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| The Militarily Non-Allied States in the CFSP of the 1990´s |
| Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira |
| European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 7
(2004) N° 3; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-003a.htm |
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: 23.3.2004 |
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1
After decades of more or less self-imposed resistance towards the European project, Austria, Finland and Sweden formally joined the European Union (EU) in January 1995. By the time the Alpine and the Nordic states started to seriously deepen their integration approaches, political and security issues had already moved higher on the EU agenda. The reactivation of the Western European Union (WEU), the adoption of the Single European Act formalising the existence of the European Political Cooperation and, later on, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty endorsing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) contributed to the trend which was to be significantly intensified over the following years. It is true that when Austria applied to the then European Community (1989), this tendency was not so pronounced as by the time Sweden and Finland submitted their petitions (1991 and 1992 respectively). In any case, paradoxical as it may seem, when seeking EU membership, all three militarily non-allied states(1), encountered a prevailing common security-oriented mood that was mirrored in the CFSP-related provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. In other words, they came across an evolving CFSP as a fait accompli.
During the accession negotiation process, the Alpine and Nordic applicants endorsed the whole acquis communautaire enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. With the signing of the 1993 Joint Declaration No. 1, they sent a first signal of alignment with Brussels’ political collective will while paving the way for a trouble-free integration into the Maastricht’s second pillar. The CFSP-related acquis was acceptable in the eyes of authorities in Vienna, Stockholm and Helsinki. On the one hand, the end of the East-West bipolarity had allowed these states to endorse a more flexible understanding of neutrality, which was now considered consistent with a political allegiance to the making-up of the CFSP. On the other hand, CFSP was, generally, found to be unproblematic. Firstly, this was the case because of its intergovernmental character which gave national governments enough room for manoeuvrability to accommodate their countries' distinctive security solutions. Largely contributing to this, there was the militarily neutral Ireland and, most importantly, Britain. The former, after approximately two decades of experience in reconciling integration with military neutrality, had secured Maastricht’s promise that the prospective advancement of CFSP “shall not prejudice the specific character of certain Member States” (Article J.4.4, known as the ‘Irish clause’). The latter had traditionally conceived collective defence tasks as belonging to the Alliance’s jurisdiction and, hence, never allowed the discussion on military and defence issues to be brought into the integration dynamics.
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Secondly, the unproblematic nature of CFSP derived from the ambiguity of the utilized phraseology reflecting the still embryonic nature of the second pillar. In effect, no inevitability was contemplated in the Maastricht’s formula which, above all, evoked a finalité that could only be pursued by means of a step-by-step approach based on unanimity. Thirdly, was also the perceived rhetoric/reality gap dramatically exposed in the Yugoslav conflict where the lack of political understanding prevailing among the Twelve and the flawed nature of the common foreign and security policy's structure both produced a resounding failure of the CFSP. Finally, those authorities were fully aware that certain loose ends had been left during the planned IGC. At that juncture, with their direct influence, they expected to be able to sharpen up the CFSP's terms so as to accommodate their security policy specificity and vital concerns.
Focusing mainly on the post-accession period, this article aims to feature the adaptation of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU's CFSP between 1995 and 1999.
It examines their declared full commitment as well as their practical undertakings towards the advancement of the CFSP. This is done against the background of official positions adopted during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996/97 leading up to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, and also within the context of the Cologne Summit of June 1999. The analytical line is drawn at the Cologne Summit since this event marked the start of a new process. As time came to reveal, the EU meeting in Cologne opened up a new world which, in the final analysis, was still in the making during the writing of this article. More specifically, this gathering sowed the seeds for a cycle of maturation of the CFSP which saw its continuation in important European gatherings such as that in Helsinki (December 1999) and in Nice (December 2000), and will not be concluded before a final resolution about the EU Constitutional Treaty.
This article argues that throughout the 1990s the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish endeavours towards endowing the EU with a security and military capability run in parallel with legally imposed as well as domestically motivated limitations. Chief among these were limitations as to the building up of a defence pillar within the EU and to an unconditional sending of national troops abroad on peace enforcement missions. Springing from the concerned states' continued adherence to the non-participation in military alliances and non-participation in wars, those restraints have precluded Austria, Finland and Sweden from adopting an all-inclusive approach towards the foreign and security policy of the EU. In the specific realm of the CFSP, as the article will reveal, this could be seen in the espousal of a 'limited mutual solidarity' (i.e. 'mutual solidarity' which did not include mutual defence assistance in case of an attack against a EU member state).
This article makes two general points. The first is that since their arrival in the European family, Austria, Finland and Sweden managed to fit into the evolving CFSP commitments. This was principally the case given the tangible efforts they put into the process. These efforts were directed at influencing the shaping of the CFSP in order for them to remain inside the core thereby participating on an equal footing in all the agreed arrangements despite their distinctive security policy stance. The second point relates to the idea that their declared acceptance of ever-more demanding commitments has not taken place without contradictions and sacrifices, many of which remained unresolved until 1999.
In 1995, within the scope of the 'security of the Union' those countries embraced Maastricht’s prospect of ‘a common policy, which might lead in time to a common defence'. Nonetheless, the post-accession period saw them consistently objecting to an eventual 'militarisation' of the EU either by means of a total merger of the EU with the WEU, or by introduction of a mutual assistance type clause into the EU treaties. On the other hand, the militarily non-allied member states consented to bind themselves to the Union's spirit of solidarity which encompassed both contributing to and benefiting from a collective political synergy generated by the integration process. The highly supportive stance adopted during the Kosovo crisis towards the allied EU partners stood out as a shining example of the aforementioned spirit of solidarity. Yet, when contemplating the possibility of an attack against a member state, they continued to feel reluctant to abandon their war-free and alliance-free orientation to render territorial assistance to a partner in distress. Finally, during the IGC, they supported the conversion of the original WEU Petersberg Tasks into EU’s missions. Yet, it was not without difficulties that they committed themselves to participate in future EU-led crisis management missions and, in particular, in peace-making operations with combat forces.
While providing evidence of the Alpine and Nordic's attempts at pushing to the limit the latitude allowed by their military non-alliance to remain inside the core as regards security and defence cooperation within the EU, the following discussion sheds light on three questions. These questions include: How the politico-diplomatic strategy of these member states towards European integration in the security domain evolved between 1995 and 1999? To what extent they contributed to the progress of the CFSP? What was the major rationale behind their determination in providing the EU with an operational capability for crisis management in the scope of Petersberg missions and what sort of difficulties confronted them in this matter?
