| Case | Applicant's 'ask' (US$) | Respondent's 'offer' (US$) | (Ask + offer)/2 US$ | Award US$ |
| EC – Bananas III(US) | 520 m | 0 | 260 m | 191.4 m |
| EC – Bananas (III (ECU) | 450 m | ? (assumption: 0) |
225 m | 201.6 m |
| EC – Hormones (US) | 202 m | 53.3 m | 127.7 m | 116.8 m |
| EC – Hormones (CAN) | 75 m C$ | 3.5 m C$ | 39.3 m C$ | 11.3 m C$ |
| US – FSC | 4,043 m | 1,110 m | 2,576.5 m | 4,043 m |
| US – Byrd | CDSO+ | 0 | 0.5 x CDSO+ |
0.72 x CDSO |
| US – Sec 110(5) Copyright | 25.5 m | 0.7 m | 13.1 m | 1.2 m € |
CDSO = Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offest Act of 2000 ("Byrd" Amendment)
Source: Spamann (2005), p. 38.
| Dispute Settlement No. | Subject | Procedural stage |
| I. Defensive Cases (EC is defendant against USA) | ||
| (1) DS 48 + DS 26 Hormones | EC bans all imports of US beef and beef products – including those that have not been treated with hormones – as of 15 June 1999 | US and Canada maintain sanctions against EC exports (starting with July 1999) by US$ 116.8 million per year and CND$ 11.3 million per year |
| (2) DS 174 Trademarks & geographical indications | Violation of TRIPS and GATT | Panel |
| (3) DS 291 GMOs (Genetically modified organism) |
Measures affecting the approval and marketing of certain biotech products | Panel |
| (4) DS 315 Customs procedures | EC customs regime (not uniformly applied measures) | Panel |
| (5) DS 316 Aircraft subsidies (Airbus/Boeing) |
Airbus/Boeing: measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft; US accuses EC to subsidies Airbus inconsistent with the SCM agreement and the GATT 1994 | Consultations/Panel |
| II. Offensive Cases (EC is complaining against USA) | ||
| (1) DS 136 1916 Anti-Dumping Act |
US antidumping legislation of 1916 incompatible with the WTO Agreements | Implementation; EC has the right to suspend its obligations under the GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement – adopting specific anti-dumping rules for US products as of 24 February 2004 |
| (2) DS 217 "Byrd amendment" The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offest Act of 2000 (CDSOA) |
Byrd amendment (Oct 2000) allows to pay proceeds from anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases to US companies responsible for bringing the cases (more than US$ 1 bio. distributed) | Implementation; EC and 6 other co-complainants (Brazil, Canada, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico) obtained DSB's authorization to impose countermeasures on US products; EC imposes additional duty of 15% on imports from USA as of 1 May 2005 |
| (3) DS 212 Follow-up of "British Steel case" |
US countervailing measures on privatized EU firms | Implementation; final panel report expected to be circulated in June 2005 |
| (4) DS 108 Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) |
FSC scheme of 1984; illegal export subsidy under the Subsidies Agreement | Implementation; until new US regime is in force, the EU countermeasures remain in force (up to a maximum of US$ 4.043 bio). EU started with extra duties of 5% in 1 March 2004 and increased it to 17% in March 2005. EU Council Regulation of 31 January 2005 suspended sanctions retroactively as from 1 January 2005. |
| (5) DS 294 Zero methodologies of dumping margins |
EU condemned the "zeroing" methodology of calculating dumping margins | Panel |
| (6) DS 160 Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act |
US Copyright Act is incompatible with TRIPs Agreement | Implementation; in September 2003, the US made the agreed payment (€ 1.219.900 per year 2001-2003; a special fee to US right holders) |
| (7) DS 176 Section 211 of the US Omnibus Appropriations Act "Havanna Club" |
Section 211 should diminish the rights of owners of U.S. trademarks previously belonged to a Cuban national or company; this is in violation of both the national treatment and the MFN obligations of the TRIPs Agreement | Implementation; implementation period to change the US law has been extended until 30 June 2005 |
| (8) DS 317 Aircraft subsidies (Airbus/Boeing) |
Boeing – according to EU – gets subsidies inconsistent with SCM Agreement | Consultation/Panel |
| (9) DS 319 AD measures on steel bars (Firth Rixson) |
US Department of Commerce (DOC) imposed an anti-dumping duty of 125.77% on imports of stainless steel bars from the UK made by Firth Rixson Special Steels Ltd. (FRSS); possible breach of WTO AD Agreement | Consultations |
| (10) DS 320 Continued suspension of obligations in the Hormones dispute | EC requested consultations with Canada and the US against the application of countermeasures. New EC legislation is WTO-consistent | Panel established |
Source: European Commission (2005).
| Scenarios | Welfare Total*)
(as % of GDP) |
Welfare
Allocation (as % of GDP) |
Terms of
Trade (%-change) |
|||||
| EU | USA | EU | USA | EU | USA | |||
| (I) | -0.000539 | -0.000264 | -0.000750 | -0.000001 | 0.000676 | -0.002122 | ||
| (II) | -0.000334 | 0.000129 | 0.000003 | -0.000028 | -0.001097 | 0.001288 | ||
| (III) | -0.000873 | -0.000135 | -0.000747 | -0.000029 | -0.000420 | -0.000830 | ||
| Exports with
Partner (%-change) |
GDP,
nominal (%-change) |
GDP, real
(%-change) |
||||||
| (I) | -0.008001 | -0.028448 | 0.001249 | -0.001964 | -0.000750 | -0.000001 | ||
| (II) | -0.061330 | -0.012093 | -0.002345 | 0.001747 | 0.000003 | -0.000028 | ||
| (III) | -0.069338 | -0.040547 | -0.001100 | -0.000322 | -0.000747 | -0.000029 | ||
*) Total welfare = allocation plus terms of trade plus other
effects.
