Table 1

Parliamentarians’ Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy in the European Union and in Their Countries

	MEP		MNP
	EU	own country	EU	own country
	%	%	%	%
very satisfied	5	14	3	15
fairly satisfied	46	58	47	65
not very satisfied	37	22	40	17
not at all satisfied	13	7	10	3
N = 100 %	310		1392

Table 2

Summary Table of 23 Regressions of Policy Competencies Attribution to the European Level on Problem Load and Problem Scope

Groups/Regressions	R²	x (Load)	x (Scope)
Mean all	0.62	0.19	0.62
Mean MEPs	0.63	0.20	0.66
Mean MNPs	0.60	0.18	0.57
Cross-country regression	0.34***	0.19**	0.62***

Aggregate regression of mean competence score for 17 policy areas for 15 groups of country MEPs and 11 groups of MNPs (n=17 for each regression); cross country regression n = 442.

* sign. at .05; ** sign. at .01; *** sign at .001.

Table 3

Vested Interests and Resistance to Shift in Policy Competencies to the European Level

	Corporatism Score	Union Density 1970-1990	Legal Regulation of Union Systems
	(Correlation with Overall Competence Score)
All	-0.43 (n = 18)	-0.57** (n = 26)	-0.46* (n = 24)
MEP	-0.35 (n = 11)	-0.64** (n = 14)	-0.46 (n = 14)
MNP only	-0.72 (n = 7)	-0.43 (n = 11)	-0.48 (n = 10)

* sign. at .05.; ** sign. at .01.

Independent variables are intervall scales.

Table 4

Regression of Competence Shift for Non-Social Policy and Social Policy Issues on the Strength of Vested Interests

		R2	Beta (Union Density)	Beta (Legal Regul.)
Regression 1 for:	Non-Social Policy Issues	0.17***	-0.40***	-0.01
Regression 2 for:	Social Policy and Equality Issues	0.25***	-0.25**	-0.30**

Aggregate regression across policy fields and countries.

Number of cases: non-social policy issues 288; social policy and equality issues (social policy, health, unemployment, taxation, and education) 120.

Table 5

Full Model of the Explanation of Differences in Support for Shifting Policy Competencies to the European Level

	Model 1 beta	Model 2 beta	Model3 beta	Model 4 beta	Model 5 beta
Problem Load	0.13***	0.14**	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***
Problem Scope	0.53***	0.51***	0.51***	0.52***	0.52***
Foreign Trade Dependency		0.32***	0.29***
Union Density			-0.19***		-0.25***
Legal Regulation of Union Systems			-0.17***		-0.08***
Power of National Parliaments				-0.20***	-0.13**
Explained Variance (adj. R2)	0.34***	0.43***	0.53***	0.40***	0.46***

Aggregate regression, cases: policy fields times groups [14 MEP; 10 MNP]), max n = 432, min n = 340.

* sign. at .05; ** sign. at .01; *** sign. at .001.

Table 6

Models of Political Order

		Responsibilities of the European Union
		low	high
Power of the EP to pass laws which directly apply in the member states	low	Weak State	Strong Intergovernmentalism
directly apply in the member states	high	Weak Parliamentarism	Strong Parliamentarism

Table 7

Plurality/Majority Preference for Political Order of MEP and MNP

	Weak State	Strong Intergovernmentalism	Weak Parliamentarism	Strong Parliamentarism
AU				MEP (p)
BE				MEP; MNP
DE	MEP
FI	MEP
FR	MNP			MEP
GE				MEP; MNP(p)
GR		MNP (p)		MEP
IR	MEP; MNP
IT				MEP; MNP
LU		MNP (p)		MEP
NE	MNP (p)			MEP
PO	MEP; MNP
SP				MEP; MNP
SW	MEP; MNP
GB				MEP

MEP = Members of the European Parliament (without [p] majority position, otherwise plurality position)
MNP = Members of National Parliaments (without [p] majority position, otherwise plurality position)

Table 8

Left-Right Ideological Position, Institutional Change and Preferred Political Order

	Correlation with Left-Right Self-placement
Better coordination (summary score)	.06
Better control (summary score)	.25***
Better electoral link (summary score)	.13***
Demand for increase in power of:	*** = sig .000
- national parliaments	.04
- the European Parliament	.20***
- national governments	-.17***
- European Commission	.01
- Council of Ministers	-.18***

Table 9

State Model^a and Political Ideology^b

	MEP			MNP
	Left	Centre	Right	Left	Centre	Right
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Weak state	18	20	68	27	40	54
Strong non-parliamentary state	9	9	4	13	19	17
Weak parliamentary state	7	9	4	8	7	4
Strong parliamentary state	66	61	25	52	34	25
n = 100 %	122	142	28	390	776	175

a: Combination of attitudes toward a European Parliament which had the power to pass laws directly and attitudes toward increasing range of responsibilities of the EU. Both 7-point scales, first three highest categories in favor against rest, combined as follows: not in favour of strong EP or strong EU: weak state; in favour of strong EU but not EP: strong non-parliamentary state; in favour of a strong EP but not EU: weak parliamentary state; in favour of strong EP and strong EU: strong parliamentary state.
b: Left-Right self-placement on a 10-point scale, where 1 is left and 10 is right. 1, 2, 3 coded as left; 4, 5, 6, 7 coded as center; 8, 9, 10