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The IGC became the initial hurdle which the EU's militarily non-allied countries had to cross since, among other things, this was projected to give a clearer definition to the content of Maastricht’s second pillar. They had to come to terms with knowing the practical limits to which their declared commitment to the advancement of CFSP should be stretched. While remaining loyal to a security policy based on freedom from alliances, all of them aspire to full-fledged participation in the CFSP dynamics.
Although bound to the ‘Federal Constitutional Law of 26 October 1955 on Neutrality’, Austria sought to portray itself as constructive builder of the Union’s security structures in such a way so as to gain increasing influence within the European family. The Nordic states, however, were particularly active during the CFSP-revision process. Finland's activism found justification in the country's security drive towards the EU and its historical experience as an isolated spot on the fringes of Europe. CFSP presented itself as a means of filling the post-Cold War security vacuum and of securing protection against Russia, while allowing the country to get out of a remote geographical corner and to gain visibility within integrated Western Europe. In its turn, Sweden's active interest linked to the need to avoid projecting the image of half-hearted European or to be seen by other partners as obstructing progress within the CFSP. Nonetheless, this country faced a especially adverse domestic climate. The spectre of the 52% on referendum day, the only day there was a majority of Swedes in favour of the integration process, continued to haunt the politicians. There were also the opposition forces which nurtured the grassroots’ ‘neutrality instinct’ as well as clamoured for withdrawal from the EU.
Since the early days of its accession, Finland and Sweden display the concern of being at the core of integrative foreign policy and security dynamics, and, by so doing, to present themselves as active player within the EU. This was a particularly crucial issue for Finland, which since the early 1990s had equated the integration process as a security net against Russia and, generally, as a way to protect itself from being left alone again.(2) Such historical need to avoid being left alone helps to comprehend Finland's interest in keeping solidarity alive and strengthening the ties between the Fifteen through the advancement of the CFSP. In this regard, the reasoning was simple: The stronger the EU became politically the stronger would be the security effect engendered by membership to the benefit of Finland’s own security.
Somewhat paradoxically, throughout the 1990's, the Finnish, but also the Swedish, concern to be at the core of integrative security dynamics should be connected with the Helsinki and Stockholm's moves to prevent any advancement of the CFSP from going as far as the setting up of a common defence pillar in which, under the current domestic and external circumstances, Finland and Sweden could not possibly participate. An eventual 'flexibilisation' of the common defence dimension, via the introduction of a choice between ‘opting in’ and ‘opting out’ of a defence protocol, was not viewed as positive development either. Even though this could preserve the specific character of these countries security and defence solutions, it would run counter to their common aspiration of belonging to the integrationist nucleus.
Anyhow, the IGC emerged as the first test or opportunity for Finland and Sweden to pass from words to deeds with respect to improvement of the CFSP. Accordingly, the Nordic states reacted in a prompt fashion. On 25 April 1996, less than a month after the IGC was launched in Turin, they presented a joint memorandum as food thought for it. This was due to add to the debate on how to further the CFSP with a view to meet the objectives stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty, and on what should be the future role and relationship between the WEU and the EU (Memorandum from Finland and Sweden, 1996). That memorandum was put forward as a ‘Swedish-Finnish Initiative’ based on the common wish to “develop the EU as a peace project” and on the common successful “tradition of active diplomacy, mediation”, as well as experience in “UN's activities on the behalf of peace” (Lena Hjelm-Wallén and Tarja Halonen, 1996). Less explicitly, though, it was also founded on the shared understanding of the EU as an 'association' or 'community' of independent states – a key point of departure typical of these Nordic countries' integration approaches (Report of the Council of State, 1995, p. 61) – and on the intention to sustain the prevailing independent defence line.
It should be noted, that it was the Finns who had originally come up with the idea of converting the original WEU Petersberg missions into the tasks of the Union; and had taken the initiative to share it with their Swedish counterparts, who had welcomed the proposition. A Finnish diplomat explained Helsinki's strategy in terms of “giving a helping hand to the Swedes” since the Finns, at that time, “were more open”(3) It is plausible to argue, however, that there was more than an altruistic gesture involved in such a move. By then there was still resentment in Finnish circles over what had happened in 1990 when Sweden announced its desire to seek EU membership without prior consultations with Helsinki causing a general outcry in Finland.
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The major reason for the Finns not to have embarked on that CFSP-related initiative on its own appeared to have resided within pure political tactics and was derived from the longstanding cautiousness characterising Finnish diplomacy. This was, after all, the first serious diplomatic endeavour in the first year of EU membership. Going along with the Nordic neighbour would add political weight to the Helsinki arguments surrounding the proposal. The fact that, at the time, Helsinki and Stockholm were ruled by Social Democrat governments (headed by Lipponen and Göran Persson respectively) with foreign policy posts held by women (Tarja Halonen and Lena Hjelm-Wallén respectively) might have also contributed to bringing together the Nordic neighbours.
Inspired by the “need for the European Union to enhance its role and capabilities in conflict management”, as well as to reinforce the linkage between the Union and the WEU in the crisis management area, the so-called Swedish-Finnish Initiative boiled down to a basic proposal. This proposal envisaged the revision of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, firstly, through inclusion of “humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and crisis management (Petersberg Tasks) into the scope of CFSP as membership tasks”. Secondly, by establishing “a reinforced link between the EU and the WEU regarding the implementation of decisions on military crisis management adopted by the EU” with the WEU conducting “peacekeeping and crisis management operations...enacted by the EU” and with all contributing EU member-states participating “on an equal footing in planning and decision-making”. In the latter respect, it was made crystal clear that “No capability will be created within the EU for planning, organising or using military resources” (Memorandum from Finland and Sweden, 1996).
The Nordic contribution to the CFSP debate made an impact upon the IGC proceedings to the extent that it ended up providing the basis for the sought after compromise in security and defence matters. Largely due to the contribution of the Finnish and Swedish proposal, the definition of the CFSP boundaries came to be fenced within peacekeeping and conflict prevention; and the division of labour between the EU and the WEU gained further clarification.
