Integration Through Participation – Introductory Notes to the Study of Administrative Integration(*)

Jarle Trondal

European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 3 (1999) N° 4; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-004a.htm

Date of Publication in : 14.4.1999

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Contents:

• I. Introduction
• II. Bureaucratic Integration – On Theme
• III. The Parallel European Administration
• IV. Conceptions of Identities, Roles and Codes of Conduct in Administrative Life
• V. Accounting for Administrative Integration
• VI. Conclusion
• References

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“[T]he growing importance of the European Integration process is developing in parallel with the growing influence of the Member States in ‘Brussels’ and at the same time the impact of ‘Europe’ in the national administrations” (Demmke 1998, 21).

I. Introduction

How do we account for the actual working of public bureaucracies? How do we render intelligible why civil servants evoke certain identifications, role conceptions and modes of acting? These questions are important to address in the study of politics and policies due to the impact of public bureaucracies on policy outcomes. When aiming at studying actual decision behaviour and identities evoked by government officials, the formal organization of the bureaucracy is shown empirically to be important (Lægreid & Olsen 1984; Egeberg 1999). The formal build-up of the central governmental apparatus is also logically revealed to impact upon the actual decision behaviour amongst civil servants (Hammond 1986).

The 1980’s and 1990’s have witnessed a turn in the study of bureaucracies. From being largely a study of closed systems of governance – treatingdomestic phenomena external to the government apparatus as residual categories, recent studies indicate how international, transnational and supranational relations increasingly impinge upon how domestic government officials carry out their work. Hence, studies of domestic bureaucracies include to an increasingly extent dynamics stemming from international political orders (March & Olsen 1998). It is assumed vital to ‘open up’ bureaucracies to a multitude of dynamics in order to understand how they work, and, ultimately, to render understandable how public policies and politics come about. Consistent with this suggestion, the study of administrative integration analyzes impacts upon domestic public bureaucracies and domestic government officials subsequent to being affiliated to a ‘fourth level of government’ (Egeberg 1980) – The European Union (EU).

This study draws on a rich body of empirical research on public bureaucracies. One important finding is that when decision behaviour, identifications and role conceptions amongst central governmental officials are to be accounted for, the institutional affiliations of these officials are more important than their social background, gender and private interests (Lægreid & Olsen 1984; Egeberg 1999). The only social background variable having a significant impact upon these factors is educational background. Hence, the general and overall research-agenda of this study is to uncover theoretical relationships between institutional affiliations and the identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour being evoked by government officials.

I argue that the study of administrative integration across levels of governance should pay attention towards two different sources of explanation: the primary and secondary institutional affiliations, and the degree of compatibility between these affiliations. To this end, this study aims at focusing on domestic government officials participating in different institutions within the EU system of governance. In order to measure the effect of formal organizational structure, we focus on government officials – at A and B grades – participating within two different classes of EU committees: Commission expert committees and Council working parties. Secondly, we direct our attention towards government official employed in domestic ministries and agencies – thus aiming at revealing the impact of domestic institutional affiliations. These organizational theory arguments are outlined more thoroughly bellow.

The study of administrative integration poses several questions: How are domestic governmental officials affected subsequent to being affiliated to several levels of governance simultaneously? Put more precisely, do government officials who participate at the EU level of governance become resocialized, thus changing their role conceptions, identifications and modes of acting? Do these officials construct new conceptions of ‘the self’, or do they evoke the same basic identifications, role conceptions and codes of conduct as they do domestically? Hence, this study takes into consideration the dual character of the EU-system of governance, and the dual character of domestic bureaucracies: The EU system of governance is a parallel administration, comprising permanent officials (total: 25 561 (Fligstein & McNichol 1998, 73)), and temporary officials from domestic bureaucracies – seconded into the EU system, or participating in committees and working parties within this system. Hence, bureaucratic integration emerges across the EU-nation state spectrum subsequent to domestic government officials participating at both these levels of governance simultaneously.

However, what is the rationale for studying the relationships between institutional affiliations and the identifications, role conceptions and modes of behaviour in the context of multi-level governance, and not in a purely domestic context? The overall rationale is a theoretical one: The study of administrative integration aims at studying institutional dynamics within the EU system, and processes whereby different levels of governance get increasingly intertwined. The central argument put forward here underscores how different institutional dynamics within the EU institutions impinge upon the identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct being evoked by domestic government officials, ultimately contributing to processes of Europeanization of domestic institutions and policy processes. Put more precisely, studies of administrative integration should aim at analysing intergovernmental and neo-functional dynamics within the EU institutions, and specifying under what conditions each dynamic is most likely to be enacted (Trondal 1999c).

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Secondly, one rationale behind studying these relationships in a multi-level context is methodological. Allow me briefly to elaborate on this: The empirical frame of reference for this study is domestic government officials having their primary institutional affiliation domestically. The secondary institutional affiliation of these officials is the expert committees and working parties at the EU level of governance in which they participate. Generally, we would expect the relationship between “where you stand depends on where you sit” to be weaker within collegial arrangements, such as the expert committees and working parties, especially when the formal affiliation to these collegial arrangements is of a secondary nature. The strength of this relationship is assumed to be further weakened, as the institutional embeddedness of these actors is multinational and multi-linguistic. Thirdly, the government officials who participate within these committees are only part-time participants – having their primary institutional affiliations at the domestic government level. Consequently, the likelihood of this secondary institutional affiliation to impinge heavily upon the participants’ identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour is modest. Hence, one rationale for choosing the EU committees and working parties as the frame for this inquiry rests upon a theoretical-methodological consideration: If we uncover statistically significant correlations between the secondary institutional affiliation and the dependent variables, this correlation may be shown to be relatively robust (Popper 1963:36).

This article does not pose all the relevant questions, neither does it address all the relevant answers. Some basic themes are, however, touched upon. The first section of this paper elaborates on the overall theme of the study of administrative integration. The second section elaborates on ‘the state of the art’ within the study of EU committees and working parties. The following two sections address the dependent variables and the independent variables of the study of administrative integration: What is to be explained and how are we going to explain it? The third section introduces the concepts of role perceptions, identities and actual decision behaviour to the study of administrative integration. Fourth, this paper briefly touches on the institutional setting within which domestic officials are affiliated – domestic ministries and agencies, and the committees and working parties within the EU Commission and the Council of the European Union. In the same vein, the fourth section also aims at conceptualizing the EU system of governance. Due to this polity being described as unique, novel and ‘mysterious’ (Bartolini 1997), and faced with an assumed lack of appropriate concepts and categories for the understanding of this polity (Jachtenfuchs 1997, 40), one vital step in this enquiry must be to carve this polity into empirically meaningful and theoretical fruitful categories.