Table 10

Discriminant Analyses of Competence Shift and State Model Preferences

	Competence Shift		State Model^a
Std. Canonical Function Coeff./ Correlation with Function 1
- Load	0.30	/ 0.69	-	/ -
- Scope	0.82	/ 0.38	-	/ -
- Export Dependency	0.51	/ 0.30	0.97	/ 0.51
- Union Density	-0.32	/ -0.33	-0.96	/ -0.52
- Legal Regulation	-0.24	/ -0.22	-0.03	/ -0.19
Number of cases	442		24
Number of Groups defined	5		3
Groups/Group Values on Function 1:
	1. contra shift	-1.49	1. Weak State	-2.89
	2.	-0.72	2. Intergov.	1.44
	3.	0.12	3. Parliament	0.83
	4.	0.90
	5. pro shift	1.28
Explained Variance, Function 1	88.18		99.03
Eta2 (function 1 score by group)	0.51***		0.76***
R2 (function 1 score regressed on group)	0.50***		0.44***
Correctly Classified in %	44.61		83.33
Mean % Correctly Classified	45.0		72.6
Mean % above Prior Probability	25.2		39.3

*** sig. P < 0.000

a (strong EU + strong EP)/2.

Table A.1

Summary Table of Returns for MEP- and MNP-Studies (MEP 96, MNP 96)

Study	Fieldwork	Number of Respondents	Return Rate	Duncan Index of Dissimilarity^a regarding
Study	Fieldwork	Number of Respondents	Return Rate	Country	Party	Gender	Age Groups
MEP-Study	20.05.- 21.6.1996	314	50.2	9.11	7.99	0.32	3.50
MNP-Studies:	(29.4.1996-10.7.1997)	1367	37.6	n.a.	7.01	1.45	2.97
- Belgium^b	3.6.1996-28.4.1997	87	58.0	n.a.	7.20	0.60	4.00
- France	2.7.1996-10.7.1997	146	25.3	n.a.	7.70	0.40	6.90
- Germany	21.5.-6.8.1996	317	47.2	n.a.	6.80	1.50	5.60
- Greece	15.4.-31.7.1996	60	20.0	n.a.	16.30	0.70	11.30
- Ireland	9.7.-25.10.1996	71	42.8	n.a.	3.20	0.00	-
- Italy	June-Oct. 1996	94	14.9	n.a.	18.30	2.40	-
- Luxembourg	12.6.1996-28.2.1997	28	46.7	n.a.	14.10	3.10	-
- Netherlands	29.4.-19.7.1996	65	43.3	n.a.	10.70	3.60	-
- Portugal	13.6.-4.8.1996	54	23.5	n.a.	8.50	0.50	-
- Spain	Autumn 1996	130	37.1	n.a.	4.90	2.80	-
- Sweden	5.3.-10.12.1996	315	90.3	n.a.	1.80	1.30	0.80

a: Duncan Index of Dissimilarity measures the percentage point differences between distributions, in this case between distribution in the uni verse and the sample. It ranges from 0 (no difference) to 100 (100 percent difference).
b: House of Representatives.
n.a.: not applicable.
-: not available.

Figure 1

Classification of Policy Areas According to Cross-country Problem Load and Cross-border Problem Scope

Cross-country Problem Load
High (3)	Unemployment		Agriculture Environment Immigrants
Medium (2)	Region. Devel. Social Policy	Crime Economy Research	Defence Devel. Countries Foreign Policy
Low (1)	Health Education Tax	Media	Money
	Low (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)	Cross-border Problem Scope

Assigned scores in brackets.

Figure 2

Competence Level and Problem Character, MEPs

Horizontal axis: scores from figure 1

Figure 3

Competence Level and Problem Character, MNPs of 11National Parliaments

Figure 4

Economic Interdependency and Overall Support for Shifting Policy Competencies to the European Level

Correlations for Overall Competence Score: MEP and MNP (24 cases; Luxembourg missing): 0.46*; MEP only (14 cases): 0.49; MNP only (10 cases): 0.48.

* sign. at .05.

Figure 5

Competence Level and Distribution of Power between National Parliaments and National Governments in 11 Member States

Note: Entries are predicted values.

Figure 6

Evaluation of Proposals for Institutional Change

Judgements based on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (very much for) to 7 (very much against). Percentages represent portion of answers with scale values of 1, 2, and 3.

Figure 7

Perceived Influence of Institutions of European Policy-making and Demanded Increase or Decrease of Influence

Figure 8

Preferences for Models of Political Order

Based on a seven-point scale where 1 indicates very much in favour of a strong EU or EP and 7 indicates being against. Percentage of answers favouring.

Figure 9

EU-Power, EP Power, and Ideology