The merit of the revision proposed by the Nordics and the subsequent successful feedback it gleaned from the European audience can be ascribed to its versatility. It concurred with the common view that the EU needed to acquire military preparedness in case of conflicts in Europe and bordering areas in order to act of its own accord, and to not be dependent on assistance from the US. Secondly, it embodied the minimum common denominator between member states who aspired to see the EU bolstering its defence dimension and developing into an independent military institution (i.e. Germany, France and Italy); and those who gave the primacy to NATO in terms of collective defence tasks and were not willing to go beyond military crisis management (notably Britain and Denmark). Finally, it fitted into the ‘in between position’ of those countries sticking to a military alliance-free stance (i.e. Austria and Ireland) who, objecting to the development of a militarised EU, insisted on a clear separation between the EU and the WEU, and saw the EU role in conflict prevention and management as the maximum option.
By actively proposing a via media, Finland and Sweden managed to give a concrete contribution to the Amsterdam Treaty. Understandably so, Finnish and Swedish authorities liked to hold up their initiative as proof of their countries predisposition towards being a participative, rather than a passive element, and to play a part in the progress of the CFSP, in line with its former endorsement of the Maastricht’s CFSP acquis. On the part of both Helsinki and Stockholm, offering a compromise formula for the upgrading of the CFSP provisions was not, however, the primary rationale. The joint proposal was originally conceived of as a defensive measure. By stressing the value of soft security issues (i.e. crisis management and conflict prevention), the Nordics endeavoured to distract their partners’ attention from the maximalist approach of the federalist-minded states endorsing the vision of a EU with a defence pillar. Anticipating, to a degree, renewed internal pressures to set-up a schedule for a gradual integration of the WEU into the EU, Finland and Sweden advanced a minimalist approach regarding the future development of the CFSP. This approach was deemed to help Finnish and Swedish negotiators avoid the debate of collective defence without giving the impression of acting as a hindering element. Most important of all, it was intended to enable the Nordic countries' participation within the core of the Union’s developing security and defence dimension to coexist with their continued adherence to military non-alliance and independent defence.
Finns and Swedes knew all too well the existence of different dispositions regarding defence integration among traditional members of the Community. By 1996, they felt that a minimalist proposal would strike a common chord with British representatives, who had traditionally contended for maintaining defence-related issues within NATO jurisdiction. Parallel to this, it was commonly held in Helsinki and Stockholm that, for years to come, Washington would never accept the integration of the WEU into the EU, as a result of which they would be forced to give the EU non-NATO members security guarantees through the backdoor.
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It should be stressed that in calling for an improved EU role and capability in military conflict management, the Nordic countries, endorsed a leaner approach towards the WEU Petersberg Tasks. In their Memorandum, besides the unproblematic humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping missions, they only referred to crisis management in general terms. Originally, then, they did not use the expression ‘tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ as laid down in the 1992 WEU Petersberg Declaration (Petersberg Declaration, 1992).
For domestic audiences, the message conveyed in the presentation of the joint proposal was one expressed in even a more lenient and vague language. No direct or indirect mention was made to Petersberg Tasks. Instead, it was advocated that the EU must “...for the purpose of the Common Foreign and Security Policy...be in a position to apply the whole gamut of instruments, from conflict prevention measures of various kinds to armed peacekeeping actions”. The emphasis accorded to the need to improve the EU role in military crisis management (as spelled out in the memorandum) was replaced by a particular emphasis on the peace-oriented nature of the (future) security and defence integration. The latter is subtly introduced as a “European peace and integration process” while the EU is presented as a “peace process”. On the other hand, the proposal for a strengthened EU-WEU relationship is tempered with reference to “a closer linkage with the peace-promoting activities of the Western European Union” as well as with the portrayal of this military alliance’s activities as resting on “peacekeeping actions, crisis management and humanitarian aid”. With more clarity and in order not to give rise to undesired criticism from opposition forces (especially from the Left and Centre Parties existing in both countries), a separation was drawn between cooperation in crisis management and collective defence arrangements. In addition, participation in future armed peacekeeping missions was made dependent upon a UN or OSCE mandate and conditioned upon a national decision. Finally, a merging of the EU with the WEU was rejected for not being consistent with Finland’s and Sweden’s military-non-allied stance (Lena Hjelm-Wallén and Tarja Halonen, 1996)
Although the utilized terminology in the drafting of the joint proposal had been carefully kept within the bounds of what the Nordic states could accommodate in light of their specific security policies and their national law governing participation in international operations, there were certain attendant risks. The essentials of the proposal revolved around the concept of Petersberg Tasks whose scope tended to be more demanding in military terms since it encompassed peacemaking with combat forces. Hence, significant difficulties could arise in case this 'harder' end of the crisis management spectrum turned out to be over-emphasised in the amended Treaty thereby raising the threshold of the projected EU military capability.
The Finnish and Swedish leadership were, of course, aware of these risks. But, again, pragmatism and tactical considerations pushed the strategy forward. In Finland, where the idea was originally brought up, there was a consensual feeling running through political quarters that it would be better for Finland to come up with a concrete proposal early thereby endeavouring to shape the outcome of the CFSP debate, rather than to be compelled to accept other member states' proposals. In this case, Finland should draw a line as to how far the country would be prepared to go. If that were not possible, it would be far more advisable for them to be pragmatically active and to take the initiative, notwithstanding. The possibility of separating humanitarian and rescue tasks from peacemaking or peace enforcement in the proposal was pondered in Finnish circles. Eventually, this possibility was dismissed.
For tactical reasons, Helsinki was determined to avoid the impression that its representatives were attempting to block the process of creation of something new or that they only wanted to do things in the country's own interest. Advancing with a geometrie variable for the Petersberg Tasks was, furthermore, likely to jeopardise the success of the concerned diplomatic initiative. As Ambassador Antti Satuli, elucidated: “Proposing less than the Petersberg Tasks would have led to failure because the majority of the EU member states were committed to the WEU. Moreover, we thought that in the long run it would be possible for us to take over the tasks of WEU except Article V.” Much in the same vein, Elina Kalkku, the Minister-Counsellor of the Finnish Mission to NATO, asserted: “Petersberg Tasks were considered a package. Either you put that package on the table or you don’t” – words which clearly confirmed the idea that, from the Finnish perspective, drawing a line between 'soft' and 'hard' Petersberg Tasks was feared to prompt an unwelcome debate over defence the eventual unfoldment of which and end-result Helsinki could neither contain nor block(4).
In the later stages of the negotiation trade-offs for the revised Treaty, the language became undesirably more forceful thereby featuring “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making” as an integral part of the CFSP’s range of possible missions (Article J.7.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty).