II. Bureaucratic Integration – On Theme

Administrative integration, as we perceive of it here, is a relatively embryonic field of study. Administrative integration might, tentatively, be understood as a process, not a fixed state of affairs. Moreover, this phenomenon is relational – comprising the relationships and interdependencies between different administrative systems, and between the members of these systems. As will be revealed more thoroughly bellow, a weak notion of integration requires that actual contact occurs between (at least) two administrative systems. A stronger notion of integration requires in addition that this contact affects the systems (mutually), and the individual members within them.

Several suggestions as to how to define administrative integration have been addressed over time. Rosenau (1969, 46) defines this as a penetrative processes whereby “members of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another”. Furthermore, Barnett (1993, 276) asks, “[w]hat happens when state actors are embedded in two different institutions … that call for different roles and behaviour?” Olsen (1998, 2) asks, “[w]hat happens to organized political units when they become part of a larger unit?” Whereas Rosenau applies a weak definition of administrative integration, Barnett and Olsen address a stronger definition of integration. Furthermore, while Olsen operates at the system level of analysis, Rosenau and Barnett apply the individual government official as the unit of analysis. Several arguments might be advanced for and against both strategies. This study applies both these definitions of administrative integration, and chooses the individual official as the unit of analysis. This is because, ultimately, individual officials are those who travel to Brussels for participation in meetings and boards – not the ministry or agency as such. Obviously, several government officials do formally and actually represent their ministry, agency or nation state when participating at these meetings. Still, we are analysing the representatives themselves, not whom they represent. Finally, it is the individual officials who evoke certain identifications, roles and codes of conduct, and who ultimately foster processes of ‘Europeanization’ and integration subsequent to ‘cross-level’ participation. Stated another way: the third and fourth level of governance is integrated through patterns of participation cross-cutting these levels, contributing to (mutual) inter-penetration (Rosenau 1969). This cross-level participation is formally institutionalized within the EU committees.

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Past studies on administrative integration exhibit largely a state-centric approach. However, from the late 1960’s onwards, a growing literature on administrative integration emerged in the wake of the accelerating European integration processes. Studies of public administrations discovered the partial embeddedness of domestic administrative systems in international political orders, and hence the multi-level character of domestic administrative systems. Early scholarly contributions on administrative integration also aimed at revealing how the domestic-international distinction became blurred due to the “intermingling of national and international bureaucrats” (Scheinman 1966, 751; Cassese 1987; Christensen 1981; Hopkins 1976; Pag 1987).

The study of European integration and processes of ‘Europeanization’ of domestic institutions and policy processes was for a long time dominated by international relations scholars. This influence is at present also strongly evident within this scholarly field (Hocking & Wallace 1997; Kassim & Wright 1991; Moravcsik 1997; Sundelius 1989; Sandholtz 1996). One argument advanced within this literature is that the “description of the Community as ‘above’, ‘alongside’ or ‘outside’ the member states are useless oversimplifications” (Pag 1987:446), highlighting ‘bureaucratic inter-penetration’ across levels of governance (Scheinman 1966; Rosenau 1969). The national level and the Community level are described as being mutually intermixed and interwoven (Demmke 1998, 15). Whereas these studies aim at studying the extent to which bureaucratic integration emerge, the impact fuelled by these processes is largely ignored. Different measures are applied for studying the extent to which bureaucratic integration actually take place: The number of travels to Brussels conducted by domestic officials (Christensen 1981; Demmke 1998; van Schendelen 1996), the number of domestic government officials participating within committees at the EU level (Hopkins 1976; Scheinman 1966), the number of days in session for these committees, etc. (Wessels 1998). What these studies, together with other studies, largely ignore, however, are the institutional affiliations of these officials. Consequently, this body of literature addresseswhether government officials become regular participants at the EU level of governance, not how and why they become affected by it. Consistent with intergovernmentalist notions, the EU level is largely perceived as an arena for combat and compromise, thus ignoring the institutional dynamics and transformative powers of this governance system (Moravcsik 1997; Putnam 1988). Hence, this article aims at introducing institutional variables into the study of administrative integration across levels of governance: What are the primary and secondary institutional affiliations of government officials, and secondly, how do the identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour of these officials reflect these affiliations?

Due to the widening and deepening of the European integration process in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and due to the institutionalist turn in the study of public bureaucracies and organizations, the study of the ‘Europeanization’ of domestic bureaucracies has been increasingly influenced by organization theory perspectives (Olsen 1996). This turn has contributed to introducing formal organization structures into the study of European integration and the study of ‘Europeanization’ of domestic institutions and policy processes. Organization structures are assumed to mobilize particular modes of behaviour, identities and role conceptions. Hence, one important topic introduced to European studies is the study of the impacts of cross-level participation. It has become important to render understandable which identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct are most likely to be evoked at the EU level, and how the institutional dynamics at the EU levels fuel processes of Europeanization of domestic institutions and policy processes. Before elaborating on how to account for the construction of identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct, the following section addresses the parallel European administration within which these processes occur: the committees and working parties at the EU level.

III. The Parallel European Administration

Little light has been shed on the dual character of the European Union bureaucracy – consisting partially of permanent officials and partially of temporary officials seconded or being participants in the committee system of the Union (Cini 1996). The EU bureaucracy is made up of permanent ‘Eurocrats’ together with ‘travelling national civil servants’ (Nedergaard 1995:26). Van Schendelen (1996) estimates that about 50 000 domestic officials are temporary engaged in the administrative work of the Union per year.(1) In 1997, European Institutions and other European bodies organized 10 950 meetings. “The Joint Interpreting and Conference Services provided 138 000 interpreter days” (Demmke 1998, 15). Furthermore, in 1989 the Commission organized about 5 500 meetings and approximately 64 000 days were spent on them. In addition, about 24 000 government experts participated in such committee meetings in 1989 (Buitendijk & van Schendelen 1995, 41). Hence, “Brussels is truly an over-crowded policy arena” (Wright 1996, 152). The committee members at the EU level are regular participants who meet each other frequently (Institut für Europäische Politik 1989). Several of those officials who participate in expert committees under the auspices of the Commission also participate in Council working parties (Schaefer 1996). However, despite the great number of committees existing at the EU level, “a complete and reliable survey of the committee – and expert – or working group system as well as an in-depth analysis of its performance in practise is still missing” (Institut für Europäische Politik 1989, 14; Butt-Philip 1991; Cassese & Della Cananea 1991).

