gardée* for national initiatives (Vasconcelos, 1996: 280-1). In the end there was no Joint Action for Mozambique, due to the opposition of Britain which has traditionally privileged a more bilateral approach in Africa (rather than a regional one under the EU umbrella). Yet in July of the same year, under German Presidency, the Twelve decided to provide electoral assistance funded by the EC budget. It should be noted that around this period Germany was very actively pushing for greater regional cooperation in Southern Africa (see Rummel, 1996: 56-7). More than 2,000 observers were deployed to Mozambique’s presidential and parliamentary elections, under the United Nations umbrella. EU countries contributed to that effort with 200 observers (the so-called EUMOZ mission) and the EC covered a substantial part of the election expenses (European Commission, 2000: 26; 2004b: 11). For its part, Portugal sent a total of 42 election observers, 30 of them under EUMOZ (United Nations, 1995: 22). Heavily supported by the international community, the electoral process in late October took place without any major incidents. The results gave a clear victory to Joaquim Chissano, while FRELIMO won a majority in the Assembly. Against that setting, the EU joined the other international observers in declaring the elections “free and fair,” at the same time as it considered the overall process a “success” (European Council, 1994).

The European approach was more demanding in the context of the third general elections held in Mozambique in late 2004. After being invited by Maputo (in February of that year) to observe the new election, the EU started to press for greater transparency. More precisely, the EU wanted the Mozambican authorities to sign a memorandum of understanding granting the observation mission more access to the different steps of the process. After protracted discussions, a memorandum was finally signed on 7 October, allowing the EOM to be deployed a few days later (AWEPA, 2004a: 9; European Commission, 2004a). Yet, no real agreement was reached about improved access for the observation mission. Mozambican authorities complained against what they saw as interference and accused the EU of forcing them to break the electoral law (European Union, 2004: 23-4). The issue was publicly raised by Mozambique’s President during his official visit to Portugal in mid-October. Speaking at a press conference after meeting with Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio, President Chissano supported the idea of transparent elections, but also added: “what the European Union wants is to trample the law to satisfy its pretensions” (Associated Press, 14 October 2004). Later in his two-day visit, Chissano emphasised the need for Europe and Africa to develop “equal-to-equal” relations and expressed his acknowledgement for Sampaio’s efforts to develop this kind of relationship between the two regions. He further added that, after leaving his post, he would cooperate actively with his successor in the strengthening of the relationship between Mozambique and Portugal in order to make it “more dynamic and effective” (Africa News, 15 October 2004).

---

23 Interview with British analyst (London, 2011).
24 The EC provided logistic and financial support, representing more than 50% of the funds needed for organising the poll.
25 Some efficiency and transparency “shortcomings” had emerged in the elections of 1999 and 2003, which were being discussed within the EU-Mozambique political dialogue (Council of the European Union, 2004: 70).
26 As noted by a Mozambican diplomat, the country’s electoral law is greatly based on Portugal’s legal tradition (interview, Lisbon, 2010).
The EU EOM was the largest international presence at this election, including 130 observers led by a Spanish member of the European Parliament. The EC also contributed around three-quarters of the entire election costs, but a smaller amount than in the second general elections in 1999 (European Commission, 2006: 205). That contribution included funding from the EC budget, covering mainly the costs of the EU EOM, and a comparatively larger portion of electoral assistance (around 80%) funded from the European Development Fund (EDF) (European Commission, 2004a). Interestingly, electoral assistance was not initially considered for this election. However, after a belated request from the Mozambican authorities, the EC delegation in Maputo (headed at the time by a former Portuguese diplomat) agreed to provide that support. In that context of urgency, the EC delegation proposed to channel the additional EDF funding via direct budget support, a procedure which appears to have left more control over the funds to the Mozambican government (AWEPA, 2004a: 8; European Commission, 2006: 204-5). The head of the EC delegation in Maputo was also present at the meeting of the EU Council’s Africa Working Group, in early November, when “signs of progress” were noted with regard to the full access of the EU EOM. Additionally, the meeting agreed to “not further increase pressure on Mozambique”, but to “keep the door open for negotiations” until the elections (Council of the European Union, 2005b: 5). Repeating the precedent of the 2003 municipal elections in Mozambique, the CPLP also sent a small (six observers) and short-term (one week) observation mission, led by a diplomat from São Tomé and Príncipe (LUSA, 27 Novembro 2004).