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What had begun as a pro-active and pre-emptive strike, in fact, finished by having a boomerang-like effect detrimental to the Nordic initiative-takers (but also to Austria and Ireland). The more combative element conveyed in the Amsterdam’s Treaty phraseology confronted the Nordic authorities with 'harder' tasks and scenarios than those they had formerly envisaged. For example, it was assented in Helsinki that the new CFSP subparagraph 2 of Article J.7 could be ultimately interpreted as allowing the EU to implement UN non-mandated peace-enforcement missions. This was a scenario in clear conflict with the domestic law governing the sending of troops abroad – the 1995 Act on Peacekeeping – in force at the time when the Treaty was ratified by the Edskunta. Under this Act, Finnish troops’ participation in a given international operation required a mandate from a representative regional body be it the UN or the OSCE not to be considered a military intervention. By virtue of the fact that peacemaking with combat forces was converted into one of the Union’s security tasks, worries were expressed in Helsinki about dangers associated with the EU evolving into a situation where it could conduct crisis management missions independently from the UN or the OSCE.
Although bound to a more liberal legal framework with respect to participation in international operations, Sweden also ran into potential difficulties when it sanctioned the insertion of Petersberg Tasks in the scope of a CFSP. Those difficulties arose, once again, from the peace-enforcing measures in the Petersberg Tasks concept and from the possibility of the EU gaining an independent role in the implementation of such operations. The existence of a UN or OSCE mandate, more than a legally formal prerequisite, has for a long time been a political conditio sine qua non in Sweden for sending personnel abroad. It was understood, therefore, that the country could participate in Chapter VI-type operations implemented by the EU or in any peace enforcement operation conducted by the EU under UN authorisation. Highly problematic, however, was the scenario in which the EU led a peace enforcement operation in the absence of the Security Council's resolution. Regardless of the fact that such a scenario had been pondered by Swedish foreign policy decision-makers, it was placed on the back burner for being considered too remote. Just as important, the new Treaty stipulated safety mechanisms (i.e. the right to exercise veto and constructive abstention) to which Sweden could resort whenever a perceived conflict between a Union's decision and national foreign and security vital issues arose.
Having been in the origins of the achieved progress in the CFSP, in the aftermath of the IGC, Finland and Sweden took in the new acquis with all the attendant problematical perspectives. From the Nordic standpoint, such perspectives were something that they had to live with in order to remain in the core of the EU. To accept Amsterdam's provisions, faute de mieux, represented the possible compromise which enabled the Nordics to reconcile EU solidarity with domestic restrictions. This, however, seemed to have been made with the mental reservation that in the foreseeable future, the EU would not be equipped to implement enforcement operations. It would have to rely on NATO and, consequently, those operations would become NATO ones. Placing emphasis on the softer side of Petersberg Tasks rather than on worst-case scenarios, the Nordic official interpretation was that engagement in the EU-enacted military crisis management in the scope of Petersberg Tasks was, by and large, unproblematic. This was so mostly given the intergovernmental nature of European crisis management as reflected by the fact that consensus was required for the initiation of a given operation, and by the fact that each country retained the sovereign right to participate. One the other hand, there was also the safeguarding principle of constructive abstention under which Finland and Sweden could abstain from taking an active part, whenever vital issues were at stake, while not hindering others from going ahead.
Equally determined, as its Nordic peers, to belong to the leading group in the central areas of integration, including security policy, Austria also used the opportunity of the IGC to portray itself as a constructive partner. For Austria, no contradiction in terms existed between participation in the building up of a common foreign and security policy and the continued adherence to military neutrality. Earlier commitment to CFSP was reflected in the introduction of constitutional changes to formalise the country’s participation in CFSP on the basis of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty. The new Article 23f(1) of the Austrian Federal Constitution came to allow Austria to participate in measures involving interruption, partial or complete reduction of economic relations with one or more non-EU countries. The comments of the government of the day pointed out that this article enabled the country to take part in sanctions, notably ones of an economic nature, adopted within the CFSP framework (Paul Luif, 1998a, p. 125).
As the conflict in Yugoslavia unfolded on Austria’s doorstep, highlighting the tangible weakness of the EU to tackle conflict situations, in Vienna there was ample awareness of the need to overcome deficiencies in European crisis management. To this end, as early as 1995, the country endorsed a security model under which the EU, in close cooperation with the WEU, employed “the instruments developed by the WEU under the heading of ‘Petersberg Tasks’ for peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian operations as well as search and rescue in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in the interest of peace and European security” (W. Schüssel, 1995).
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Vienna was informed of the Northern Initiative before it was formally publicised in April 1996 during the Irish Presidency. The proposal centred on European crisis management with peace-enforcement as its most far-reaching responsibility, was judged as being politically acceptable. This was the case despite the fact that, by then, the country was not allowed by law to participate in EU-led peace enforcing actions without a UN or OSCE mandate.
From the point of view of Austria, on the whole, participation in the Petersberg Tasks was not considered problematic. These tasks were both wide-ranging in scope and defensive in concept. The important decision to engage in a given mission was exclusively based on free choice volition and individual assessment. The ‘Irish clause’ and constructive abstention existed as safety mechanisms formerly introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. These were believed to enable the country to keep aloof from any decision contrary to military neutrality. Not least important was the involvement of Finland, and especially of Sweden – to whom Austria felt closer and whose example it tended to look upon – which stood as a stamp of feasibility for the engagement of militarily non-allied states in Petersberg missions.
In addition to all this, it soon became apparent to the Viennese authorities that the Petersberg Tasks were the new challenge of the security integration process in which Austria wished to participate fully and on an equal footing alongside its other peers. In the hopes of a context for a growing utilisation of WEU’s operational capacities by the EU, Austrians declared themselves ready to contribute to those tasks via the units of the national army especially prepared for peacekeeping and crisis management (vorbereitete Einheiten) (Patrice Buffotot, 1997, p. 37.) Another weighty argument in favour of the novel CFSP element, as advanced in the spring of 1997 by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wolfgang Schüssel, rested on the idea of Europe gaining some sort of security self-sufficiency vis-à-vis the United States. Speaking to a NATO audience, he declared: “Europe must develop its own capacities in the field of crisis management, in a very substantial way. We simply cannot count on our American friends and partners bailing us out every single time we run into trouble!” (Wolfgang Schüssel, 1997)
All in all, in light of a more flexible interpretation of residual neutrality obligations, participation in crisis management, the sending of Austrian armed personnel abroad and future involvement in a Union’s peace enforcement capability seemed to not encroach on the country’s Federal Constitutional Law on Neutrality. This is not to say that there were no strains stemming from Austria subscribing to the novel membership tasks. By the time Austria signed the Amsterdam Treaty, national consensus regarding the country’s inability to commit troops in enforcement missions without a UN or OSCE mandate still endured. That being the case, the country’s involvement in an EU-led peace making operation, as ultimately envisaged in the revised Treaty, lacked both political and legal domestic legitimisation. At that moment, even if it was possible to send a contingent to a peace-enforcement UN-authorised operation this did not necessarily mean that Austria would feel inclined to dispatch military personnel and, by extension, was ready to fight.
