Table 1

Parliamentarians’ Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy in the European Union and in Their Countries

MEP MNP
EU own
country
EU own
country
% % % %
very satisfied 5 14 3 15
fairly satisfied 46 58 47 65
not very satisfied 37 22 40 17
not at all satisfied 13 7 10 3
N = 100 % 310 1392

Table 2

Summary Table of 23 Regressions of Policy Competencies Attribution to the European Level on Problem Load and Problem Scope

Groups/Regressions R2 x (Load) x (Scope)
Mean all 0.62 0.19 0.62
Mean MEPs 0.63 0.20 0.66
Mean MNPs 0.60 0.18 0.57
Cross-country regression 0.34*** 0.19** 0.62***

Aggregate regression of mean competence score for 17 policy areas for 15 groups of country MEPs and 11 groups of MNPs (n=17 for each regression); cross country regression n = 442.

* sign. at .05; ** sign. at .01; *** sign at .001.

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

Table 3

Vested Interests and Resistance to Shift in Policy Competencies to the European Level

Corporatism Score Union Density 1970-1990 Legal Regulation of Union Systems
(Correlation with Overall Competence Score)
All -0.43
(n = 18)
-0.57**
(n = 26)
-0.46*
(n = 24)
MEP -0.35
(n = 11)
-0.64**
(n = 14)
-0.46
(n = 14)
MNP only -0.72
(n = 7)
-0.43
(n = 11)
-0.48
(n = 10)

* sign. at .05.; ** sign. at .01.

Independent variables are intervall scales.

Table 4

Regression of Competence Shift for Non-Social Policy and Social Policy Issues on the Strength of Vested Interests

R2 Beta
(Union Density)
Beta
(Legal Regul.)
Regression 1 for: Non-Social Policy Issues 0.17*** -0.40*** -0.01
Regression 2 for: Social Policy and Equality Issues 0.25*** -0.25** -0.30**

Aggregate regression across policy fields and countries.

Number of cases: non-social policy issues 288; social policy and equality issues (social policy, health, unemployment, taxation, and education) 120.

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

Table 5

Full Model of the Explanation of Differences in Support for Shifting Policy Competencies to the European Level

Model 1
beta
Model 2
beta
Model3
beta
Model 4
beta
Model 5
beta
Problem Load 0.13*** 0.14** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
Problem Scope 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.52***
Foreign Trade Dependency 0.32*** 0.29***
Union Density -0.19*** -0.25***
Legal Regulation of Union Systems -0.17*** -0.08***
Power of National Parliaments -0.20*** -0.13**
Explained Variance (adj. R2) 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.53*** 0.40*** 0.46***

Aggregate regression, cases: policy fields times groups [14 MEP; 10 MNP]), max n = 432, min n = 340.

* sign. at .05; ** sign. at .01; *** sign. at .001.

 
 

Table 6

Models of Political Order

Responsibilities of the European Union
low high
Power of the EP to pass laws which
directly apply in the member states
low Weak State Strong Intergovernmentalism
directly apply in the member states high Weak Parliamentarism Strong Parliamentarism

  
  
  
  
  
  

Table 7

Plurality/Majority Preference for Political Order of MEP and MNP

Weak State Strong Intergovernmentalism Weak Parliamentarism Strong Parliamentarism
AU MEP (p)
BE MEP; MNP
DE MEP
FI MEP
FR MNP MEP
GE MEP; MNP(p)
GR MNP (p) MEP
IR MEP; MNP
IT MEP; MNP
LU MNP (p) MEP
NE MNP (p) MEP
PO MEP; MNP
SP MEP; MNP
SW MEP; MNP
GB MEP
MEP = Members of the European Parliament (without [p] majority position, otherwise plurality position)
MNP = Members of National Parliaments (without [p] majority position, otherwise plurality position)

Table 8

Left-Right Ideological Position, Institutional Change and Preferred Political Order

Correlation with
Left-Right Self-placement
Better coordination (summary score)  .06
Better control (summary score)  .25***
Better electoral link (summary score)  .13***
Demand for increase in power of: *** = sig .000
  - national parliaments  .04
  - the European Parliament  .20***
  - national governments -.17***
  - European Commission  .01
  - Council of Ministers -.18***

 
 

Table 9

State Modela and Political Ideologyb

MEP MNP
Left Centre Right Left Centre Right
% % % % % %
Weak state 18 20 68 27 40 54
Strong non-parliamentary state 9 9 4 13 19 17
Weak parliamentary state 7 9 4 8 7 4
Strong parliamentary state 66 61 25 52 34 25
n = 100 % 122 142 28 390 776 175
a
Combination of attitudes toward a European Parliament which had the power to pass laws directly and attitudes toward increasing range of responsibilities of the EU. Both 7-point scales, first three highest categories in favor against rest, combined as follows: not in favour of strong EP or strong EU: weak state; in favour of strong EU but not EP: strong non-parliamentary state; in favour of a strong EP but not EU: weak parliamentary state; in favour of strong EP and strong EU: strong parliamentary state.
b
Left-Right self-placement on a 10-point scale, where 1 is left and 10 is right. 1, 2, 3 coded as left; 4, 5, 6, 7 coded as center; 8, 9, 10