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One way of classifying the EU committee system is (i) preparatory expert committees under the Commission, (ii) Council working parties and (iii) comitology committees (Schaefer 1996). These committees are dealing with policy areas falling under the first pillar. The comitology committees are excluded from this analysis mostly due to methodological considerations.(2) The preparatory expert committees consist mainly of domestic government officials in addition to representatives from the relevant DG in the Commission. Representatives from industry, universities, and from interest organizations also frequently participate in these committees. The main function of these committees is to “assist the Commission in drafting proposals for legislation in the Commission” (Schaefer 1996, 19). The Council working parties consist mainly of domestic government officials, representatives from the permanent representation in Brussels, representatives from the Presidency of the Council and representatives from the Commission. The main function of these committees is to “prepare decisions of COREPER and the Ministers on the basis of Commission proposals” (Schaefer 1996, 19).

Within the literature on EU committees and working parties, the focus is mainly directed towards the comitology system. Secondly, the focus is on the Council working parties, and only lastly does the literature pay heed to the preparatory expert committees. The majority of this body of literature concerns the following aspects: (i) outlining typologies of the committees, (ii) describing the formal and legal role of the different committees, (iii) assessing the impact of these committees on policy processes within the EU, and (iv) addressing the functions fulfilled by the committees (Institut für Europäische Politik 1989, 24). In the following, a fourfold classification scheme of this literature is suggested: A major part of the literature on EU committees is oriented towards (i) the historical development of the committee-system, with a particular emphasis attached to internal reforms of this system (Bradley 1997; Vos 1997; Ballmann 1996; Egan & Wolf 1998; Demmke et al. 1996; Bücker et al. 1996); this literature is (ii) formal-legalistic, focusing on legal typologies of these bodies (Hankin 1997; Joerges 1997; Joerges & Neyer 1997; Bücker et al. 1996; Dogan 1997; Bertram 1967; Schindler 1971; Haibach 1997); this body of literature pays heed to (iii) the number of committees, the number and types of participants and meetings, the size of these committees, etc. (EURO-CIDCE 1996; Ballmann 1996; Wessels 1998; Cassese & Della Cananea 1991; Lindberg 1963; Institut für Europäische Politik 1989; Pag 1987; Wessels 1990; Schaefer 1996; Van der Knaap 1996; Falke 1996); and finally, (iv) some contributions to this body of literature are mostly of a theoretical nature, trying to understand this phenomena more broadly (Egan & Wolf 1998; Wessels 1998; Eriksen 1998; Lindberg 1963; Joerges & Neyer 1997; Bücker et al. 1996). Amongst those scholarly contributions written in the 1960’s and 1970’s – and to some extent in the 1980’s – a legal and historical approach tends to dominate the analysis. Furthermore, a weak definition of administrative integration characterizes past analysis – focusing on the degree of actual cross-level participation. Contemporary literature is more empirical oriented, aiming at measuring and assessing different implications of this committee system (van Schendelen 1998). Hence, a stronger definition of administrative integration is applied. Two pioneer contributions to this empirical turn were Scheinman and Feld (1972), and Feld and Wildgen (1975). One basic insight gained from their research is that political attitudes and orientations amongst domestic government officials are partially moulded when participating in committees at the EU level. A basic weakness exhibited by these contributions is, however, the lack of distinction between different types of committees. A later contribution from The Institute für Europäische Politik (1989) reveals the number of committees and the intensity of networking occurring within these committees. The impact of this participation is, however, not analysed. A more recent analysis studies the EU committees as influential policy makers, focusing on their function as “channels of participation” (van Schendelen 1998, 288).

The only literature, to the author’s knowledge, analysing the general impact fuelled by the EU committees as regards the identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour, is contributed by researchers at the University of Leuven (Jan Beyers, Guido Dierickx and Bart Kerremans) and at the University of Oslo (Morten Egeberg and Jarle Trondal). Beyers & Dierickx analyse impacts on communication networks and attitudes amongst the domestic government officials subsequent to participating within Council working parties (Beyers 1998; Beyers & Dierickx 1997; Dierickx & Beyers 1999). They basically reveal that communication networks within these working parties are largely influenced by the nationality of the officials (Beyers & Dierickx 1997), but that intensive participation within these committees might enhance processes of re-socialization (Dierickx & Beyers 1999). Moreover, Beyers & Kerremans (1996) reveal the centrality of the Foreign Ministry in the contact patterns within the Council working parties. Consistent with this pattern, participants within Council working parties also tend to ascribe the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a vital role in the domestic co-ordination of EU-related affairs (Beyers & Kerremans 1996). Finally, Beyers (1998) shows that the attitudes towards European integration amongst these participants reflect prior national socialization experiences (their primary institutional affiliation) and the period of entrance to the Union. These studies thus reveal the importance of paying heed to the dual institutional affiliations of government officials.

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Morten Egeberg (1998) adds to this picture the expert committees under the auspices of the EU Commission, while also including the Council working parties. He uncovers that identities and role perceptions evoked by domestic government officials are affected differently when participating within expert committees than when participating within Council working parties. Officials who participate in expert committees tend to evoke intra-sectoral identifications and roles more frequently than officials participating in working parties under the auspices of the Council. Moreover, officials who participate in both expert committees and working parties tend to evoke a multiple set of roles and identities. Jarle Trondal (1999a) adds to this an intensity dimension: The likelihood of being resocialized within Commission expert committees and Council working parties is positively related to the sheer intensity and length of participation within them. However, the supranational allegiance developed at the EU level is shown to be only secondary and complementary to the domestic allegiances (Egeberg 1998).