Despite the difficulties implicit in an ever-increasing participation in a upgraded CFSP, Austria took in Amsterdam's new instruments such as the policy planning and early warning unit, the appointment of the High Representative for the CFSP and a stronger EU-WEU cooperation. Linked to the latter aspect, the basic fact remained that the incorporation of the 'Petersberg Tasks' into the revised Treaty of the European Union was a fitting response to help to develop European crisis management (Viktor Klima, 1997).
At this stage of the discussion it should be noted that the Austrian position, throughout the Treaty-revision period, followed a pragmatic line. Authorities in Vienna wanted to preserve the central military function of neutrality. At the same time, they were predisposed to pay the price for allowing the Union to develop crisis management capabilities which was considered a matter of special interest for a country in close proximity to a conflict area (i.e. the Balkans). The cost of the preservation of military neutrality implied the acceptance of engagement in the full range of Petersberg Tasks. This acceptance was made possible with a constitutional amendment to Article 23f of the Federal Constitution, adopted in the summer of 1998, as a result of which Austria was allowed to participate in peace-enforcement actions on the basis of EU decisions – besides that of UN and OSCE resolutions. By then, Austrians could contemplate participation in the EU enforcing peace efforts without the authorisation of the UN or the OSCE provided that the necessary consensus amidst the EU member states was achieved. (Paul Luif, 1998b, p. 96). Subsequent to official acquiescence of the country's involvement in the total spectrum of Petersberg Tasks, Klima’s government issued a number of declarations stating that Austria desired to concentrate on the lower level of the Petersberg Tasks, and that these tasks should be brought in line with the current understanding of neutrality.(5)
Austria was to take over the EU Presidency from Britain on 1 July 1998. Putting aside its obvious historical significance, since this was the first time Austria held the EU Presidency, such an opportunity placed Vienna in a somewhat precarious position. Could a nation legally attached to permanent neutrality, (i.e. not being a member of NATO or WEU) and profoundly divided in governmental terms on security policy be effective in managing the agenda of the Union in the field of CFSP?
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By the time Austria stepped into the role of the Presidency, the EU had completed a deepening phase bringing about a qualitative advance in the CFSP which was still awaiting ratification by national parliaments of the member states and implementation. It was logical, therefore, that Vienna could reasonably consider its main task as that of keeping the CFSP ship on course and to seamlessly hand it over to the Germans (Wolfgang Schüssel, 1998, p. 87).
This course of action was, indeed, in the best interest of the Federal Government in Vienna for whom CFSP had become a thorny internal issue to tackle given the diverging views held by the two coalition parties (Social Democratic Party and Conservative Party) as to the limits of the country’s participation in the Union’s defence dimension. The actual fact that nothing extraordinary was to be expected from the first militarily non-allied newcomer in taking over the EU Presidency was indicated by the list of Austrian chairmanship priorities in which no allusion was made to the CFSP. (Kurt Richard Luther and Iain Ogilvie, 1998, pp. 87-95)
Two developments reflected the Austrian effort to keep the CFSP ship on course. One was the promotion of the discussion of EU’s security role within the informal meeting of EU leaders at Pörtschach in October 1998. The other was the announcement of support for the British proposal on the merger of the WEU’s political functions into the EU. A retrospective and critical analysis as to how things evolved in the CFSP, nonetheless, shows that the work orchestrated by Austria could have gone almost unnoticed, if it were not for the unexpected shift in London's attitude towards the military role of the EU; and the subsequent Franco-British understanding in St. Malo one week before the closing Vienna European Council.
The St. Malo breakthrough gave immediate rise to a commonly acclaimed impetus for the European debate on common security and defence policy. Besides the “effective application of the new Common Foreign and Security Policy instruments following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty”, the “continuation of reflection on the development of a European security and defence policy” found its place in the so-called ‘Vienna Strategy for Europe’, as enshrined in the Presidency Conclusions. Not least important, the closing summit of the Austrian Presidency also welcomed “the intention of the WEU to conduct an audit of the assets available for European operations” in line with the expressed general agreement that “in order for the European Union to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed up by credible operational capabilities” (Austrian Presidency Conclusions, 1998).
The call for the development of a functioning CFSP underlying the ‘Vienna Strategy for Europe’ was to steer the path towards the endorsement of new common resolutions making the recently forged commitments in Amsterdam look ‘old’ even before they saw their full implementation. In fact, approximately one month after the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, the European family gathered in Cologne and ventured upon additional steps aimed at the strengthening of the EU security dimension. The impact of the Kosovo war, where NATO Allies had fought against Milosevic cannot be overlooked in as much as it ended up galvanizing the collective political will to accept deepened joint commitments in the field.
The Franco-British Initiative had changed the setting in which Austria, Finland and Sweden had been operating since their entry into the Union. Until St. Malo, the militarily non-allied governments counted on Britain to sustain the historical defence taboo within the integration process. The forward-thinking approach embraced by Blair at St. Malo, in opening up the Pandora’s Box of the European security and defence integration debate, appeared to announce additional difficulties for the Social Democrats in Vienna, Helsinki and Stockholm now subject to pressures from both inside and outside their countries.
When the Finnish and Swedish foreign-policy makers forged the proposal for the IGC in 1996 and a year later signed up to the Amsterdam Treaty, they were certainly not expecting things to develop so quickly. The Nordic states could not possibly have anticipated the new British thinking on European defence as conveyed by the Anglo-French Declaration of St. Malo and the implications this was to bring to the EU security and defence integration dynamics. Nor could it foresee the outbreak of the Kosovo war which added stimulus to the strengthening of the EU military role. Against this background, Finnish authorities started to show some anxiety about the pace and direction of the EU defence dimension, and to adopt a more reactive, rather than a proactive posture. Symptomatic of such nervousness was the fact that the Finnish authorities began to have problems with the language used in official EU declarations. The first striking example was linked to the working out of the Declaration of the Council of General Affairs on NATO's military campaign against Serbia issued at the end of April 1999. To the surprise of many at the table, the Finns vehemently opposed the characterisation of that action as 'justified' or 'necessary' (as endorsed by the British among others) demanding that the word 'warranted' should instead be used. Once the language problems were resolved, Helsinki had no further difficulties in joining the common position of the Union, which was reiterated in the WEU Bremen Declaration in May.