The election, which took place from 1-2 December, gave the new FRELIMO candidate, Armando Guebuza, a landslide victory, while his party renewed a comfortable majority in parliament. Yet the process was marked by more irregularities than in previous elections and RENAMO called for the ballot to be annulled (AWEPA, 2004b). On 4 December, the head of the EU EOM gave its initial reaction to the voting, praising the general conduct of the election, but also highlighting many shortcomings. He warned, in particular, that the observation would not be complete unless observers had access to all stages of vote tabulation (Africa News, 4 December 2004). A less critical assessment was provided by the CPLP in a statement released the day immediately after the vote: “[t]he CPLP observation mission did not witness any incidents, having verified that the voting process occurred in a climate of normalcy and civility” (Agence France Press, 3 December 2004). During its meeting on 7 December, the EU Africa Working Group Council discussed the elections. Among other aspects, the Group agreed that a joint declaration should be issued as soon as preliminary election results were published, and that bilateral congratulation messages would not be appropriate before that. The report of the meeting expressly mentions Portugal’s

27 A delegation of 7 European parliamentarians (from Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden), headed by a British representative, was also present. In contrast to previous cases, the official report on Portugal’s contribution to the 2004 EU EOM only mentions that it included long and short-term observers, without specifying its number (Portugal, 2005: 242).
28 The EC Strategy Paper for Mozambique for 2001-2007 did not include electoral assistance as a priority. In fact, after the 1999 elections in Mozambique, the head of the EC delegation in Maputo stated openly that the Community would no longer provide financial support for elections (Tollenaere, 2006: 11).
29 José Pinto Teixeira was head of delegation between 2002 and 2005. Traditionally the head of political affairs of the EC delegation in Mozambique has been a “seconded official” coming from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry (interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 2011).
position: “[t]he Portuguese delegation shared the impression that elections had gone peacefully and smoothly, and it agreed with the proposed timing of an EU reaction to the elections” (Council of the European Union, 2005a: 9). In the end, Mozambique’s promises of greater transparency did not fully materialise (see AWEPA, 2004b; European Union, 2004: 23-5). Yet on 21 December, the same day preliminary results were published, the Dutch Presidency issued a declaration welcoming the “generally successful and peaceful” conduct of the elections and congratulating the people of Mozambique on their “commitment to democracy.” While noting that some “irregularities” had taken place, the statement also pointed out that they “did not have an impact on the result of the elections.” Moreover, the declaration included a formula used in previous processes considering the election a “further step” in the consolidation of democracy and a basis for “continued cooperation” between the EU and Mozambique (European Council, 2004). The 2004 national report on Portugal’s participation in the EU is particularly explicit describing the role Lisbon allegedly played in the developments above:

“Within the European Union, Portugal has always sought to convey a positive image of the democratic transition process in Mozambique, having played an important role in the decision of sending the election observation mission and in the content of the Declaration on the presidential and parliamentary elections in Mozambique” (Portugal, 2005: 243).

In sum, the relatively more demanding and coordinated EU approach in this election increased the pressure on Mozambican authorities. In turn, that appears to have produced the simultaneous need for Portugal to give more visibility to its own positions within the Union. As explained by a senior Portuguese diplomat, “each time there is a ‘problem’ with one of the Lusophone countries, Portugal tries to mediate and smooth harsher approaches in Brussels. However, this needs to be done carefully, in order to bring something positive and avoid putting at risk Portugal’s own position in the EU.” In this occasion, by subscribing to the EU common position and concurrently proclaiming a more “benevolent” stance vis-à-vis Mozambique, Portugal seems to have reasonably balanced its objectives towards the EU and its ex-colony.

Conclusions

The purpose of this article was to assess the impact of EU membership on Portuguese foreign policy by looking specifically at the case of Mozambique. On the basis of the adopted framework, the findings above yield significant evidence of Europeanisation, chiefly as “national projection.” In general terms, Lisbon pushed for “more Europe” in the domain of diplomatic relations with Mozambique. This is an outcome that also served Portugal’s interests as a small power which has had a complex relationship with its former colony located in a sub-region where other member states have special interests. In that sense, Lisbon was very active within the EU promoting closer relations between Brussels and Maputo in an attempt to successfully combine the achievement of common European

objectives with the attainment of its own national goals. Yet that was not always an easy process. Throughout the long-term period analysed here, more significant results of “exporting” national preferences were only produced in the most recent stages. Indeed, during the initial phase of Portugal’s EC membership, the opportunities to project its preferences were limited, particularly due to the low level of priority attached to Africa within the EPC and the scarce instruments of this form of foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, Portugal’s relations with its ex-colony were complicated at the time by the negative influence of Portuguese interest groups, while concurrently Mozambique had established close links with other EC countries. In that sense, Portugal’s close collaboration with the US and the UN during this period can be read as a compensation for EPC limitations, but also as a way to reinforce its own position, particularly at the European level. In the subsequent phase examined in this article, Mozambique’s internal developments attracted more attention from the EU at the same time that the CFSP (especially when backed by EC instruments) offered new possibilities of joint action. Additionally, the gradual improvement of Lisbon’s bilateral relationship with Maputo reinforced Portugal’s claim as a valid “interlocutor” in Brussels.