Hormones case:
(I) = EU bans MEAT imports from the USA
amounting to US$ 116.8 million (input in the meat sector).
(II) = USA
reduces imports from EU by US$ 116.8 million according to retaliation list of
products (inputs in the sectors: meat, foot, other primary and manufactures).
(III) = EU versus USA trade war: Scenarios (I) + (II) combined.
Source:
Own simulations with the GTAP5 model.
| Scenarios | Welfare Total*)
(as % of GDP) |
Welfare
Allocation (as % of GDP) |
Terms of
Trade (%-change) |
|||||
| EU | USA | EU | USA | EU | USA | |||
| (I) | 0.000201 | -0.000756 | -0.000139 | -0.000171 | 0.001079 | -0.004780 | ||
| (II) | -0.000671 | 0.000177 | -0.000143 | -0.000024 | -0.001732 | 0.001558 | ||
| (III) | -0.000470 | -0.000579 | -0.000281 | -0.000196 | -0.000653 | -0.003221 | ||
| Exports with
Partner (%-change) |
GDP,
nominal (%-change) |
GDP, real
(%-change) |
||||||
| (I) | -0.013515 | -0.065884 | 0.003328 | -0.004246 | -0.000139 | -0.000171 | ||
| (II) | -0.105096 | -0.018708 | -0.003803 | 0.002279 | -0.000143 | -0.000024 | ||
| (III) | -0.118611 | -0.084593 | -0.000476 | -0.001967 | -0.000281 | -0.000196 | ||
*) Total welfare = allocation plus terms of trade plus other
effects.
Bananas case:
(I) = EU blocks BANANAS imports from the
USA amounting to US$ 191.4 million (input in the "bananas" sector).
(II) =
USA reduces imports from EU by US$ 191.4 million according to retaliation list
of products (input in the manufacturing sector).
(III) = EU versus USA
trade war: Scenarios (I) + (II) combined.
Source: Own simulations with the
GTAP5 model.
| Scenarios | Welfare Total*)
(as % of GDP) |
Welfare
Allocation (as % of GDP) |
Terms of
Trade (%-change) |
|||||
| EU | USA | EU | USA | EU | USA | |||
| (I) | 0.010163 | -0.002143 | 0.002144 | 0.000686 | 0.028071 | -0.035651 | ||
| (II) | 0.007094 | -0.015304 | -0.001326 | -0.000983 | 0.026789 | -0.115756 | ||
| (III) | 0.017251 | -0.017441 | 0.000816 | -0.000296 | 0.054861 | -0.151408 | ||
| Exports with
Partner (%-change) |
GDP,
nominal (%-change) |
GDP, real
(%-change) |
||||||
| (I) | 0.239033 | 1.739642 | -0.031311 | 0.053677 | 0.002144 | 0.000687 | ||
| (II) | -0.390677 | -1.888334 | 0.075005 | -0.102136 | -0.001327 | -0.000982 | ||
| (III) | -0.151643 | -0.148694 | 0.043694 | -0.048459 | 0.000817 | -0.000295 | ||
*) Total welfare = allocation plus terms of trade plus other
effects.
FSC case:
(I) = USA subsidizes exports to EU by US$
4,043 billion (input in all 7 sectors).
(II) = EU reduces imports from USA
by US$ 4 billion according to retaliation list of products (inputs in the
sectors: meat, food, other primaries, steel and manufactures).
(III) = EU
versus USA trade war: Scenarios (I) + (II) combined.
Source: Own
simulations with the GTAP5 model.
| Scenarios | Welfare Total*)
(as % of GDP) |
Welfare
Allocation (as % of GDP) |
Terms of
Trade (%-change) |
|||||
| EU | USA | EU | USA | EU | USA | |||
| (I) | -0.003174 | 0.001096 | -0.000614 | -0.000412 | -0.008291 | 0.013025 | ||
| (II) | 0.002142 | -0.004161 | -0.000181 | -0.000278 | 0.007402 | -0.031401 | ||
| (III) | -0.001030 | -0.003065 | -0.000795 | -0.000690 | -0.000889 | -0.018376 | ||
| Exports with
Partner (%-change) |
GDP,
nominal (%-change) |
GDP, real
(%-change) |
||||||
| (I) | -0.467466 | -0.110962 | -0.016206 | 0.013390 | -0.000614 | -0.000412 | ||
| (II) | -0.106857 | -0.511811 | 0.020733 | -0.027991 | -0.000181 | -0.000278 | ||
| (III) | -0.574330 | -0.622773 | 0.004527 | -0.014602 | -0.000795 | -0.000690 | ||
*) Total welfare = allocation plus terms of trade plus other
effects.
Steel case:
(I) = USA introduces safeguard measures
for steel imports from the rest of the world (tariffs increase to 30%; inputs
in the steel sector in seven regions: EU, EFTA, Turkey, Brazil, China, Japan
and Korea); USA reduces steel imports from EU by US$ 1 billion.
(II) = EU
reduces imports from USA by around US$ 1 billion (inputs in the sectors: food
and manufactures).
(III) = EU versus USA trade war: Scenarios (I) + (II)
combined.
Source: Own simulations with the GTAP5 model.