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Further indicators of apprehension were to surface again in the course of preparations for the Cologne Summit. Amidst the clamour of the ongoing war in Kosovo and seizing Britain’s more relaxed attitude regarding a EU military role, the German Presidency sought to sustain the momentum of the defence debate. Towards this end, and on its own initiative (with the back-up of France, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg) discussions over the inclusion of the WEU Article V into the EU were pushed ahead with the setting up of a collective defence arrangement in sight. In such particular circumstances, Finland and Sweden went through great pains to prevent it from seeing the light of day and to limit further progress on the security and defence front within the parameters of what had previously been agreed upon in the Amsterdam Treaty. Austria also endeavoured to stop a collective defence drive by aligning themselves with the Nordics and Ireland.
It is interesting to note, however that Vienna's representatives tended to be much less outspoken that the their Nordic counterparts. Such an Austrian reticence should be primarily understood against the backdrop of the security policy-related breach existing within the governmental coalition and the resulting difficult bargain between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives which only allowed for a minimalist consensus. Additionally, the Austrian delayed approach was inspired by politico-diplomatic tactics. The negotiators involved in preparation of the Cologne European Council were instructed to remain silent and to let themselves go along with the other partners. In the domestic arena, this enabled eventual decisions in the security and military fields to be sold as a result of Austria having been forced into the EU ‘mould’.
An exception to the discreet profile adopted by Austria in the context of Cologne can be found in a concrete initiative of the Social Democrat Federal Chancellor, Viktor Klima. This initiative, to be understood in light of the approaching European Parliamentary elections (scheduled for 13 June 1999) gained substance in the ‘European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence’, where on Klima's insistence, the word 'neutral' was explicitly featured in the text. The use of the old ‘neutrality card’ was part of the Social Democrats’ preparations for political bargaining with the Conservatives which was expected to take place after the autumn general elections. It sent a clear signal that opposition against an eventual NATO membership stood fast, and that any endeavour in that regard would be met with fierce resistance.
The Alpine and the Nordic states applauded the final common resolution adopted à la Quinze, which did not encompass a common defence agreement, but was confined to the enhancement of the EU security policy so as to allow Europeans to gain a fitting crisis management capability. In this perspective, they accepted the transfer of the WEU functions necessary for the purpose of conducting the Petersberg operations and the setting-up of common security planning and decision-making structures. The endorsement of the strengthening of a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the development of a EU-led military crisis management capacity were not seen as qualitative steps towards common defence. On the whole, they were viewed as a continuation of the 1996 Swedish-Finnish Initiative with the stress accorded to the ESDP being linked to the objective of seeing the Union taking up an enhanced role in the crisis management area.
Within the Cologne Summit's context, although the Nordic and Alpine states saw their security specificity validated, and their participation on an equal footing in the EU-led crisis management safeguarded, the work ahead towards the framing of a common defence policy foretold politically trying times. The possibility of the EU acquiring autonomous capacity to conduct the full range of Petersberg missions was given even further relevance. The creation of multilateral structures for the purpose of discussing defence issues and the establishment of a military staff received wide support. A closer cooperation with NATO, in order for the EU to effectively implement its operations, was unanimously endorsed.
The eventual development of the three aforementioned points, now high on the EU agenda, was especially problematic for Sweden and Finland. On the part of the latter, the sight of seeing the country participating in a EU-led peacemaking operation with combat forces, without a UN mandate, remained constitutionally unacceptable. The setting-up of a permanent Military Committee in Brussels, as well as of an EU Military Staff, raised particular concern amidst the Swedish political leadership. Military cooperation within the framework of the Alliance’s PfP had been somewhat easy to justify domestically by virtue of the fact that it proceeded at an exclusive bilateral level and in line with the country's long-established peacekeeping vocation. Cooperation on issues with defence implications within the Union’s (projected) multilateral structures presented itself as a completely novel practice. This was a practice that proved much more difficult to bring before an ill-disposed European opposition and public opinion which was originally led to believe integration stood for an Internal Market. For both Nordics, a development which was fraught with many challenges sprang from the hoped-for closeness and transparency between the EU and NATO in the implementation of EU-led crisis management.
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Despite committing itself to the trying developments agreed upon in Cologne, as part of the emerging ESDP, Sweden and Finland fiercely stood up against any audacious step forward in the military field. Unwillingness to see the military dimension rapidly moving ahead induced these countries to not only focus on the lower end of those missions, but also led them to draw its peers' attention to the importance of the civilian side of crisis management and the necessity of keeping the right balance between the civilian and military components of the CFSP.
The common ground finally agreed upon in Cologne was not linked to defence capacity, but rather to military capacity centred on crisis management. This permitted the militarily non-allied Nordics to continue to participate in the evolving CFSP both fully and in a spirit of solidarity. Incidentally, in the name of solidarity, a few months before the European Council in Cologne, the Nordic and Alpine authorities gave political and diplomatic support to NATO military intervention against Serbia. Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna did not officially condemn Alliance bombing, despite lamenting that the action was taken without a UN mandate. A clear understanding was expressed by the Austrians, Finns and Swedes, as to the necessity of NATO actions, in unison with European Allied members within the frameworks of both the EU and the WEU. In the Declaration of the Council of General Affairs issued at the end of April 1999, the Alliance's military campaign against Serbia was qualified as "warranted". In the formulation of the WEU Bremen Council Declaration, all of them sent an unprecedented signal of political alignment with Brussels. A Swedish diplomat remarked that “had Sweden not been a member of the EU, we would have deplored the actions taken by NATO tout court. It was the fact that we were bound to EU solidarity that made us take that line.”(6) This reasoning can surely be applied to the Austrian and Finnish cases.
With the question of mutual assistance arrangement formally pending, the meaning and implications of ‘mutual solidarity’, which was supposed to guide the member states’ conduct as regards the Union's security policy as stipulated in Maastricht, did not receive further elucidation. What the principle of 'mutual solidarity' should imply in the event of a threat and/or attack against any member state continued to be left at the discretion of the involved European governments.
