Table I

Types of Multi-Level Governance

Table II

Regional Governance in the European Union, 1950-2000

Table 2 measures regional governance along two dimensions: the extent to which a regional government exercises authority independently from central government, and the extent to which a regional government participates in national or European decision making. (1)

We apply Daniel Elazar’s notion that federalism combines self rule (autonomy) with shared rule (power sharing) (Elazar 1987). We evaluate self-rule by scoring constitutional federalism, special territorial autonomy and regional elections. We evaluate shared rule by scoring the role of regions in central government. For country-by-country details of coding decisions see Hooghe and Marks, 2001.

I. Constitutional Federalism

Constitutional federalism taps the formal scope of regional government within the state as a whole. We assign one point for each of the following characteristics:

• existence of a functioning regional tier of government
• extensive authoritative competencies, including two or more of the following: authority to tax; control over police; education policy (including tertiary education); cultural policy; transport and communications policy; economic development; local government; and authority to determine regional political institutions (e.g. administrative hiring, budget process, timing of regional elections)
• specific regional competencies that are constitutionally guaranteed
• federal state in which constitutional change is co-decided by the central state and regions.

These features are usually, but not always, cumulative. That is to say that the first characteristic is a requisite for the second, the second a requisite for the third, and the third a requisite for the fourth.

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II. Special Territorial Autonomy

By special territorial autonomy we refer to the decentralization of authority to territorial minorities, not merely deconcentration of administration. Our scale varies from 0.5 to 2 and is derived by multiplying scores for the following criteria:

• authoritative competencies:

  0.5 = weak authoritative competencies;

  1 = extensive authoritative competencies (same as entry for constitutional federalism)

• population coverage:

  1 = special arrangements for home rule for less than ten percent of the population;

  2 = special arrangements for home rule for more than ten percent of the population.

Footnote

(1) We define as ”regions” as the most authoritative tier of intermediate government. Intermediate level governance is equivalent to NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions in the European Union’s categorization (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques), which we reproduce here in Table 3. Regions in our analysis range from Valle d’Aosta with a population of 119,000 to the 17.9 million in the case of North Rhine-Westphalia—a range that is similar to that among states in the United States. The regional level in a country may shift over time if regional institutions are reformed. This is the case for Belgium, where the region replaced the province in the early 1980s as the dominant meso level of government.

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III. Role of Regions in Central Government

We distinguish two kinds of power sharing. First, regions can share rule because they collectively constitute a national legislature, usually a second chamber composed of representatives of regional parliaments or regional executives. Second, regional governments may share executive power to the extent that regional ministers and civil servants regularly negotiate legislation or executive decisions with their counterparts in central government.

• legislative power sharing:

  1= a chamber in the national legislature composed of representatives of regional governments or parliaments without wide-ranging legislative veto power

  2 = a chamber in the national legislature composed of representatives of regional governments or parliaments with wide-ranging veto power

• executive power sharing:

  1 = regular intergovernmental meetings between central state and regional executives without authority to reach binding decisions

  2 = regular intergovernmental meetings between central state and regional executives with authority to reach binding decisions

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IV. Regional elections

• 1 = the regional assembly is indirectly elected

  2 = the regional assembly is directly elected

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Table III

European Regional Divisions

Note: NUTS division as revised in 1995 by Eurostat. Source: Antonia Casellas & Catherine Galley (1999).

Table IV

Issue Arenas and Levels of Authority in Europe: 1950-2001 (1)

Key:

1 = All policy decisions at national level

2 = Only some policy decisions at EC level

3 = Policy decisions at both national and EC level

4 = Mostly policy decisions at EC level

5 = All policy decisions at EC level.

Footnotes

(1) Source for estimates, 1950-1968: Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 67-71). Source for estimates, 1992-2000, Schmitter (1996b: 125-126). Estimates for 1992 and 2000 are based on projections from existing treaty obligations and obligations undertaken subsequently. Schmitter's scores were based on judgments provided by Geoffrey Garrett, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, Philippe C. Schmitter and David Soskice in March 1992. Scores in parentheses ( ) for 1968 represent ex post revaluations in March 1992 of the original scores in Lindberg & Scheingold by Garrett et al. Scores in parentheses ( ) for 2000 represent ex post revaluations in March 2000 of the original scores in Schmitter by Hooghe and Marks.

(2) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter estimates for 1950-1968.

(3) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.

(4) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.

(5) Defined as ”Exploitation and protection of natural resources” in Lindberg & Scheingold.

(6) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.

(7) Called ”Economic development and planning” in Lindberg & Scheingold.

(8) Called ”Counter-cyclical policy” in Lindberg & Scheingold.

(9) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.

(10) Category not in Lindberg & Scheingold. Schmitter's estimates for 1950-1968.

(11) Called ”Public health, safety and maintenance of public order” in Lindberg & Scheingold.