Hence, Egeberg underscores the importance of carving up the institutional terrain of the EU system when aiming at studying the impact promoted by cross-level participation. However, before addressing this topic, I will outline the dependent variables measuring the strong mode of administrative integration, thus highlighting the impact fuelled by cross-level participation.

IV. Conceptions of Identities, Roles and Codes of Conduct in Administrative Life(3)

Processes of administrative integration across levels of governance might be measured along a multitude of lines. What is the appropriate level of analysis, and which variables are capable of accounting for administrative integration? Two general measures are suggested within the current article:

• The level and degree of actual participation across levels of governance, and
• The impact fuelled by such participation on the identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct evoked by the participants.

Whereas liberal intergovernmentalism takes into account the first measurement, focusing on how domestic government officials participate within the EU-system of governance as national representatives (Moravcsik 1997), neo-functionalists highlight, in addition, that these officials become heavily affected by this participation – thus ‘turning native’ (Haas 1958; Niemann 1998). Hence, a strong notion of administrative integration is accounted for by the neo-functional notion. Conversely, the liberal intergovernmental perspective addresses a weak notion of administrative integration.

A weak mode of administrative integration: At the general level of analysis, liberal intergovernmentalists assume that when government officials do participate within committee meetings in Brussels, they act as national representatives. Hence, processes of resocialization at the EU level are assumed to be absent. Thus, the degree of administrative integration is pictured as superficial and shallow and not penetrating the domestic administrative apparatus or the ‘inner self’ of these civil servants. This scenario pictures government officials as national representatives having largely national allegiances. The officials do participate at the EU level, but they do not become resocialized subsequent to this participation (Moravscik 1997).

First, as regards the degree of actual cross-level participation between the EU system and the domestic government apparatus, several variables might care it to unravel: Whereas Christensen (1981) studies the travel patterns amongst government officials, Wessels (1990) studies the amount of participation amongst domestic government officials within EU committees. Furthermore, the frequency of participation in committee-meetings within Union bodies, the number of committees on which officials are members, the level of engagement and involvement in formal negotiations within these committees, the frequency of informal contacts prior to these meetings and the frequency of consultations after the meetings (by phone, pos, e-mail, fax, etc.) are also vital variables to this end. Still, other studies address processes of parachuting(4) domestic officials directly into top positions of the EU Commission bureaucracy, processes of seconding(5) domestic officials into this administrative fabric, and processes of lobbying the Commission and the Council institutions. All these variables are easy to operationalize and are pretty straight forward to measure, indicating the extent to which domestic government officials become integrated and locked into the decision-making processes at the EU level.

A strong mode of administrative integration: The second aspect of administrative integration concerns the impact fuelled by such cross-level participation on the identities, role conceptions and modes of acting amongst the participants. New-institutionalists and neo-functionalists picture government officials as being heavily influenced subsequent to participating at the EU level of governance. The ‘inner self’ of the official is partly resocialized subsequent to intensive and protracted interaction with officials from other member states within committees and working parties. The question thus becomes, how do we account for these change processes? Which features of the officials are valid indicators as far as the impacts of ‘cross-level’ participation are concerned? Three candidates are put forward in this article: Studies of administrative integration should analyse to what extent, how and why domestic government officials, who participate in committees and working parties at the EU level, tend to evoke certainidentities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour. However, due to these variables being largely ignored within the study of administrative integration, the following pages aim at discussing these variables more thoroughly. Each variable is presented successively, succeeded by a discussion of how each variable is likely to relate to processes of ‘cross-level’ participation.

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First, actual decision behaviour relates to what officials actually do and how they do it. Decision behaviour might be seen as processes where premises are supplied and chosen (Simon 1997). Decision behaviour relates to which actors, problems, alternatives and solutions are brought together and which are held separate. When operationalizing this variable, contact patterns are vital – who has contact with whom, when and how? Secondly, it is vital to understand which considerations are attached importance by officials when making decisions. Thirdly, what signals are assigned weight amongst government officials in the course of taking decisions? Finally, which officials pay heed to which problems, solutions and consequences? Which solutions are perceived of as important, good, legitimate, appropriate and modern? These questions thus relate to central elements in day-to-day decision-making processes within domestic governmental institutions. This article asks whether and how participation within committees and working parties at the EU level of governance impinge upon the actual decision behaviour amongst these participants. Moreover, do different codes of conduct and modes of actual decision behaviour become evoked within different committees or by different committee participants? Ultimately, do these processes of enactment of particular codes of conduct at the EU level affect the codes of conduct being evoked domestically?

“[P]arallel with the growing influence of the Member States [and their representatives] in ‘Brussels’…, the impact of ‘Europe’ in the national administrations” is increasing (Demmke 1998, 21). Processes of resocialization at the EU level are assumed to foster processes of ‘Europeanization’ of domestic institutions and decision processes. In order to measure these processes two particular modes of decision making are stressed throughout this article, that is, inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral co-ordination processes within the domestic central governmental fabric. The central question being posed is whether participation within committees and working parties at the EU level of governance generally affects these modes of co-ordination. Inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination relate to processes of horizontal and vertical co-ordination between organizations and between different policy sectors. Conversely, intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination relate to horizontal and vertical co-ordination processes within organizations and within policy sectors.

The definition and perception of co-ordination varies between different authors. Metcalfe (1994) advances a cumulative Guttman-scale measuring increased sharing of information and increased level of agreement on politics and policies among different actors. Boston (1992, 89) includes acts like “the avoidance, or at least minimization, of duplication and overlap; the avoidance of policy inconsistencies; the quest for coherence and cohesion and an agreed ordering of priorities; the minimization of conflict…; and the promotion of a comprehensive or ‘whole government’ perspective against … sectoral perspectives”. As this definition reveals, most accounts on co-ordination largely ignore the intra-sectoral dimension of co-ordination, thus solely paying heed to cross-sectoral co-ordination processes. This article focuses on both intra-sectoral co-ordination and inter-sectoral co-ordination.