Subsequently, there was no certainty as to how and to what extent the Alpine and Nordic states would ultimately deal with potential threats or crises affecting EU member states. Until 1999, from the standpoint of the countries being discussed, no formal issued declarations indicated their preparedness to surrender their free-alliance and free-war tradition in favour of 'mutual solidarity' in the territorial defence domain. Amidst governing circles in Austria, Finland and Sweden, the ‘density’ of cooperation achieved thus far did not allow for indifference vis-à-vis a given partner in distress. Far reaching political solidarity (encompassing a wide range of measures from political declarations to economic sanctions) was, therefore, openly contemplated in clear departure from their traditional policies of neutrality. This same situation, however, was widely interpreted as not compelling states to translate their solidarity into military action.
In fact, both in Finland and Sweden and as late as 1999, the possibility of military intervention to defend a member state's territory under attack was resisted.
In the Finnish case, a governmental resolution of 1997 stipulated that “Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the Union and a third party”, (Report by the Council of State, 1997, p. 48) which may be said to imply a promise of far-reaching solidarity. Yet, however great and multifaceted this solidarity was, it fell short of involvement in military intervention. Alluding to this, a Finnish diplomat observed: "Whether participation in crisis management automatically involves us in a collective defence of a member state victim of aggression? There is no automatism on that. It would depend on the circumstances. At present, participating in the defence of other member states is excluded.”(7) Along these lines, it was non-belligerency rather than common territorial defence that constituted the maximum allowable sacrifice which Finnish authorities were prepared to envisage in the name of the Union’s ‘mutual solidarity’.
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When it comes to Sweden, the government had previously undertaken not to be “indifferent” in the event of a threat or attack (Sverker Aström and Magnus Holm, 1997, p. 29). Such a position, also established back in 1997, was understood as a commitment to display concrete political solidarity likely to range from condemning diplomatic démarches to joint economic sanctions. Therefore, it should by no means be equated with a resolution to surrender time-honoured non-participation in military alliances (Sverker Aström and Magnus Holm, 1997, p. 72). In this vein, although recognising the importance of showing solidarity towards an EU partner in distress, a top-ranking Swedish diplomat commented: “The fact that we are no longer politically neutral does not force us to militarily participate in the protection of other countries. So, whether Sweden would be able to participate in the operation the answer is, in principle, ‘No’.”(8) That is not to say that in the event of a regional conflict afflicting a EU member, Sweden would necessarily issue a declaration of neutrality. In this particular instance, the more likely situation would be to see Sweden taking a similar stand to the one adopted during the Kosovo war as a non-belligerent country.
As for Austria, bound to the obligations emanating from the Federal Constitutional Law of Neutrality still in force, the country remained bound to the general obligation of non-intervention in armed conflicts (Verdross, 1978, pp. 41-48). Tangible signs of Vienna’s seriousness as to the observation of neutrality duties emerged in the summer of 1998 and in the spring of 1999. In the context of the Balkan and Kosovo crises, Viktor Klima denied Paris permission to send ships down the Danube from Passau to Slovakia, and refused the use of national airspace by NATO planes involved in the bombing campaign against Serbia. The Social Democrats’ inclination to favour an Article V protocol, displayed during the Cologne Summit preparations, nevertheless, cast a formidable shadow of doubt over their political will to continue upholding neutrality obligations.(9) By mid-1999, it remained unclear how Austria would express its ‘mutual solidarity’ in the event of an outbreak of hostility between a member state and a third country.
Along this line of reasoning, during 1995-1999, ‘mutual solidarity’ never stood for ‘mutual territorial defence’ with most Austrian, Finnish and Swedish key foreign policy decision-makers. Given this reason alone, the EU’s militarily non-allied states had real limitations when it came to display ‘mutual solidarity’ in the form of military security guarantees. True, the solidarity that they were potentially capable of demonstrating, far from being all-inclusive, was limited by the concern of not affecting the essentials of the country’s security policy. Generally speaking, this tended to be originated by domestic, political and legal considerations distinctively linked to their security doctrine which continued to be founded on military neutrality.
This article has given a detailed account of how the militarily non-allied states impacted qualitative advances that the European foreign and security integration went through between 1995 and 1999. During and after the IGC 96/97, pressures to tie up the loose ends left by the Maastricht Treaty regarding CFSP grew considerably. The search for a compromise formula became a priority not only for the more integrationist EU members, but especially for the Nordic and Alpine states resolved to preserve their security policy specificity. These countries appeared unable and unwilling to wrestle for a singularising solution that, besides damaging their image as wholeheartedly committed members, could be interpreted as being contradictory to their declared full involvement in the CFSP. In this vein, they were determined not to lose face and to not allow themselves to be catapulted into a sort of limbo between full participation in the EU and Swiss non-participation.
Sweden and Finland, while backed up by Austria and Ireland, sought the lowest common denominator amidst diverging views on the direction of future CFSP progress: the inclusion of the former WEU Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP realm. This was, by far, a formula most compatible with their security policies founded on military non-alliance and independent defence. While offering a substantive contribution to the EU security and defence dimensions debate, the so-called Finnish-Swedish Initiative paved the way for the insertion of a new provision in the Amsterdam Treaty. Under this new provision, the former WEU Petersberg Tasks were converted into membership tasks with the possibility of EU availing itself of WEU assets and capabilities to carry those missions out.
Behind the scenes of the political rhetoric, however, the major argument favouring such diplomatic initiative rested primarily on the grounds that the proposal offered the possibility of postponing a deeper debate on common defence. In any case, by keeping the CFSP centred around the Petersberg Tasks concept, the militarily non-allied states managed to rule out the necessity of resorting to an ‘opting out’ strategy that was judged to be detrimental for their image. The Petersberg Tasks, officially equated with peacekeeping and humanitarian measures and allowing for a voluntary involvement in conformity with constitutional rules, enabled them to square the circle. In other words, it allowed them to continue exhibiting their adherence to a military non-allied stance in Stockholm without compromising the political solidarity issuing from deepened cooperation with Brussels.
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Latent tensions connected with participation in future Petersberg peacemaking operations were not unfamiliar to militarily non-allied states’ foreign policy decision-makers and security planners. In any case, these did not become the major preoccupation, and, in the end, did not prevent the countries under scrutiny to keep pace with progress. It was widely understood that the Petersberg Tasks were fundamentally of a humanitarian nature and that they should remain so. The perceived likelihood associated with seeing EU involvement in enforcement actions was drastically reduced. In the worst-case scenario, there was no doubt that resorting to constructive abstention was a legitimate choice within the Petersberg 'menu' founded on self-determination and consensus.
