Table 1

The case sample

	1960s/1970s	1990s/2000s
1st level: Legitimization	International drug prohibition	International drug prohibition
2nd level: Methods	Diffusion of American drug enforcement techniques	Fight against criminal finance
3rd level: Authorization	First steps beyond ad hoc cooperation	Joint investigation teams

Table 2

Overall preference configurations

Sample	Relationship	Strength	Significance
All cases	scope o range	.291	.168
All cases	range o depth	.460	.024
All cases	scope o depth	.623	.001

Table 3

Preference configurations for France

Sample	Relationship	Strength	Significance
Only France	scope o range	-.682	.136
Only France	range o depth	.727	.101
Only France	scope o depth	-.909	.012

Table 4

Data

Time	Level	Country	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6	P7	I1	I2	I3
1960/1970s	Legitimization	France	1	2	4	4	1	0	2	0,75	0,63	0,25
1960/1970s	Legitimization	Germany	1	-2	0	4	1	1	2	-0,25	0,63	0,38
1960/1970s	Legitimization	Italy	1	-1	2	3	0	2	2	0,13	0,38	0,50
1960/1970s	Legitimization	UK	1	-4	0	4	1	-2	0	-0,50	0,63	-0,25
1990/2000s	Legitimization	France	1	4	0	3	1	2	2	0,50	0,50	0,50
1990/2000s	Legitimization	Germany	1	-1	-2	1,5	-0,5	2	0	-0,38	0,13	0,25
1990/2000s	Legitimization	Italy	1	3	2	4	2	2	2	0,63	0,75	0,5
1990/2000s	Legitimization	UK	1	0	0	2	0	2	0	0,00	0,25	0,25
1960/1970s	Methods	France	1	3	2	3	3	2	4	0,63	0,75	1,00
1960/1970s	Methods	Germany	1	4	2	3	2	-1	2	0,75	0,63	0,75
1960/1970s	Methods	Italy	1	3	2	3	3	-1	4	0,63	0,75	0,63
1960/1970s	Methods	UK	0	–	–	–	–	3	4	0,00	0,00	0,00
1990/2000s	Methods	France	1	4	4	3	3	2	4	1,00	0,75	0,75
1990/2000s	Methods	Germany	1	-1	2	3	3	-1	2	0,13	0,75	0,13
1990/2000s	Methods	Italy	1	3	4	2	2	-1	4	0,88	0,50	0,38
1990/2000s	Methods	UK	1	0	4	4	4	3	4	0,50	1,00	0,88
1960/1970s	Authorization	France	1	4	2	3	3	2	4	0,75	0,75	0,75
1960/1970s	Authorization	Germany	1	4	4	3	2	2	2	1,00	0,63	0,50
1960/1970s	Authorization	Italy	0	–	–	0	0	–	–	0,00	0,00	0,00
1960/1970s	Authorization	UK	0	–	–	0	0	–	–	0,00	0,00	0,00
1990/2000s	Authorization	France	1	4	0	2	1	2	2	0,50	0,38	0,50
1990/2000s	Authorization	Germany	1	4	0	2	1	3	4	0,50	0,38	0,88
1990/2000s	Authorization	Italy	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	0,13	0,38	0,13
1990/2000s	Authorization	UK	1	3	0	2	1	0	0	0,38	0,38	0,00

NOTE:
In the above Table, clicking on the red triangles on the top right of each cell in the columns for P1 to P7, will lead to pop-up window that gives you the necessary information about the criteria according to which we have allocated particular scores. For this to function properly, Javascript has to be enabled in your browser and popups need to be allowed for this site.
An ordered list of comments is also attached to the PDF version of this paper.

Table 5: Preference configurations by sub-samples

(Sub-)Sample	Relationship	Spearman's rho	Significance	n
All Cases	I1 o I2	.291	.168	24
All Cases	I2 o I3	.460	.024	24
All Cases	I1 o I3	.623	.001	24
Period 1970s	I1 o I2	.289	.363	12
Period 1970s	I2 o I3	.394	.205	12
Period 1970s	I1 o I3	.671	.017	12
Period 2000s	I1 o I2	.334	.288	12
Period 2000s	I2 o I3	.614	.034	12
Period 2000s	I1 o I3	.613	.034	12
Legitimization Level	I1 o I2	.417	.239	8
Legitimization Level	I2 o I3	.103	.808	8
Legitimization Level	I1 o I3	.691	.0.58	8
Methods Level	I1 o I2	-.130	.760	8
Methods Level	I2 o I3	.621	.100	8
Methods Level	I1 o I3	.447	.267	8
Authorization Level	I1 o I2	.582	.130	8
Authorization Level	I2 o I3	.650	.081	8
Authorization Level	I1 o I3	.601	.115	8
Without France	I1 o I2	.250	.317	18
Without France	I2 o I3	.294	.236	18
Without France	I1 o I3	.725	.001	18
Without Germany	I1 o I2	.285	.252	18
Without Germany	I2 o I3	.489	.040	18
Without Germany	I1 o I3	.588	.010	18
Without Italy	I1 o I2	.290	.243	18
Without Italy	I2 o I3	.598	.009	18
Without Italy	I1 o I3	.586	.011	18
Without UK	I1 o I2	.220	.381	18
Without UK	I2 o I3	.391	.108	18
Without UK	I1 o I3	.442	.066	18
Only France	I1 o I2	-.682	.136	6
Only France	I2 o I3	.727	.101	6
Only France	I1 o I3	-.909	.012	6
Only Germany	I1 o I2	.303	.559	6
Only Germany	I2 o I3	.313	.546	6
Only Germany	I1 o I3	.688	.131	6
Only Italy	I1 o I2	.059	.912	6
Only Italy	I2 o I3	0	1	6
Only Italy	I1 o I3	.678	.139	6
Only UK	I1 o I2	.401	.431	6
Only UK	I2 o I3	.309	.552	6
Only UK	I1 o I3	.567	.241	6

Note: Correlations that are significant at the 10% level are set in bold.

Figure 1

European integration a virtuous circle

Figure 2

European integration as a vicious circle

Figure 3

The virtuous circle according to our data analysis

Figure 4

Parameters and indices

P1: Does the country believe that the problem should be dealt with internationally?
[Yes = 1; undecidable = 0; no = -1].

I1: Preferences on substantive scope

P2: What is the substantive scope of the intended agreement?
[Sum of four topics with positive (=1), neutral (=0) or negative (=-1) preference]

P3: Is the intended agreement set to restrict or expand the substantive scope of an existing international regime?
[Strongly restrict = -4; restrict = -2; status quo = 0; expand = 2; strongly expand = 4]

I1= min[P1;0.125(P2+P3)]

I2: Preferences on geographical range

P4: What is the geographical range of the intended agreement?
[Case-by-case = 0; in-between = 1; EU = 2; in-between = 3; universal = 4]

P5: Is the intended agreement set to restrict or expand the geographical range of an existing international regime?
[-4; -3; -2; -1; 0; 1; 2; 3; 4] (Difference between status quo and intended regime)

I2 = min[P1;0.125(P4+P5)]

I3: Preferences on institutional depth

P6: What is the institutional depth of the intended agreement?
[Sum of four topics with positive (=1), neutral (=0) or negative (=-1) preference]

P7: Is the intended agreement set to restrict or expand the institutional depth of an existing international regime?
[Strongly restrict = -4; restrict = -2; status quo = 0; expand = 2; strongly expand = 4]

I3 = min[P1;0.125(P6+P7)]