| Step | Section | Comparison | Comparative approach | |||
| Nations | Time | Sectors | ||||
| 1 | II | Telecoms and electricity regimes in the EU | International Regime Approach (IRA) & Policy Sector Approach (PSA) | Constant | Constant | Vary |
| 2 | III | Telecom liberalization in Spain and Portugal up to 1993 | National Pattern Approach (NPA) | Vary | Constant | Constant |
| 3 | III | Telecom liberalization in Spain and Portugal after 1993 | National Pattern Approach (NPA) | Vary | Constant | Constant |
| 4 | IV | Electricity liberalization in Spain and Portugal up to 1993 | National Pattern Approach (NPA) | Vary | Constant | Constant |
| 5 | IV | Electricity liberalization in Spain and Portugal after 1993 | National Pattern Approach (NPA) | Vary | Constant | Constant |
| 6 | V | Telecoms and electricity Spain and Portugal | Compound: PSA & NPA combined | Vary | Constant | Vary |
* For the comparative terminology, see the introduction to this special issue as well as Levi-Faur (2004b).
| Cross-sectoral similarities | Cross-sectoral variations | |
| Cross- national similarities | Expectations: variations
in the EU regimes and the propensity of the sectors for competition will have a
strong impact on the degree of liberalization in the two pairs of sectors and
countries. Observations: There is clear and strong evidence of cross-national and cross-sectoral similarities in the movement towards more liberal regimes, but the regimes are open enough to the promotion of national interest and national champions. Implications: The observations do not support the expectation of a strong impact of Europeanization on the extent of liberalization. |
Expectations:
Liberalization in electricity would develop more slowly than in
telecoms. National variations will be minimal in scope in comparison with the
sectoral one. Observations: Variations in the structure of governance and market opening are less distinctive than expected. The variations in the degree of competition are mainly the result of technological and economic characteristics of the sectors. Implications: Stronger propensity for competition in telecoms and a supra-national regime at the EU level did not prevent the two countries moving towards liberalization despite the constraints on competition in electricity and despite the lesser pressure from the EU in this respect. |
| Cross- national Variations | Expectations:
Portugal’s social étatism will result in a lesser
propensity for liberalization than Spanish liberal étatism.
Cross-sectoral variations will be minimal. Observations: The Portuguese moved more slowly than the Spanish on competition but were more inclined to delegate authority to the regulatory agencies. Implications: Nations may better explain variations in public policy than variations in EU regimes. The arguments about the critical importance of Europeanization as major force of change are qualified. |
Expectations: The creation
of EU regimes will produce both sectoral and national variations but the degree
of variations will differ across nations and sectors Observations: Sectoral differences in Spain are greater than in Portugal. At the level of both governance and market, electricity differs from telecoms to a greater extent in Spain than in Portugal. Cross-national variations at both sectors are bigger at the level of governance than the market. Implications: The strength of private actors in Spanish electricity and their relative weakness in Portugal seem to explain better than Europeanization the balance of private-public power and the dynamics of Spanish liberalization. |