Grouping actors, problems, solutions and consequences into different organizational units encourages co-ordination within units, not between them (Mintzberg 1979, 107). Intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination relate to processes whereby each policy sector is linked closer together as regards actors, problems, solutions and modes of thinking. Intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination at the domestic level of governance are generally assumed to increase as one moves down the formal hierarchy, and as one moves from the ministry level towards the agency level. Conversely, inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination are basically inter-organizational in nature, comprising co-ordination processes between different ministries and between different agencies. This mode of co-ordination is asserted to strengthen ministries with a horizontal co-ordination role within the governmental apparatus, i.e. the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and to some extent the Ministry of Environment. The portfolio of these ministries crosscutts the sectoral principle of the sector ministries and sector agencies. Inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination are generally assumed to increase as one moves up the formal hierarchy, and as one moves from the agency level towards the ministry level. However, as most scholarly accounts on co-ordination processes solely pay attention to inter-sectoral co-ordination, intra-sectoral co-ordination is often perceived as fragmentary processes: From an inter-sectoral viewpoint, intra-sectoral dynamics are seen as dynamics of fragmentation. In the current article, however, co-ordination is seen as having both an intra-sectoral and an inter-sectoral dimension.

The arguments advocated in the next section stress how modes of domestic co-ordination are likely reflect different institutional dynamics within different EU committees. Moreover, I argue that administrative integration is likely to be stronger when intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination are activated. Inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination, being largely controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), are likely to construct administrative ‘filters’ or buffers between different levels of governance. Conversely, within processes of intra-sectoral co-ordination the role of the MFA is smaller, thus rendering the domestic level of governance vulnerable to sectoral penetration and influence from the EU level of governance. A more thorough discussion of these relations is provided in the next section of the article.

The general rationale for studying co-ordination processes relates to the question of policy coherence. A general political-administrative goal is to prevent policy fragmentation, and to foster policy connectedness. As regards administrative integration, this study aims at revealing how domestic government officials evoke different modes of co-ordination domestically due to participating within different committees at the EU level: Whereas the expert committees under the auspices of the EU Commission are assumed to evoke intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination, the Council working parties are likely to activate more inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination, inter-locking different policy sectors. I also argue that administrative integration is promoted more strongly subsequent to government officials participating within Commission expert committees than when they participate within Council working parties. This is due to sectoral inter-penetration being filtered and modified by efforts towards inter-sectoral co-ordination promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These efforts are assumed to be strengthened by the institutional dynamics within the Council working parties. Conversely, I argue that the gate-keeping function of the Foreign Ministry is being weakened as a result of the institutional dynamics of the Commission expert committees. The reason for these processes is outlined more thoroughly in the next section.

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Domestic government officials participating within Commission expert committees are likely to evoke intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination. Within contemporary literature this mode of co-ordination are often perceived of as inter-sectoral fragmentation. Hence, administrative integration is fostered by the lack of inter-sectoral co-ordination by the MFA, thus contributing to sectoral penetration of the domestic governmental apparatus. Conversely, and consistent with the liberal intergovernmental notion, inter-sectoral modes of co-ordinating – fostered by the Council of Ministers – are likely to hamper administrative integration across levels of governance, and ultimately to ‘rescue the nation state’ (Moravcsik 1997; Milward 1996).

The second and third dependent variables measuring administrative integration (in the strong sense) are role conceptions and identity perceptions. These variables are, however, almost entirely lacking within contemporary studies of administrative integration. The question posed here is whether government officials evoke sectoral or national roles and identities when participating within EU committees. I argue that a strong notion of administrative integration is fostered if these roles and identities are sectoral in nature – thus largely ignoring national senses of belongingness. Moreover, these processes are seen as fuelled by institutional dynamics within Commission expert committees.

In this section roles and identities are discussed in parallel because these properties of the self are perceived of as a continuum: Having an identity is a result of internalizing the values and goals prescribed by the role. Moreover, by ‘role’ we usually mean a set of expectations (norms or rules) that more or less specify the desired behaviour of the role incumbent. An identity is a conception of self, organized into rules for matching action to situations. Roles prescribe how one should act while identities in addition prescribe who one should be. Hence, “the adoption of roles is central to the development of social identities” (Pratt 1998:196). According to social identity theory, the adoption and enactment of roles are seen as necessary means for producing identification (Pratt 1998). Identities are thus more difficult to distinguish from the self than the role, and therefore are also more difficult to alter in different situations. The notion of role rests on an analogy of the theatre where the actor is expected to perform according to a particular script. Hence, the current study analyses civil servants as actors at two different theatres: domestic and European. These officials are perceived of as multiple selves (Elster 1986), having multiple roles and identities. The question thus becomes: Which script (identity and role) should they enact in which play? Additionally, is each official able to separate which role to enact in different situations? Conversely, when one particular role is evoked frequently, the likelihood increases for this role to be evoked in other situations than the initial situation, thus fostering a process of co-evolution and integration of different roles. Hence, a logic of recency easily becomes activated (March 1994).

Why is it important to study identities and roles? First, they provide a cognitive, moral and normative system of orientation and self-reference. Secondly, they provide the actor with a shared system of meaning. Thirdly, they might influence the framing of action. Hence they provide “conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties, and endowments, and thereby with a capacity for purposeful action” (March & Olsen 1995, 30). Within this article, roles are seen as the roles of being ‘domestic officials’ within domestic ministries and agencies, the roles as ‘national representatives’ at the EU level, and the roles as ‘independent experts’ at the EU level. Identities are perceived of as the feeling of belongingness to different parts of these domestic governmental institutions and the feeling of belongingness to different parts of the EU-system. The questions we pose are whether participation at the EU level of governance activates other roles and identifications than those being evoked domestically. Or, do officials who participate at the EU level evoke the same role and identity conceptions at the EU level as they do domestically? Furthermore, if new role and identity conceptions become evoked at the EU level, are these roles and identities also evoked domestically, thus contributing to processes of ‘Europeanization’ of domestic governance processes?