The Nordics initiated the process of developing EU capability in crisis management without expecting things to develop so quickly and in such a short time span. CFSP-related language during IGC negotiations was made stronger in featuring ‘peace making with combat forces’ as a EU mission in the revised Treaty. Afterwards, London’s complete and unanticipated change of heart and the subsequent St. Malo Deal opened the door to military cooperation within the EU.
Following the entering in force of the Amsterdam Treaty, and influenced by the Kosovo trauma, the militarily non-allied members accepted, at the Cologne European Council, the setting-up of a multilateral decision-making framework for the carrying out of European crisis management and the building-up of a common ESDP.
Participation in a Union’s common defence, generally interpreted as potentially comprising mutual territorial defence guarantees and European integrated defence forces, however, was consistently rejected for it would have meant the end of their policies of non-participation in military alliances. In this vein, mutual solidarity towards other member states was only conceivable in strict political and security terms, and could not possibly embrace any military responsibility for other members' territorial defence. In contemplating a scenario in which a EU member state was attacked, it was not yet certain whether these states would abandon their war and alliance-free security policy orientation to render assistance to a partner in distress. The Austrian, Finnish and Swedish authorities tended to converge on non-belligerence as the likely maximal stance within the reach of their respective countries’ security strategies. The concept of limited solidarity gained expression against this background.
________, Act on Finland’s Participation in Peacekeeping Activities Based on a Decision by the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Unofficial Translation.
Åström, Sverker and Holm, Magnus, A Larger EU – A More Secure Europe. Study of the Consequences fro Security of EU Enlargement, Stockholm, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Official Reports (SOU 1997:143), 1997.
Buffotot, Patrice, La Défense en Europe: Les adaptations de l'après-guerre froide, Paris, La documentation Française, Edition 1998, 1997.
________, "European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence", Annex III of the Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council Meeting, 3-4 June 1999 (found via http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm).
________, Finland’s points of departure and objectives at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Report to the Parliament by the Council of States, 27 February 1996.
Hjelm-Wallén Lena and Halonen, Tarja, a Swedish-Finnish initiative designed to strengthen the EU's conflict management capability, Helsingin Sanomat and Dagens Nyheter, 21 April 26 (found in http://www.europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/ms-doc/state-fi/210496.html).
Klima, Viktor, Statement by the Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria at the Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Countries Participating in the EAPC, Madrid, 9 July 1997.
Klima, Viktor, “A People’s Europe. Goals and Challenges of the incoming Austrian EU-Presidency”, Lecture given by the Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria at the London School of Economics, London, 23 February 1998.
Laursen, Finn, The EU ‘Neutrals’, the CFSP and Defence Policy, Esbjerg, South Jutland University Press, TKI Working Papers on European Integration and Regime Formation, 26/98, 1998.
________, Law on Armed Force for Service Abroad, 1992:1153, Unofficial translation.
Luif, Paul, “Austria: Adaptation through Anticipation”, in Kenneth Hanf and Soetendorp, Ben (eds.), Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union, Harlow, Longman, 1998, pp. 116-130.
Luif, Paul, “The Western European Union and the Neutrals. The Security Policy of Europe’s Non-Aligned Countries in the Context of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LI, No. 1-2, 1998, pp. 77-98.
Luther, Kurt Richard and Iain Ogilvie (eds.), Austria and the European Union Presidency: Background and Perspectives, Keele, Keele European Research Centre, 1998.
Manners, Ian and Whitman, Richard G. (eds.), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester/New York, Manchester University Press, 2000.
Pesonen, Pertti and Vesa, Unto, Finland, Sweden and the European Union, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, Research Report No. 77, 1998.
________, Presidency Conclusions, Vienna European Council Meeting, 11 and 12 December 1998 (found at http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm).
Schüssel, Wolfgang, Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the WEU Council of Ministers in Birmingham, 1995.
Schüssel, Wolfgang Keynote speech to the participants of SHAPEX, Mons, 24 April 1997.
Schüssel, Wolfgang, Presentation of the Programme of the Austrian Presidency by the President of the Council to the European Parliament on 15 July 1998.
________, Security in a Changing World. Guidelines for Finland’s Security Policy, Report by the Council of State to the Parliament of 6 June 1995, Publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, 1995.
________, Swedish-Finnish initiative designed to strengthen the EU's conflict management capability. See this article at http://www.europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/ms-doc/state-fi/210496.html.
Verdross, Alfred, The Permanent Neutrality of Austria, Vienna, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1978.
________, Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992 (at http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf).
Interviews with Finnish, Swedish and Austrian, politicians, diplomats and military elite conducted in Vienna (1998), Helsinki and Stockholm (1999); and Brussels (2000).
(1) In most texts written in English, the term habitually employed to portray the countries being discussed, even during the late 1990s, is ‘neutral’ or 'non-aligned'. The latter can be said to be highly misleading, if not inaccurate, insofar as it was originally forged to identify a specific group of countries whose international stance greatly differed from that of Austria, Finland and Sweden after 1989. On the other hand, the label ‘militarily non-allied’ is preferable to ‘neutral’, which (despite being the term taken from the international law of war) no longer reflects the self-perception of the respective countries’ foreign and security policy postures after the Cold War.
(2)In general, Finns felt that they were let down in the Second World War before the hostile Eastern neighbour. Eventually, they survived the military confrontation, although with great human, material and territorial losses. The whole experience has, in consequence, created a collective psychological hang-up.
(3) Interviews in Brussels, May 2000.
(4) Interview with Elina Kalkku, Minister Counsellor at the Finnish Mission to NATO and with Antti Satuli, Ambassador at the Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU, Brussels, 9 May 2000.
(5) Interview with an Austrian civil servant, Brussels, May 2000.
(6) Interview with a senior civil servant of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, October 2000.
(7) Interview with a Finnish diplomat, Brussels, May 2000. [Author’s emphasis].
(8) Interview with a Swedish diplomat, Brussels, May 2000.
(9) Evidence that, during the preparatory works leading up to the June 1999 Cologne Summit, Social Democrat leadership showed inclination to accept the shaping of an Article V protocol was provided by an Austrian civil servant posted in Brussels during an interview conducted in May 2000.