In comparison, the degree of “national adaptation” was generally lower. Through EC accession, Portugal adopted the *acquis politique* on Mozambique and committed itself to coordinating its national initiatives towards its ex-colony with its new European partners. Yet the political *acquis* applicable to Mozambique was very limited and broadly in accordance with Portuguese interests. Moreover, it did not develop much further afterwards. In fact, intergovernmentalism remained a defining feature of this policy domain, allowing Portugal to keep its own national policy in parallel. Still, Lisbon abided by its European duties by and large and even displayed an interest in linking its national initiatives to the EU level of action. This was well illustrated during the Mozambican peace process when Portugal’s important level of national activity was not kept completely separated from the EPC. Also, in the context of Mozambique’s electoral processes, Portugal’s efforts were chiefly channelled through a European framework. The 2004 elections presented an interesting test in this regard, since the European pressure on Mozambique was higher and more coordinated than in previous polls, while Portugal’s loyalties appeared split between the observation missions deployed by both the EU and the CPLP. The specific role Lisbon played in the deployment of the CPLP mission needs further clarification, but in any case Portugal subscribed to the EU position (even if making its own specific stance more visible) in this instance.

In turn, the level of “identity redefinition” appears to have been low. On the whole, Portugal played the “Brussels game,” but without relaxing fundamental national perspectives towards its ex-colony. During the pre-accession phase, Portuguese decision-makers stressed the utility of EC membership for enhancing Portugal’s postcolonial relations. Despite great emphasis on the instrumentality of the EC, more ideational dynamics favouring change might not have been completely absent at that stage. Indeed, decision-makers with stronger European convictions may have concealed their beliefs in order to facilitate the process of accession. In any case, a possible identification with European ideas was not necessarily incompatible with own representations in relation to Mozambique. In effect, while national and European
objectives in Africa were presented by Portuguese authorities as “complementary,” the specificities of Portugal’s position (its African “vocation” and “sensibility”) also received great attention. After accession, Portugal’s enduring attachment to its ex-colonies was readable in the efforts Lisbon made to play an important role in Mozambique’s peace process (sometimes denoting competition, rather than cooperation, with some of its European peers). Along those lines, Portugal’s open support for a coordinated and regional European approach in Southern Africa simultaneously suggested the intention to help preserve elements of a “Lusophone identity” in an essentially Anglophone area. Subsequently, the greater “understanding” in the appraisal of Mozambique’s democratic progress also appears to back the assertion that more national understandings continued to imbue Lisbon’s decisions towards its ex-colony. Ultimately, this dimension of identity redefinition is an aspect that needs to be further explored, namely through conducting additional interviews with key foreign policy-makers.

These findings provide a more detailed and nuanced picture than the one found in the literature on Portuguese foreign policy mentioned earlier. The conceptualisation of Europeanisation along three dimensions proved useful for capturing the specific European dynamics that influence national foreign policy. For Portuguese decision-makers EU common objectives and instruments related to Mozambique became an important reference point. By and large, Portugal also subscribed positively to the general principles and values expressed by the EU. But in many situations Portugal appears to have “Europeanised” its national priorities towards Mozambique, mainly to benefit from the opportunities stemming from EU membership. Even if an explanation was beyond the scope of this article, this rather instrumental approach implies that the Europeanisation of Portugal’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Mozambique represented more of a “strategic adaptation” to common EU mechanisms and practices than a “deeper” change of its national preferences and norms (see Alecu de Flers, 2005: 14; Moumoutzis, 2011: 615-7). Moreover, that level of Europeanisation did not compromise, nor even significantly constrain, Portugal’s national preferences and self-understandings. Instead, its “enabling” features opened new possibilities for Portugal to promote and reinforce its relationship with Mozambique (see Major, 2005: 187-8; Wong, 2005: 147). This conclusion is likely valid for the other Portuguese former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similar results can also be expected vis-à-vis Portuguese-speaking territories in Asia and South America, as suggested by the limited contributions related to the subject (e.g. Magone, 2000: 170-5; Vasconcelos, 1996: 271). In fact, the EU “cover” and “scale” has proved a valuable tool for Portugal’s diplomacy, in a pattern similar to other member states with a colonial past and smaller foreign policy machineries (see Hill and Wong, 2011: 222; Manners and Whitman, 2000: 247, 263). Another qualification relates to the fact that the European “card” was not the only option considered by Portugal in the cases examined above. Lisbon’s incentives for conducting its foreign policy (more) through the EU were stronger during an initial phase, when its bilateral relationship with Maputo was weaker. Later, the gradual improvement of those relations strengthened Lisbon’s chances to “project” its national priorities through Europe, but that may have equally opened the door to some “de-Europeanisation.” Broader post-Cold War developments seem to have reinforced Portugal’s need to galvanise the Lusophone and Atlantic dimensions of its foreign policy.
This qualification is consistent with the depiction of foreign policy Europeanisation as just one factor of change among others and a process which is neither predetermined nor irreversible (see Wong, 2005: 148, 151). In brief, this study contributes to scant literature on Portuguese foreign policy and corroborates the usefulness of the Europeanisation concept in the foreign policy domain. Its findings can also be illuminating for other studies on smaller EU member states and Europe-Africa relations.
References

Associated Press (2004). Mozambique president Chissano accuses EU observers of wanting to be above the law, 14 October.


LUSA Agência de Notícias de Portugal (2004). CPLP vai enviar missão de observadores a Moçambique, 27 Novembro.