Important to this study is the notion of identities and roles as complementary: Consistent with the notion of the individual as a ‘multiple self’, individuals might evoke several, partially contending roles and identities simultaneously. Due to being exposed to conflicting role and identity expectations at two levels of governance, government officials may take on a partially conflicting set of roles and identities, i.e. evoking the role as a domestic representative together with the role as an independent expert. Consistent with the co-ordination variable discussed above, we ask whether officials, who participate within committees and working parties at the EU level, conceive of themselves as being representatives of the nation state as a whole, as representatives of the policy sector, the ministry/agency as a whole, or only one section or unit within these ministries/agencies. As regards identity conceptions, this study asks whether participation within committees and working parties at the EU level strengthen the feeling of belongingness towards the nation state as a whole, towards the domestic governmental apparatus as a whole, or only to his/her ministry/agency, division, etc. As will be revealed more thoroughly in the next section, the Council working parties tend to evoke identities and role conceptions as inter-sectoral in nature, while the Commission expert committees tend to evoke more intra-sectoral identifications and role conceptions. Moreover, national identifications are more likely to be evoked within Council working parties than within Commission expert committees. Regarding role and identity conceptions, a stronger degree of administrative integration is likely to be fuelled by the institutional dynamics within the Commission expert committees than by the Council working parties.

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Jon Elster (1998) argues that roles often come in pairs, that one role implies the existence of an opposite number. Similarly, the conception of the self is paired with the conception of ‘the essential other’ (Galatzer-Levy & Cohler 1993). Our conceptualization of role and identity does not, however, ascribe this distinction vital importance. The central point to be made is that “[a] sense of belonging appears to be closely interrelated with membership in a political community” (Aggestam 1998, 7). In the current study we analyse government officials having dual memberships – at the domestic level and at the EU level. We ask whether this duality, as regards memberships, fosters dual role concepts and identifications, or if officials evoke the same role and identity conceptions in different institutional settings at different levels of governance? The next section aims at addressing some explanatory variables as regards the questions being posed.

V. Accounting for Administrative Integration(6)

Whereas neo-functional and new-institutional scholars picture increased fragmentation of the nation state bureaucracy subsequent to being affiliated to the European Union (Dehouse 1997; Kassim & Wright 1991; Siedentopf & Ziller 1988; Wessels & Rometsch 1996), liberal intergovernmental scholars picture the rescue of the national bureaucracy and the national identity (Mörth & Jacobsson 1998; Milward 1996; Moravcsik 1997). This article argues that both these scenarios are partially correct (Egeberg & Trondal 1999).

Hence, the issue becomes – how to account for the processes and dynamics outlined in the foregoing section. How should we come to grip with processes of enacting certain roles, identities and codes of conduct in particular situations? How should we render understandable that individuals tend to behave and identify in certain ways in particular situations and in other ways in other situations? Organizational dynamics and processes of ‘Europeanization’ of identifications, role conceptions and modes of behaviour within domestic governmental institutions might be analysed against the background of different perspectives (Cram 1997; Olsen 1998). The purpose of this article is in principle to shed light on some dynamics more than on others. The general argument laid down underscores processes of administrative integration to partially reflect the way political and administrative life is formally organized.(7) Hence, the current analyses is based upon assumptions and arguments advanced by organization theorists.

At this initial point of departure, several social mechanisms might be ruled out of the study, such as purposeful choice, communicative rationality and discursive dynamics, imitation processes, etc. (Eriksen & Weigard 1997; Friedman 1996; Hedstrom & Swedberg 1998). This study is based on the basic assumption of bounded rationality, thus drawing heavily on cognitive theory. This perspective sees political and administrative life as contextualized and embedded. Formal structures are pictured as political agendas (Hammond 1986), biasing the way actor’s frame their behaviour, identifications and conceptions of roles (Schattschneider 1960).

This article focuses on government officials having two main institutional affiliations, one primary and one secondary. The primary institutional affiliation consists of the domestic ministries or agencies in which government officials are employed. The secondary institutional affiliation consists of the expert committees and working parties at the EU level in which domestic government officials participate more or less regularly. Contemporary studies of administrative integration analyse whether government officials are affected subsequent to participating within different administrative structures. The current study focuses, however, also upon in the way civil servants are affected. I basically argue that the identities, roles and modes of acting evoked by civil servants partially reflect the way political-administrative institutions are formally organized. Hence, the following section provides a very brief conceptualization as regards the organizational build-up of these primary and secondary institutional affiliations. More energy, however, is devoted to conceptualizing the EU system of governance due to the fact that this system is less known and more difficult to classify. Anticipating the arguments addressed beneath, this article aims at conceptualizing the EU system of governance along the same constitutive lines as the domestic governmental apparatus. Whereas a huge body of literature pictures the EU system as a novel and partially ‘mysterious’ polity – not resembling anything seen before – I argue that the EU system resembles to a great extent the structures of the nation state bureaucracies. I thus reason against arguments stressing that “[t]he European Community is a political entity that does not fit into any accepted category of government” (Sbragia 1993, 24) (my emphasis). My argument does not ignore idiosyncrasies of the EU system, being multi-national, multi-linguistic and multi-level. The basic arguments laid out here does, however, stress the similarities of the EU polity and other polities, that is the nation state bureaucracy.

9

The primary institutional affiliation of domestic government officials consists of the domestic government apparatus. The officials are employed in particular ministries or particular agencies. One central empirical observation within contemporary studies of public administration is that role enactment, identifications and modes of behaviour evoked are somewhat different amongst civil servants at the ministry level than amongst civil servants at the agency level (Egeberg 1998). The general finding is that political considerations and contacts towards the political-administrative leadership are decreasing as we move down the formal hierarchy (Christensen and Egeberg 1997; Trondal 1999b). Similarly, professional considerations and contacts with interest organizations and businesses outside the government apparatus increase as we move down the formal hierarchy within ministries and agencies, and also as we move from the ministry level towards the agency level (Christensen and Egeberg 1997; Egeberg 1994). Correspondingly, the tendency to identify with the central governmental administration as a whole increases as we move up the formal hierarchy (Zuna 1998), and processes of cross-sectoral co-ordination increase correspondingly (Trondal 1999b).

Parallel to these findings, the likelihood of enacting the role as ‘government representatives’ when participating at the EU level is greater amongst government officials employed at the ministry level, and amongst officials in top rank positions. Conversely, the tendency of representing largely technical expertise and professional considerations is assumed to be greater amongst officials employed at the agency level, and amongst officials in bottom-rank positions. Correspondingly, tendencies towards identifying with the central governmental apparatus as a whole and conducting cross-sectoral co-ordination are assumed to be greater amongst the first category of officials than amongst the second category. Hence, the Foreign Ministry will be assigned greater importance in the co-ordination of domestic EU affairs amongst the first category of officials than amongst the second category.