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

Table 10

Discriminant Analyses of Competence Shift and State Model Preferences

Competence Shift State Modela
Std. Canonical Function Coeff./
Correlation with Function 1
  - Load 0.30 / 0.69 - / -
  - Scope 0.82 / 0.38 - / -
  - Export Dependency 0.51 / 0.30 0.97 / 0.51
  - Union Density -0.32 / -0.33 -0.96 / -0.52
  - Legal Regulation -0.24 / -0.22 -0.03 / -0.19
Number of cases 442 24
Number of Groups defined 5 3
Groups/Group Values on Function 1:
1. contra shift -1.49 1. Weak State -2.89
2. -0.72 2. Intergov. 1.44
3. 0.12 3. Parliament 0.83
4. 0.90
5. pro shift 1.28
Explained Variance, Function 1 88.18 99.03
Eta2 (function 1 score by group) 0.51*** 0.76***
R2 (function 1 score regressed on group) 0.50*** 0.44***
Correctly Classified in % 44.61 83.33
Mean % Correctly Classified 45.0 72.6
Mean % above Prior Probability 25.2 39.3

*** sig. P < 0.000

a  (strong EU + strong EP)/2.

 
 

Table A.1

Summary Table of Returns for MEP- and MNP-Studies (MEP 96, MNP 96)

Study Fieldwork Number of Respondents Return Rate Duncan Index of Dissimilaritya regarding
Country Party Gender Age Groups
MEP-Study 20.05.- 21.6.1996 314 50.2 9.11 7.99 0.32 3.50
MNP-Studies: (29.4.1996-10.7.1997) 1367 37.6 n.a. 7.01 1.45 2.97
- Belgiumb 3.6.1996-28.4.1997 87 58.0 n.a. 7.20 0.60 4.00
- France 2.7.1996-10.7.1997 146 25.3 n.a. 7.70 0.40 6.90
- Germany 21.5.-6.8.1996 317 47.2 n.a. 6.80 1.50 5.60
- Greece 15.4.-31.7.1996 60 20.0 n.a. 16.30 0.70 11.30
- Ireland 9.7.-25.10.1996 71 42.8 n.a. 3.20 0.00 -
- Italy June-Oct. 1996 94 14.9 n.a. 18.30 2.40 -
- Luxembourg 12.6.1996-28.2.1997 28 46.7 n.a. 14.10 3.10 -
- Netherlands 29.4.-19.7.1996 65 43.3 n.a. 10.70 3.60 -
- Portugal 13.6.-4.8.1996 54 23.5 n.a. 8.50 0.50 -
- Spain Autumn 1996 130 37.1 n.a. 4.90 2.80 -
- Sweden 5.3.-10.12.1996 315 90.3 n.a. 1.80 1.30 0.80
a
Duncan Index of Dissimilarity measures the percentage point differences between distributions, in this case between distribution in the uni verse and the sample. It ranges from 0 (no difference) to 100 (100 percent difference).
b
House of Representatives.
n.a.
not applicable.
-
not available.

  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  

Figure 1

Classification of Policy Areas According to Cross-country Problem Load and Cross-border Problem Scope

Cross-country
Problem Load
High (3) Unemployment   Agriculture
Environment
Immigrants
Medium (2) Region. Devel.
Social Policy
Crime
Economy
Research
Defence
Devel. Countries
Foreign Policy
Low (1) Health
Education
Tax
Media Money
Low
(1)
Medium
(2)
High
(3)
Cross-border
Problem Scope

Assigned scores in brackets.

 
 

Figure 2

Competence Level and Problem Character, MEPs

Figure 2

Horizontal axis: scores from figure 1

Figure 3

Competence Level and Problem Character, MNPs of 11National Parliaments

Figure 3

Figure 4

Economic Interdependency and Overall Support for Shifting Policy Competencies to the European Level

Figure 4

Correlations for Overall Competence Score: MEP and MNP (24 cases; Luxembourg missing): 0.46*; MEP only (14 cases): 0.49; MNP only (10 cases): 0.48.

* sign. at .05.

Figure 5

Competence Level and Distribution of Power between National Parliaments and National Governments in 11 Member States

Figure 5

Note: Entries are predicted values.

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

Figure 6

Evaluation of Proposals for Institutional Change

Figure 6

Judgements based on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (very much for) to 7 (very much against). Percentages represent portion of answers with scale values of 1, 2, and 3.

Figure 7

Perceived Influence of Institutions of European Policy-making and Demanded Increase or Decrease of Influence

Figure 7

  
  

Figure 8

Preferences for Models of Political Order

Figure 8

Based on a seven-point scale where 1 indicates very much in favour of a strong EU or EP and 7 indicates being against. Percentage of answers favouring.

Figure 9

EU-Power, EP Power, and Ideology

Figure 9
©1999 by B. Wessels
formated and tagged by MN, 28.9.1999