Put more generally, the primary domestic institutional affiliation is assumed to affect the enactment of roles, identities and modes of behaviour more strongly than the secondary affiliation. Domestic government officials are full-timers within the domestic government apparatus, whilst they are part-timers within the EU system of governance. The secondary institutional affiliation of these government officials consists of the committees and working parties at the EU level in which they participate. The feeling of belongingness and allegiance to these committees is, however, assumed to be strengthened by the sheer length and intensity of participation within these committees. One important point underscored here, however, is also making explicit the content of this impact: The domestic officials are not only likely to be socialized and re-socialized within the EU committees and working parties, they also become socialized and re-socialized in a particular way. Hence, one mode of approaching this quagmire is to conceptualize the formal structure of the EU system of governance. Consequently, the next pages are devoted to conceptualizing the EU system of governance in general, and the EU committees and working parties in particular.

Generally, governance systems might be conceptualised along several lines – some of a pragmatic nature, some of a more basic nature. Luther Gulick (1937) outlines four basic principles of organization along which administrative systems might be classified: on the basis of purpose or sector, process, geography, and finally by clientele. The reason for Gulick’s preoccupation with these principles is the fundamental assumption related to formal structures as political instruments: Different principles of organization evoke different conflicts, identities, modes of behaviour, and role perceptions. Organizing according to the principle of purpose, sectoral considerations, identities, role perceptions and decision processes are processed and evoked, contributinging to sectoral differentiation and geographical integration. The opposite is assumed to be the case when organizing according to the principle of area (Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990). March & Olsen (1978) add a fifth principle to the four discussed by Gulick: the time dimension. Almost every organization and every decision process is organized in sequence, where different problems, solutions and actors are attended to at different phases. A sixth principle of organization is the principle of space or physical location (Egeberg 1994; March 1994), which, however, is somewhat equal to the principle of area. This list of principles is not complete, but is only meant to be suggestive.

I argue that the EU system of governance in general, and the web of committees and working parties in particular, are organized according to two basic principles of administrative life. Parallel to the sectoral and spatial institutional build-up of the domestic administrative apparatus (sector ministries and agencies versus the Foreign Ministry), the EU Commission, and the preparatory expert committees underlying it, exhibit sectoral and purposeful principles, while the Council of the European Union, and the web of working parties organized under it, exhibit spatial and area-based principles of organization (Egeberg & Trondal 1999). Moreover, several conflicting principles are often built into each organization structure: Within the EU Commission a geographical principle runs parallel with the sectoral principle, and within the Council the sectoral principle of organization is present at all levels of governance, supplementing the area principle. What is important, however, is that these additional, and partially contending, principles of organization are being interpreted, and biased by the uppermost principle of organization (Gulick 1937).

10

I argue that the uppermost principles of organization of the EU Commission and the Council are sector and area, respectively (Egeberg & Trondal 1999; Trondal 1999a). The overall rationale for being preoccupied with these principles is the idea that different principles tend to evoke different conflicts, identities, role conceptions and modes of co-ordination (Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990; March 1994). Due to the EU Commission and the Council comprising “a variety of contradictory organization logics” (Christiansen 1997, 87), identities, role conceptions and modes of co-ordination are assumed to be affected differently within these organizational settings. Government officials participating within these institutional bodies will be affected by the uppermost principles present. Hence, officials participating within Commission expert committees are likely to evoke intra-sectoral identifications, role conceptions and modes of co-ordination: He or she will conceive of him or herself as representatives of the sector and tend to co-ordinate within, rather than across, policy sectors. Government officials participating within Council working parties are more likely to evoke inter-sectoral and national identifications and feelings of belongingness towards the central administration as a whole. Furthermore, co-ordination processes are likely to be inter-sectoral of nature, ascribing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vital importance. Correspondingly, administrative integration is likely to be more strongly promoted as a result of government officials participating within expert committees than when they participate within Council working parties. Sectoral inter-penetration is assumed to be filtered and modified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a result of pressure for co-ordination fuelled by the Council working parties. Conversely, I argue that the gate-keeping function of the Foreign Ministry is being weakened as a result of sectoral dynamics of the Commission expert committees.

Consistent with organizational theory arguments, different organizational principles at the EU level of governance are likely to affect processes of administrative integration differently. The sectoral principle (present within the Commission) is likely to foster a strong mode of administrative integration. Conversely, the principle of area (present within the Council of Ministers) is likely to foster a weak mode of administrative integration.

The re-socializing potential of EU committees and working parties, however, is likely to be conditioned by the primary institutional affiliation of these officials. Domestic government officials are only ‘part-timers’ at the EU level of governance, and thus likely to be only partially re-socialized at this level (Egeberg 1998). Thus, officials employed at the agency level are more likely to evoke intra-sectoral roles, identities and modes of co-ordination than officials employed at the ministry level. The relative primacy of different identities, role conceptions and modes of acting is likely to reflect the formal organizational structures of the domestic government apparatus.

In addition, processes of administrative integration might be conditioned by the degree of compatibility in principle of organization between two (or more) levels of organizations (Trondal 1999a). By compatibility I mean that organizational borders are organized according to the same basic, constitutive principles, i.e. purpose, process, area, clientele, time and physical location. Thus, the degree of compatibility constitutes a mechanism for administrative integration (Coparaso, Cowles & Risse 1999). From social psychology we have learned that “[a]n event, a concept, an object, or a behavior that ‘fit’ a particular internal structure [is] more likely to be attended to and processed than one that did not” (Markus & Zajonc 1985, 143). Translated into organizational theory language, identities and role perceptions within different organizational settings are likely to co-evolve if these settings are organized according to the same basic principle (Højbjerg & Marcher 1995, 48). This means that the organization of attention is compatible across two (or more) organizations, implying that compatible identities, role perceptions and modes of behaviour are likely to be evoked in the two settings. Conversely, non-compatibility of principles of organization between organizatizational settings will counter processes of administrative integration. This situation will, on the contrary, lead to the development of distinct identities, roles and modes of behaviour, as a result of separate search processes. Stated as a general hypothesis: Domestic government officials tend to evoke identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct at the EU level which are compatible with the ones normally evoked domestically. Concequentially, government officials employed at the agency level are likely to be affected more strongly by the dynamics within the Commission expert committees than by dynamics within the Council working parties. The opposite is likely to be the case amongst government officials at the ministry level. Moreover, due to the integrating potential of the principle of sector, the potential for administrative integration is strongest amongst domestic civil servants at the agency level participating within Commission expert committees. The opposite is likely amongst domestic government officials at the ministry level participating within Council working parties.

The study of administrative integration across levels of governance poses several questions and explanatory variables. Among these are:

11

• What is the impact of participation within the expert committees under the EU Commission compared to participation within the Council working parties?
• What is the impact of the sheer length and intensity of participation within these committees?
• What is the impact of being employed at the ministry level versus the agency level when participating within committees and working parties at the EU level? Moreover, what is the impact of rank within the ministries and agencies when participating at the EU level?
• What is the impact of seniority within domestic ministries and agencies as to the potential for being re-socialized at the EU level of governance? The effect of seniority might be perceived of as having a direct effect on the dependent variables of this study. However, this effect might also be indirect – through the rank-variable: Rank and seniority are seen as positively related variables.

As revealed above, this analysis of administrative integration rests on arguments advanced by organizational theorists. We do not, however, rule out other dynamics as vital for understanding (i) decision processes at the EU level, and (ii) processes of administrative integration across levels of governance (Cram 1997; Olsen 1998). The purpose of this study is principally to shed light on some dynamics more than others. The basic dynamics are of an organizational nature, paying heed to the primary and secondary institutional affiliation of domestic government officials and to the degree of compatibility in principles of organization across levels of governance. Finally, administrative integration is assumed to be affected by the sheer intensity and length of cross-level participation.

VI. Conclusion

Whereas the study of public administration is dominated by closed system perspectives, in the sense that phenomena external to the nation state are treated as residual categories, the 1980’s and 1990’s have witnessed a turn towards greater emphasis attached to international political orders (March & Olsen 1998). When studying the interconnectedness of administrative systems – and in particular the integration of domestic administrative systems and the institutions of the European Union – at least two variables are important to address: (i) the intensity and frequency of cross-level interaction and participation amongst the members of these systems, and (ii) the principles of organization as uppermost at both levels of governance. I argue that studies of administrative integration should analyse how and why cross-level participation fosters changes in the identities, role conceptions and modes of acting amongst the participants of the two systems of governance. When trying to account for these processes, this article stresses the effects of primary and secondary institutional affiliations and the dynamics stemming from the degree of compatibility between the two. Processes of administrative integration are fuelled by a high degree of cross-level compatibility in organizational structures, and secondly by the sheer intensity and length of cross-level participation. I also argue that administrative systems organized according to the principle of purpose foster administrative integration more strongly than governance systems organized according to the principles of area. Henceforth, participating within working parties under the auspices of the Council of Ministers fosters administrative integration more weakly than does participation within expert committees under the auspices of the EU Commission. Administrative integration is also likely to be stronger amongst government officials employed at the agency level than amongst civil servants at the ministry level. These relationships are, however, likely to be conditioned by the degree of compatibility in principles of organization across levels of governance, and by the sheer intensity and length of ‘cross-level’ participation.

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Endnotes

(*) This study is financially supported by the ARENA program (The Norwegian Research Council), The University of Oslo. The current article is based on an ongoing empirical study. The major arguments addressed are, however, of theoretical nature only. No effort is devoted towards operationalizing the theoretical dimensions advocated. Neither are any primary empirical data provided here. Hence, this article resembles an interim research report. The author is indebted to Morten Egeberg and three anonymous referees for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.

(1) A corresponding total of 25 561 officials have permanent positions within the different Union bodies. Of this total, 17 946 officials are employed by the Commission (70%), while 2 225 officials work permanently within the Council structure (9%) (Fligstein & McNichol 1998, 73).

(2) Empirical studies show that officials participating in expert committees and in comitology committees have difficulties in telling these committees apart as regards their formal status (van Schendelen 1996). “This mixture of working group and comitology committee sometimes makes it very difficult for national civil servants to know when they have to act as representative of a Member State within a Comitology committee and when as an independent national expert” (Demmke 1998, 17). Excluding the comitology committees from the analysis, the likelihood of mixing these committees is reduced, although not completely excluding this possibility. Then, why concentrate the analysis on expert committees instead of the comitology committees? The overall reason for this is the institutional context in which the expert committees are embedded: The expert committees are institutionally affiliated more clearly towards the EU Commission, whereas the comitology committees have a more dual institutional affiliation between the EU Commission and the Council. The Council working parties, on the other hand, are institutionally affiliated solely towards the Council of the European Union. One argument against excluding the comitology committees from the study is the potential ‘importance’ of these committees due to the internal market legislation being implemented in the years to come. Against this argument, studies indicate that the relative ‘power’ of the comitology committees is limited within the legislative processes of the EU. The initial propositions from the EU Commission were altered and corrected in only 1 % of the cases between 1987 and 1996 (van der Knaap 1996, 103-104). If administrative and legal correction tells us something about the relative influence of different institutions, and if we leave out anticipated reaction from consideration, these numbers indicate a low degree of influence on the part of the comitology system in the EU-legislative process.

(3) The reflections addressed in this section are solely of a theoretical nature. The empirical observations applied are of a secondary nature.

(4) Parachutage implies horizontal recruitment of civil servants directly into top positions of the Commission services. David Spence (1997, 81) defines this phenomena as “the process whereby posts are filled by appointments from outside the regular career structure” of the Commission.

(5) Secondment implies in general the appointment of temporary officials into the Commission services, that is domestic officials being appointed for a maximum period of three years. On some occasions, these officials are parachutaged at a later stage (Cini 1996:120).

(6) This section provides some examples of assumed relationships between our independent and dependent variables. These examples are, however, solely of a theoretical nature, and do not refer to any primary empirical research. The following section, however, draws heavily upon secondary empirical material. References to this material are provided in the text.

(7) Formal organizational structures are perceived of as those codified and written expectations that relate to the role incumbents. These expectations regulate the relations “between problems (or solutions) and choice opportunities”, and the relationships “between decision makers and choice opportunities” (March & Olsen 1984, 746). More generally stated, these sets of formal expectations relate to who should do what when.